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From observatory to dominion

geopolitics, colonial knowledge and the origins of the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, 1797-1822

From observatory to dominion: geopolitics, colonial knowledge and the origins of the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, 1797-1822

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Abstract

The thesis explores official information-gathering and colonial rule during the transition which led to the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, between 1797 and 1822. It studies more closely the official anxieties that played a crucial role in the protectorate's early development, placing these in the framework of British official concerns after the Napoleonic Wars related to retrenchment and security associated with a militarist ethos. Overwhelmingly, previous historiography on the islands has focused on the controversies which brought the end of the protectorate. It has also, to some extent, exaggerated the transformative characteristics of imperial rule. Unlike previous studies of British rule in the islands (*Anglokratia* in Greek) which focus on its end and the ultimate cession of the islands to Greece in 1864, this thesis focuses on the early period of British rule, analysing the origins of the protectorate in a Mediterranean, as well as an imperial, context. British officials were ambivalent about the place of the protectorate in the empire from its very beginning. Yet, despite the recurring political and economic crises going on in the islands during the period under study, the British were adamant on maintaining control over the islands. Taking the Ionian Islands as a case-study of early nineteenth century imperial rule, this thesis argues that the reasons for maintaining control over the islands were more directly related to the wartime origins of the protectorate than of what is often assumed in the historiography on the islands. Similarly, as in other parts of the empire, crucial aspects of the governance of the islands, such as the control of information and the compilation of statistics, consistently followed official mentalities of the period, which should not be conflated with the subsequent 'information revolution' of the 1830s. In order to illuminate this argument further, the thesis focuses on key themes including disease-control, information-collection and security imperatives. By re-examining the origins of the protectorate and its 'logic' of rule in the earlier period this thesis revises our understanding of the nature of British rule in the islands and offers for potential comparison with other wartime acquisitions.

Dedication

To Artemis Anastasaki, a very special person to me. This work is dedicated to her, for her great heart, love and wisdom. The thesis would be poor without the long journeys, the things that I learned, and the discussions I had with her.

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This thesis would never have happened without the backing and love of people closest to me: Artemis and my family, Kostas, Elsa, and Myrto. I want to thank them first. Also, the project would never come to fruition without the support of Saripoleion Foundation Athens in Greece. I am incredibly grateful to them for funding my project, despite the challenging times that came along during the economic crisis in my country.

My supervisors, Simon J. Potter and Richard Sheldon, have been incredibly helpful and patient from the earliest steps of this project. I am grateful to Simon for the fascinating discussions about the British Empire and history in general, as well as his guidance on research, teaching and particularly for the day-to-day practicalities of being an academic! I would also like to thank Richard for the thought-provoking discussions on history, politics, revolutionary movements, and, well, volcanoes. I have truly learned a lot from both of them during these last couple of years, and especially from their kindness and good sense of humour.

In Greece, discussions have been particularly interesting with professors since my early years as an undergraduate student, as well as with other scholars that I got to know more recently: Sakis Gekas, Panayiotis Kapetanakis, and Olga Katsiardi-Herring. Especially Gelina Harlaftis' comments on the early stages of the thesis have been very helpful. Such discussions have helped me balance the project between Greek and British histories and historical traditions. The workshop that was organized by the French Archeological Institute in Athens was truly a fascinating experience, where I had the chance to meet with many intelligent scholars. From them I would like to thank especially for the discussions and their friendship: Erik De Lange, for reading drafts of the thesis, as well as for the fascinating discussions we had on maritime security and piracy in the Mediterranean. Anna Sekulic, for aspects of Balkan and Ottoman history. Lucia Carminati, for discussions on empires and how to do research in general. This workshop really kept me going, in a particularly challenging and questioning phase for the project. On previous periods outside of my field, I would like to thank Reinard Gluzman for the very informative discussions, and journeys to the Venetian legacies (figuratively and literally).

Conversations with British academics have greatly enriched my understanding of British as well as of Greek history. From the beginning, I am grateful to Robert Holland for discussing with me the project and for reading earlier drafts of the thesis. His assistance and encouragement has been invaluable. At the same time, academic conversations evolved into friendships: I feel incredibly fortunate that I have met people like Khaleelah Jones, Fernando Padilla Angulo, Denise Vargiu, Maria Papathanasiou, Peter Evans and many others. A special thanks to Khaleelah, who, apart from honoring me with her friendship, has offered accommodation while staying in London for research and has given me very helpful comments on the thesis. I would also like to thank Joshua Wollens and Dan Booker for proofreading the thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank the personnel in the archives and libraries that I used for doing the research for the thesis: in the United Kingdom, I am indebted to the professionalism of the staff in the National Archives and the British Library in London, as well as for the incredible help of the staff in The University of Nottingham Archives, Manuscripts and Special Collections. In Greece, I have been benefitted tremendously by the help of archivists in the General State Archives in Athens and Corfu.

Author's Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

SIGNED: E.Z. DATE: 24/06/2018

Contents

Introduction

This thesis analyses the origins of the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, from the first official connection between Britain and the islands, until its cession from Britain to Greece and the early years of its development as a protectorate. The United States of the Ionian Islands, as the new protectorate was named, was a peculiar political and legal creation: nominally it was an independent state, but in reality it was governed like a colony. The historiography of the islands has traditionally focused on the period of the protectorate from the cession of the islands to Britain in 1815, until its end and the transfer of the islands to Greece in 1864, as a single coherent period.[1] The chronological frame of this study reflects a different approach: unlike the existing literature on the islands that deals with the period as a whole, this thesis focuses on the earlier years, and places them in a comparative perspective by relating them to the wider background of early-nineteenth century empire, and in particular to developments in the Mediterranean region.

The first aim of the thesis, then, is to draw out continuities and changes in British involvement in the region during the period following the Napoleonic Wars and the French Revolution. In regards to the origins of the protectorate, traditional accounts focus their analysis on the beginning of the protectorate in 1815, drawing their attention to the diplomatic negotiations that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars.[2] In fact, British military commitments started to increase in the eastern Mediterranean much earlier, in terms of military aid and information-collection, and began to penetrate Ionian politics well before 1815. Instead of considering the formal cession of the islands as a starting point, this thesis considers it more as a new phase in Britain's connection with the islands and the wider region. It argues that, contrary to traditional accounts of the history of the islands, the creation of the

[1] Sakis Gekas, *Xenocracy. State, Class and Colonialism in the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864* (New York, 2017); Maria Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities: The Ionian Islands in British Official Discourses; 1815-1864' (unpublished PhD thesis, University College London, 2009); Thomas W. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion: Culture, Identity and Power in the British Mediterranean* (Indiana, 2002); Eleni Calligas, "'The Rizospastai' (Radicals-Unionists): Politics and Nationalism in the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, 1815-1864", (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London 1994); Tumelty, J.J., 'The Ionian Islands under British Administration, 1815-1864' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1953).

[2] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities'; Calligas, 'The Rizospastai'; Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands'.

protectorate in 1815 was not merely a diplomatic gambit that came out of the post-Napoleonic settlement, but more the outcome of previous British engagement in the region, which had resulted in the cultivation of significant information networks. The origins of the protectorate also reflected Britain's broader imperial concerns regarding counter-revolutionary movements, security, financial expenditure, and metropolitan interference in the conduct of colonial governors.

The second aim of the thesis is to examine the consolidation of imperial rule during the first years of the protectorate, and particularly how British officials employed new forms of knowledge in the establishment of colonial governance. Here, the thesis will reveal the level of involvement of local actors and 'native informants' in the transition from an unofficial British connection to the consolidation of British rule. Studies of how information networks were formed into power structures as part of the transition into colonial rule have been central to this thesis.[3] Furthermore, this study is concerned with the ways that British officials used information and particularly how they employed 'modern' ways of collecting and organizing information in the Ionian Islands. This included the increasing use of statistics and the establishment of a professional state bureaucracy in the islands. The period between the Napoleonic Wars and the information revolution of the 1830s in Britain was particularly formative in the change of mentalities and approaches to governance. The thesis engages with relevant works on imperial as well as on British history, examining the use of information by the modern state.[4] Studying the Ionian case in concert with developments in Britain reveals the chronologically parallel processes which took place in both locations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Until recently, historiography on the Ionian Islands has shown little interest in these processes, instead paying exclusive attention to issues of cultural representation and race as the organizing principles of British rule in the islands.[5]

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[3] C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information. Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 [1996]).

[4] Joanna Innes, *Inferior Politics. Social Problems and Social Policies in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Oxford, 2009); Zoe Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections, 1815-1845. Patronage, the information Revolution and Colonial Government* (Manchester, 2005); David Eastwood, 'Amplifying the Province of the Legislature': the Flow of Information and the English State in the Early Nineteenth Century', *Historical Research*, 62: 149 (October, 1989), pp. 276-294.

[5] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities'; Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion.*

As mentioned above, there has been a general trend in recent literature (influenced by Foucauldian notions of 'colonial governmentality') towards identifying the characteristics of the logic of colonial rule in the islands beyond cultural representations and stereotypes.[6] In this work, practices of governance through the employment of statistics, public works and the classification of Ionian society into economic divisions have been interpreted as elements of a liberal project to 'improve' and transform Ionian society, which were also generated from within Ionian society itself. While the thesis builds upon such work, it questions the coherence of such modernizing projects at the beginning of the protectorate. British rule certainly claimed to be an improvement on the islands' Venetian past, but it also built on some 'traditional' aspects, and did not break entirely with earlier approaches to colonial governance.

The Ionian Islands are a group of seven main and a little more than twenty smaller islands in the Ionian Sea, located between Greece and Italy. The principal islands are Corfu (Kerkyra), Zante (Zakynthos), Santa Maura (Lefkada), Paxi, Cephalonia and Ithaca (Ithaki), and, as an administrative paradox, Cerigo (Kythira). This particular island, which now belongs to the modern region of Attica, is located to the south of the Peloponnese, southern Greece. In Greek they are known as 'Heptanesa' (Seven Islands). Today the islands are popular tourist destinations and sustain a population of about 200,000; they are also famous in Greece for the legacies of Venetian, French and British cultural influences, such as ginger beer and the occasional game of cricket in Corfu.

In terms of architecture, the islands are heterogeneous and reflect the diverse history of the region. Corfu town is distinctively Italian, mixed with neoclassicism and typical Modern Greek architecture, while Zante was rebuilt after the earthquakes that practically levelled the buildings of the island with many casualties in 1953. In terms of geography and strategy, the valuable location of the islands at the entrance of the Adriatic and at close proximity to the mainland explains why they changed rulers all too often. Historically, the islands were

[6] Gekas, *Xenocracy.* Also on governmentality: Simon Gunn, 'From Hegemony to Governmentality: Changing Conceptions of Power in Social History', *Journal of Social History*, 39:3 [Special Issue on the Future of Social History] (Spring, 2006), pp. 705-720; Peter Pels, 'The Anthropology of Colonialism: Culture, History, and the Emergence of Western Governmentality', *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 26 (1997), pp. 163-183; David Scott, 'Colonial Governmentality', *Social Text,* 43 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 191-220.

incorporated into the Venetian Republic after the fourth crusade (1204), and remained part of its dominions in the eastern Mediterranean for roughly 400 years until French revolutionary troops marched into Venice in 1797 and brought the republic to an end. After that, the islands changed rulers four times within fifteen years. The islands passed through, successively, Venetian (roughly between 12th and 17th centuries-1797), French (1797-1798), Russian-Ottoman (1798-1807), and French again (1807-1814), before finally being occupied by British forces during the Napoleonic wars.

Character and scope of the project

Studying and researching the origins of British rule in the Ionian Islands has been an interesting as well as a daunting experience. Political and constitutional changes, as well as the administrative chaos that often followed during the period under study, make the history of the islands a particularly challenging prospect: between 1797 and 1815 the islands had four different rulers, and each one of them applied their own respective systems in administration. State officials in the Ionian Islands used Italian, French, Greek and English, while the majority of official correspondence, preserved in Britain, is in English. This includes correspondence between British officials and the Ionian authorities, as well as Ionian newspapers (most notably the *Ionian Gazette*) and the annual statistical returns of the *Colonial Office Blue Books of Statistics*.[7] Even more dispersed and fragmented are the archives consisting of the proceedings of Ionian political bodies like the Senate, which are kept in Corfu.

Spread across each one of the Ionian Islands, archives have suffered from natural catastrophes such as the earthquake of 1953 which practically flattened almost all buildings in the islands of Zakynthos and Cephalonia, including the archives. Moreover, the archives in Corfu took extensive damage during the Second World War. Today, archival research in Corfu suffers from a long-term lack of funds, especially since Greece was hit by the recent crisis.

[7] For the period under study, the reference in the Blue Books of Statistics is in The National Archives (henceforth TNA), Colonial Office records (henceforth CO) 136/1391.

Problems in the classification of archives in Corfu persist, particularly in terms of continuity. But even before the twentieth century, since the union with Greece in 1864, archives of the period of British rule were saved by the persistent work of individuals who preserved them without external funding. For example, from 1884 the Corfiote Markos Theotokis spent 28 years cataloguing the archives of the Ionian Senate, which had contained all the proceedings of the executive body of the state during British rule. The challenge of cataloguing the huge archive produced under the Venetians is still ongoing.[8] Despite the problems that researchers have to contend with when dealing with the history of the islands, Ionian historiography – by 'Ionian historiography' is meant all the historical works that have been written about the islands – has been a vibrant field in historical writing, even though it often lacks a broader context.

Most historical works on *Anglokratia* focused on the reasons that brought the end of the protectorate and the union with Greece in 1864, debating the inherent political and economic controversies of British rule in the islands.[9] The reasons given for the collapse of the Ionian State vary, from constitutional deadlock[10] to extraordinary levels of debt (at the time exceeding £200,000). Gekas, for example mentions four reasons: first, the indebtedness of the peasants (a chronic problem which was never entirely solved), state bankruptcy (with a debt reaching 150 per cent of the state's annual revenues), the lack of public works in the later years which led to wide dissatisfaction amongst the population, and the emergence of a class of liberal Ionians who started putting pressure on the British administration for Union with Greece, especially after 1840s.[11] However, a recurring tendency in Ionian historiography is the fact that many historians have viewed the end of the protectorate as a foregone conclusion, which was supposedly looming from the beginning. As a result, the earlier period of British rule

[8] Information taken from the site of General State Archives Corfu (GAK Kerkyras), in Greek: http://gak.ker.sch.gr/Hist/istor-01f_1864ke.htm

[9] On the end of British protectorate see for example the discussion in: Robert Holland and Diana Markides, *The British and the Hellenes. Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1850-1960* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 46-80 or Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 325-337; Bruce Knox, 'British policy and the Ionian Islands, 1847-1864: nationalism and imperial administration', *English Historical Review*, 99: 392 (July 1984), pp. 503-529; C.C. Eldridge, 'The Myth of Mid-Victorian "Separatism"; the Cession of the Bay Islands and the Ionian Islands in the Early 1860s', *Victorian Studies*, xii (1969), pp. 331-346; Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands', pp. 324-362.

[10] Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands', pp. 249-286.

[11] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 327; also, Calligas, 'The Rizospastai'.

is often seen as a mere prelude to the political and constitutional crisis starting in the 1840s, which brought the final end of the protectorate in 1864.

The protectorate was a peculiar legal creation, but at the same time presented similarities with broader developments in the empire which are often neglected in relevant historiography, or entirely left out. The period under study was the interval between the seismic shifts of British expansion taking place in India and the later development of free trade throughout the British Empire. This was a period of transition between the collapse of old structures and the establishment of new ones, which too remains relatively uncharted in imperial historiography.[12] Instead of approaching the period 1797 – 1815 as a prelude, this thesis read the period on its own terms. It argues that in the post-Napoleonic era there were imperatives and unresolved issues coming from wartime and diplomatic settlements that persisted during early British administrations in the islands. Moreover, British officials shared similar concerns in the islands as those in other wartime acquisitions elsewhere in the empire after 1815: retrenchment, fear of revolutionary movements, security imperatives or controlling sea lanes and ensuring maritime rights. The thesis builds on relevant works on the post-Napoleonic period, particularly in British history.[13]

Unlike historical works that study the consequences of World Wars of the twentieth century for example, the worldwide impact of the Napoleonic Wars has received far less interest, despite its length and scale. This thesis argues, that this is not only due to a lack of interest, but also due to a wide assumption that the period after 1815 was much more linear than it actually was. There have been works particularly in British history which challenge this view.[14]

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[12] C.A. Bayly, 'The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760-1830', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 26:2 (1998), pp. 28-47 and *Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the world, 1780-1830* (London: Longman group, 1989).

[13] Boyd Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People? England 1783-1846* (Oxford, 2006); David Eastwood, 'The age of uncertainty: Britain in the early-nineteenth century,' *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 8 (1998), pp. 91-115; John D. Post, 'A Study in Meterological and Trade Cycle History: The Economic Crisis Following the Napoleonic Wars', *The Journal of Economic History,* 34:2 (June 1974), pp. 315-349.

[14] Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People*; Eastwood, 'The age of uncertainty'; John D. Post, 'A Study in Meterological and Trade Cycle History: The Economic Crisis Following the Napoleonic Wars', *The Journal of Economic History,* 34:2 (June 1974), pp. 315-349.

The period after 1815 is often read as Britain's ascendancy to global hegemony. The tendency of 'post-Waterloo euphoria' is also followed in relevant works on the Ionian Islands.[15] Yet, such views on the early nineteenth century and especially before the 'Age of Reform' have been under criticism, including of course social and economic processes taking place in Britain at the time.[16] In fact, uncertainty and insecurity were more common in imperial thinking than triumphant notions of Britain's place. Particularly amongst diplomats and statesmen, fears about the revival of the French revolution, for example, sparked extended cooperation between European authorities to monitor revolutionary movements; what is defined rather provocatively as 'Age of Imperial Revolutions'.[17] Triumph was also less the sense amongst contemporary British officials, whose generation had seen the loss of the American colonies, the seismic shifts of imperial expansion in India, in what has perceived to be also by contemporaries, as still a 'remarkably underinstitutionalized world'.[18]

Three central arguments are advanced in this thesis. First, by focusing on the early period of British rule on its own terms, the thesis pays greater attention to the immediate impact of the Napoleonic Wars on imperial rule and how formative were security concerns and a militarist ethos which insisted in colonial governance. Building upon other works on imperial rule in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the thesis reads the period in its own terms, both in an imperial and a Mediterranean context. In this sense, contemporary official concerns such as anxieties over Russia's conduct and the impact of war can be analysed in greater detail, compared with studies in Ionian historiography which focus on the whole period of British rule (1815-1864). Fundamentally, official anxieties about the renewal of a military conflict in the region show how closely connected were strategy and governance in shaping British administration in the islands. This was particularly the case during the Greek Revolution of 1821.

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[15] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 74-76; The quote is in Calligas, "'The Rizospastai', p. 22.
[16] Eastwood, 'The age of uncertainty, pp. 91-115.
[17] Jeremy Adelman, 'An Age of Imperial revolutions', *The American Historical Review,* 113:2 (April, 2008), pp. 319-340.
[18] John McAleer and Christer Petley (eds.) *The Royal Navy and the British Atlantic World, c. 1750-1820* (London, 2016), p. 3; Quote from Trevor Burnard, 'The British Atlantic' in Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan (eds.), *Atlantic History. A Critical Appraisal* (Oxford, 2009), p. 127.

Second, influenced by theories of governmentality, there has been an increasing attention in Ionian historiography focusing on studying the consistent efforts of British officials to organize Ionian society into categories of rule by integrating new forms of knowledge in governance. Drawing on 'colonial governmentality' literature, such work has rightly suggested that British officials placed greater emphasis on political economy, statistical information and legal culture than previous administrations in the islands. On the other hand, this literature assumes that the development of colonial governance was a much more systematic and coherent process than it actually was. Such an emphasis on systematic or institutional forms of power may describe the period after the 1820s more accurately, but this certainly is not the case for the earlier period. Even though there was a tendency to gather and classify information, which increased dramatically across the empire after metropolitan pressures multiplied in the 1820s, in the earlier period the collection and organization of information about the islanders was essentially the product of political and social interaction between British and Ionians, and depended on individual governors gathering 'affective' knowledge through their direct involvement.

To a large degree, Ionian historiography has traditionally highlighted the peculiar character of the protectorate as a 'half-colony'.[19] However, imperial presence in the islands was part of a greater imperial project, and the islands were integrated in multiple ways even since wartime with other parts of the empire. This thesis builds upon relevant works on imperial networks.[20] Emphasizing connectivity, the third point argues about the importance of networks

[19] Works of British rule in the Ionian Islands during the period under study such as Bayly, *Imperial Meridian* or Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities' have focused on power dynamics between the British and the Ionians, discussing tendencies on colonial governance and how similar these were with elsewhere in the empire inn early-nineteenth century, like Malta, Ireland, or the Cape (Bayly, *Imperial Meridian,* pp. 194-200; Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 76-79. Only Gekas' recent work has drawn analogies and comparisons with colonies elsewhere in the empire (*Xenocracy*).

[20] The works listed here are selective: John McAleer, ''A young slip of botany': botanical networks, the South Atlantic, and Britain's maritime worlds, c. 1790-1810', *Journal of Global History*, 11:1 (March 2016), pp. 24-43; Bell, David A., 'This Is What Happens When Historians Overuse the Idea of the Network', *New Republic,* October 26, 2013, Online version: https://newrepublic.com/article/114709/world-connecting-reviewed-historians-overuse-network-metaphor; Simon J. Potter, 'Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and the Mass Media in the Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century British Empire', *Journal of British Studies*, 4 (2007), pp. 621-46; David Lambert and Alan Lester (eds.), *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire* (Cambridge, 2006); Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections*; Wendy Jepson, 'Of Soil, Situation, and Salubrity: Medical Topography and Medical Officers in Early Nineteenth-Century British India',

and discourses in cementing the protectorate in the empire, and especially in terms of gathering and processing various information from the islands in regards to customs, climates, populations etc. Such examples were medical officials who used imperial networks out of a genuine scientific interest in disease, as well as for career advancement. These professionals did not necessarily work directly for imperial ends, but nevertheless created networks which effectively cemented imperial connections and culture, often by displacing local knowledges and superstitions in favour of scientific reasoning and a belief in 'objective' statistical knowledge, as seen in medical debates taking place in the metropole at the time. To illuminate this point further, the thesis discusses the case of a plague that broke out in Corfu in 1815.

Statistical forms of knowledge in governance and Ionian 'governmentality': from Venice to Britain

Recent literature in imperial history has been particularly influenced by the concept of 'colonial governmentality', examining the employment of bureaucratic systems and scientific methods (such as statistics) in colonial governance by Europeans.[21] Historical writing has challenged the assumption that centralized and quantitative information was a product of modernity.[22] Imperial historians have also explored the intersections between pre-colonial and colonial forms of knowledge in systems of information, like in India, or communication systems across the empire, particularly in South Asia.[23] Of course, the practice of accumulating quantitative knowledge was not exclusive to colonialism or the modern age; it has existed for as long as there have been states. If we want to go further back, practices of manorial record-

Historical Geography, 32 (2004), pp. 137-155; Alan Lester, *Imperial Networks. Creating identities in nineteenth-century South Africa and Britain* (London, 2001).

[21] S. Gunn, 'From Hegemony to Governmentality'; Pels, 'The Anthropology of Colonialism'; D. Scott, 'Colonial Governmentality'; Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago, 1991).

[22] Edward Higgs, 'The Rise of the Information State: the Development of Central State Surveillance of the Citizen in England, 1500-2000', *Journal of Historical Sociology,* 14:2, June 2001, pp. 176-178.

[23] Tony Ballantyne, 'Colonial Knowledge' in Sarah Stockwell (ed.), *The British Empire. Themes and Perspectives* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 177-197; Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton, 1996), especially Nicholas Dirks, 'Foreword'; Bayly, *Empire and Information, passim.*

keeping and surveying were a governing strategy since medieval times.[24] Instead, we need to examine the particular ways in which quantitative knowledge was deployed in colonial contexts, which varies from place to place and over time. The aim of this section is two-fold: firstly, it will provide a historical background for the official use of information in the period before the protectorate. Secondly, it shall explain that, to a significant extent, processes of official information-gathering in Britain and in the islands were parallel and culturally very similar: 'governmentality' was not necessarily 'colonial' in nature.[25] Above all, this section emphasizes an overarching theme throughout this thesis: despite the assumptions about a supposed all-pervasive state, in the period under study British official knowledge of the Ionian Islands – either in terms of population or political information – was not only incomplete, but was also controversial.

Although the direct comparison of Venetian, French and British governing practices is not the subject of this thesis, it would be useful to take into account just how similar they actually were. The case of the Ionian Islands contributes to such relevant discussions on transitions in imperial historiography more broadly. To start with, British officials collected information based on institutions and practices inherited from previous rulers and employed the local population of the Ionian Islands.

There have been plenty of studies on the value that Venice put in systematized information systems, from demography to political information and espionage.[26] As for statistics, Venetian administration had long employed numerical knowledge along with a sophisticated print culture.[27] According to Frederick Lane, 'the Venetian government was the first to take statistics seriously', with the earliest fragments of census records dating to 1509.[28]

[24] Paul Griffiths, 'Surveying the People' in Keith Wrightson (ed.), *A Social History of England, 1500-1750* (Cambridge, 2017), p. 39.
[25] Gekas, *Xenocracy, passim.*
[26] Ioanna Iordanou, 'What News on the Rialto? The Trade of Information and Early Modern Venice's Centralized Intelligence Organization', *Intelligence and National Security*, 31:3 (2016); Filippo de Vivo, *Information and Communication in Venice. Rethinking Early Modern Politics* (Oxford, 2007) Eftychia Kosmatou, 'Plithismiaka megethi ke geografiki kinitikotita sta Eptanisa (18os – 19os aionas)' in ['Population and geographical mobility in the Heptanese, 18th – 19th centuries'], *Proceedings of 7th Panionio Synedrio, Lefkada 26-30 May 2002* (Athens, 2004).
[27] Peter Burke, *A Social History of Knowledge. From Gutenberg to Diderot* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 22-23.
[28] Frederick C. Lane, *Venice, A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore, 1973), p. 19.

For example, in the Ionian Islands during Venetian rule 'cadastral sources' had been compiled since the fourteenth century (the exact date varying by island, as not all islands passed under Venetian authority at the same time), seeking to quantify the islands' military capacity, revenues, population movement, land, climate, and customs. Censuses described broader changes in population and were not detailed, at least compared to the nineteenth century versions. While the Venetian administration accumulated information for surveys or surveillance, Gekas wrote, 'no Venetian *Proveditore* [the Venetian governor who managed criminal and civil affairs] used these sources to achieve the sophisticated level of nineteenth-century colonial governance, to use a population as a resource for economic development at an empire-level'.[29] But even more than numerical knowledge, Venice relied on state surveillance and a very sophisticated system of gathering and diffusing information: secrecy and a system of bureaucracy, diplomacy and intelligence-collection ensured Venice's maritime supremacy until the eighteenth century.[30]

The Venetians possessed a pioneering postal system ('*Compagnia dei Corrieri*') and a 'deeply-rooted international business network of merchants, brokers and agents'.[31] Venice had also become an urban centre of diffusing information.[32] The Venetians had developed sophisticated systems of information, particularly in terms of disease-control and medical practice. Directly addressing their patients in their private sphere, private physicians, for example, played a crucial role in monitoring as long as treating the population, and many of them were working closely with the state.[33] We will return to this in the next chapter. Our knowledge of Venetian systems of information in the islands, however, is by no means complete, partially due to the incomplete nature of the archives. For the period when central

[29] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, chapter 4, especially p. 103.
[30] Iordanou, 'What News on the Rialto?', p. 308.
[31] Iordanou, 'What News on the Rialto?, p. 311. Also, on the Venetian postal system see: Eric R. Dursteller, 'Power and Information: The Venetian Postal System in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean, 1573-1645', in *From Florence to the Mediterranean: Studies in Honor of Anthony Molho* (Florence, 2009), pp. 601-623. I would like to thank Reinard Gluzman for suggesting me this article.
[32] De Vivo, *Information and Communication,* pp. 200-269; Peter Burke, 'Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and Communication' in J. Martin and D. Romano (eds.), *Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797* (Baltimore, 2002), pp. 389-419.
[33] On the relation between medical marketplace and official informants in Venice, see for example De Vivo, *Information and Communication*, pp. 102, 103, 105.

administration withdrew and the Venetian Republic was in full decline the evidence is even more scant. Yet, at the same time, the period after the collapse of the Republic in 1797 was also formative for the islanders, as well as for different mentalities in governance.

As mentioned previously, the islanders experienced an extended period of political and social turmoil over the course of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, rife with armed conflict between aristocratic factions. By the end of the eighteenth century, Ionian middle and upper classes – also partly due to extensive cultural and intellectual links with their counterparts in Europe – shared similar mentalities in governance with western Europe, especially Italian cities and France. A particularly knowledge-rich society was emerging in the urban centres, giving shape to what recent work on the islands has characterized as 'Ionian governmentality'.[34] These changes were parallel to the emergence of a public sphere and class consciousness, particularly amongst the middle-classes who provided the new administration with public servants.[35] In 1808 for example, under the French administration, Ionian intellectuals founded the Ionian Academy where medicine and other subjects were taught. The Ionian Academy commissioned the first 'statistical' register of Corfu during the French administration to measure its population. This book, titled *Statistikai – Istorikai peri Kerkyras Eidiseis* (Statistical – Historical News from Corfu) was published in 1822 and the author was Stylianos Vlassopoulos.[36] The Academy, which had quickly enhanced strong intellectual networks between the islands and France, was subsequently abolished by the British governor James Campbell.

During the British administration, works that built on earlier Venetian practices of data collection included a 'statistical historical' account of Zante published in 1811 by P. Mercati (*Saggio Storico Statistico della Citta et Isola di Zante*).[37] Dividing the population into three classes (the nobili, cittadini and plebeii) between the town and the country, Mercati's work

[34] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 29-36.
[35] Nikos Karapidakis, 'Apo ton koinotismo stin politiki: koinoniologia ton dianooumenon kai ton anthropon tis politikis drasis ston eptanisiako choro (teli tou 18ou aiona arches tou 19ou) in Aliki Nikiforou (ed.), *Eptanisos Politeia (1800-1807): ta meizona zitimata* (Corfu, 2001), pp. 33-41.
[36] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, p. 104.
[37] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 104-105.

drew together valuable information relating to the exact occupations and trades in the countryside and the towns, as well as information on age and sex, and details of the island's Jewish community. John Davy, a British medical official who served in the Ionian Islands, incorporated Mercati's work in his own acknowledging the latter's 'valuable' work.[38] As is mentioned above, the employment of statistical methods in governance was parallel to a broader social and political process in the islands, and the emergence of a 'commercial bourgeoisie' characterized by its involvement in global trade, cultural transfers with Europe and an aspiration towards reforming legislature and establishing public education.[39] Although not yet self-defined as a cultural and social formation, there were already popular demands from many Ionians to be 'modernized' by the British. This interest in statistical information shown in the Ionian society and administration during wartime had parallels to Western Europe, especially in France and Britain.

In Britain, statistics were considered to be the means by which the lives of ordinary people could be improved, in terms of effective agricultural methods, for instance. As one contemporary put it, 'statistics is a term lately invented, to convey an idea of that department of science, which has been defined "the knowledge of the present state of a country, with a view to its future improvement".[40] Statistical accounts were compiled earlier – like for example Sir John Sinclair's 21-volume *Statistical Account of Scotland* (1793) – but the first census by Act of Parliament was conducted in 1801 directed by John Rickman.[41]

When looking at the use of data and social enquiry in the early-nineteenth century, works on British history have been particularly useful to this study. For example, Joanna Innes distinguishes 'power' from 'happiness' as two broadly defined, but also interconnected, lines of enquiry when conducting administrative enquiries in Britain. On the one hand, political

[38] John Davy, *Notes and Observations on the Ionian Islands and Malta with some remarks on Constantinople and Turkey* (London, 1841), pp. 32-35. Unfortunately, due to my lack of knowledge, I was unable to consult the original work by Paolo Mercati which is in Italian.
[39] Sakis Gekas, 'The commercial bourgeoisie of the Ionian Islands under British rule, 1830-1864: class formation in a semi-colonial society' (unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Essex, 2004).
[40] William Shaw Mason, *A Statistical Account of Parochial Survey of Ireland, drawn up from the communications of the Clergy* (Dublin, 1814), p. vii.
[41] Kathrin Levitan, *A Cultural History of the British Census. Envisioning the Multitude in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 2011).

arithmeticians were concerned with power and the wealth of the state, 'conceived as deriving, in significant part, from the size and wealth of the social aggregate on which it rested. Men of this generation talked a good deal about "happiness" … happiness being conceived as 'membership in a powerful social body'.[42] 'Alongside the statistics of power', Innes continues, 'there meanwhile developed a second line of enquiry. This was not aggregative but disaggregate. It focused on local and social difference, on the health and prosperity of communities and members of different social groups—in general, on the distribution of happiness and pain across the social body'.[43] By 'happiness' Innes states that she follows the definition by Sinclair from his *Statistical Account* who illuminates the 'quantum of happiness' for example arising from the 'availability of education'.[44] Such observations coming from British historiography can be useful also in imperial history, this study argues, as similar mentalities can be traced also in the context of British administration in the Ionian Islands; most characteristically, a shift in official attitudes throughout the nineteenth century, from addressing the membership of a powerful body to addressing a whole 'population' and compiling statistics for its improvement.

As for the population itself, despite the censuses taken through the years by Venetians, French, or Ionian officials, there was no consensus amongst contemporaries on the exact number of the population of the islands at the beginning of *Anglokratia*: despite writing as late as 1841, Davy's mentions of censuses in the islands were few and far between.[45] John Hennen, another medical official, wrote about Corfu in 1830: 'There are great diversities of opinion as to the present population of Corfu, both in the city and the more remote villages'.[46] Moreover, as we will see later, British and Ionian state officials met with significant resistances in disclosing information, especially in rural areas. Above all, official initiatives for gathering information involved class antagonisms and cultural tensions, even when British and Ionian officials sought

[42] Innes, *Inferior Politics,* p. 111.
[43] Innes, *Inferior Politics*, p. 112.
[44] Innes, *Inferior Politics*, p. 112; John Sinclair, *Specimens of Statistical Reports: Exhibiting the Progress of Political Society, from the Pastoral State, to that of Luxury and Refinement* (London, 1793).
[45] Davy, *Notes and Observations,* pp. 158, 212.
[46] John Hennen, *Sketches of the Medical Topography of the Mediterranean: comprising an account of Gibraltar, the Ionian Islands, and Malta; to which is prefixed, A Sketch of a Plan For Memoirs on Medical Topography* (London, 1830), pp. 175-176.

to collect information on population or land: this thesis examines such cases, for example in the plague in Corfu in 1815, or the peasant rebellion in Santa Maura in 1819.

Class antagonisms and Ionian society: main issues in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century

By the time of British occupation in 1809, the feudal system of the Ionian Islands survived with small changes since Venetian times, involving rigid social stratification.[47] In terms of the economy, the Venetians encouraged local monoculture instead of self-sufficiency.[48] But the differences were also cultural as well as local. Nobles from Corfu, for example, mostly spoke Italian. A traveller at the time mentioned that a stranger would have difficulty in believing them to be Greeks.[49] Although with significant variations from island to island, the relationship between the cultivator and the landowner were similar to serfdom in western and central Europe. There is evidence of peasants being tied to the soil while in many cases the nobles had exclusive jurisdiction over their tenants.[50] In terms of the status of property, colonial officials and travellers of the time found the islands to resemble a 'veritable jungle'.[51] The rigid social

[47] Calligas, 'The Rizospastai,' p. 21; David Hannell, 'The Ionian Islands under the British Protectorate: Social and Economic Problems,' *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, vol. 7 (1, May 1989), p. 108.
[48] Calligas, 'The Rizospastai', p. 15.
[49] Davy, *Notes and Observations,* p. 128.
[50] George Yannoulopoulos, 'State and Society in the Ionian Islands, 1800-1830' in Richard Clogg (ed.), *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence* (New Jersey, 1981), pp. 43, 44. Generally any relevant study of the feudal structures of the Ionian society during Venetian rule today can be extremely complicated. As far as this study is concerned, there has been only one quantitative study on the relations between peasants and landlords during Venetian rule, and this had been conducted in 1914: Andreades, Andreas M., *Peri tis Oikonomikis Dioikiseos tis Eptanisou epi Venetokratias* (Athens, 1914) *[Regarding the Economic Administration of the Seven Islands during Venetian Rule].* The same is true for the period of British rule at a smaller extent, mainly because of the sheer bulk of the available material kept in different local archives spread in the Ionian Islands.
[51] Yannoulopoulos, 'State and Society,' p. 4. Unfortunately the same is true for the primary material kept in local archives in the Ionian Islands: In 06.05.2014 when I travelled to the Greek General State Archives section in Corfu, the relevant files on economic administration were not even on catalogues and therefore I could not access them. The boxes included decisions of the Ionian Senate filed as 'Economic Administration, 1780-1866'. The absence of a consistent and systematic attempt to utilize the available material in local archives and the difficulty in quantitative research mentioned by Yannoulopoulos is still evident today, p. 44. There is, however, the Blue book of statistics kept in the National Archives for the period 1821-1827 with various printed statistical information on revenues (CO 136/1391).

stratification was all too clear in the friction caused by class antagonisms.[52] Class antagonisms amongst the islanders played a crucial role in the relationship between central administration and Ionian society, as well as to the British understandings of Ionians.

In 1610 the wealthy and upper classes were prohibited by the Venetian authorities from engaging in trade. In 1641 another Venetian law forbade them from voting in the council of nobles unless they owned a house within the city.[53] Therefore, the nobles – called signori – took up residence in the towns, further increasing the gap between them and the lower orders who were living in the countryside. There were also differences between the middle and the upper classes of the Ionian Islands, which started to diminish, however, during the last phase of Venetian rule in the islands. Yet, until 1849 the franchise for the Ionian legislative assembly was restricted to only 1% of the city population, the richest members of the Ionian society.[54] The peasants (called *villani* during the Venetian era) had no political rights. The peasants were 'worse off under this feudal system' than their counterparts living under Ottoman rule and they were summed up in the capitulations at the time along with other 'movable and immovable goods of their lords'.[55] Occasionally they expressed their discontent through petitions to Venice or insurrection.

The nobles, being absentee landlords, resided in the cities while persons loyal to them became agents on their estates, and were sent to enforce the payment of debts in case this was needed.[56] Moreover, the *villani* living in the countryside retained their customs and language, further deepening the gap between them and the urban elites who were educated overseas in Italian cities. Antagonism between the countryside and the city intensified during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Intermarriage and education in Venice or other Italian cities created strong cultural bonds as well as social mobility between the middle-classes and aristocracy. Local landlords were granted a significant degree of autonomy and thus the

[52] On Ionian economic and social institutions during Venetian rule see Calligas, 'The Rizospastai', pp. 3-21; William Miller, 'The Ionian Islands under Venetian Rule,' *The English Historical Review*, 70 (Apr., 1903), pp. 209-239.
[53] Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion*, p. 4.
[54] Hannell, 'The Ionian Islands,' p. 107.
[55] Miller, 'The Ionian Islands,' p. 217.
[56] Miller, 'The Ionian Islands', pp. 217, 218; Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion*, pp. 4,5, 96.

Venetian state was able to rely on collaboration with them. Hired armed groups, called *bravi*, were employed by the Ionian upper classes to gather revenues, enforce the payment of debts or wage wars between the opposing factions of the *signori*. Little is known from which class the *bravi* were recruited, but it would be fair to speculate that they may have been peasants. The structure of Ionian aristocracy reflected the feudal organization of society, and the various aristocratic factions exercised their power effectively, especially during the years of Venetian rule. In fact, Venice relied on the Ionian elites for military manpower and funds. A characteristic example is the defence of Santa Maura in the Ottoman-Venetian war in 1715 solely by a military force that was enlisted by a single aristocrat, Konstantinos Typaldos.[57] Gang wars between aristocratic factions were also common. In any case, the presence of the nobility was essential in Venetian politics as the power of local elites was utilized by Venice so that 'both parties co-operated in sustaining a system that preserved' their rule.[58]

Relations between the countryside and the city were extremely tense. The power of landlords had grown during the last years of Venice's decline, when there was no central authority in the islands. The excesses of landlords varied, but a constant source of tension was the creation of debt, one of the thorny issues British authorities had to tackle during *Anglokratia*. The landlords could threaten their tenants with eviction to secure better terms when negotiating rents. Moreover, the same happened with production of commodities for export such as currants, wine or olive oil. The peasants relied on these products as their main sources of income. Important food products such as grain were not produced in sufficient quantities to meet consumption requirements in the Ionian Islands. Therefore the peasants had to buy them.[59] As exported products of the Ionian Islands, like oil and currants, were highly speculative in terms of the incomes they generated, the peasant producers relied on moneylenders to bridge gaps between income and expenditure. The terms of borrowing were unfavourable for the peasants: they had to offer their tenancy as security without any legal

[57] Nikos Karapidakis, 'Ta Eptanesa: Evropaikoi antagonismoi meta tin ptosi tis Venetias' ['The Heptanese: European rivalries after the fall of Venice], in Vasilis Panayiotopoulos (ed.), *Istoria Neou Ellinismou, 1770-2000* (Athens, 2003) *[History of Modern Hellenism]*, p. 154.
[58] Calligas, 'The Rizospastai,' p. 17.
[59] Yannoulopoulos, 'State and Society,' p. 46.

protection.[60] The peasants often borrowed from their landlords in anticipation of their crop yields: in cases of bad harvests the debt was perpetuated at mounting rates of interest.[61] The dissatisfaction caused by this intense level of dependency is most evidently seen in the case of peasant rebellions during Venetian rule, when violence was directed against the moneylenders and the nobility. Coupled with heavy taxation and poverty, indebtedness endured under British rule and often caused explosive conflicts that resulted in rebellions; one example was the Santa Maura rebellion of 1819.

The British colonial state did very little legislatively to improve the condition of the indebted tenants, or to improve future negotiations between tenant and landlord. The use of an archaic legal mechanism of seizure for default meant that the debtor could press for the tenant's arrest and confinement if he was not able to settle his debt. There were some attempts to amend the Penal Code of the Ionian Islands in 1841, but no changes improved the position of the indebted tenant.[62] It was extremely difficult to legislate over the matter, as doing so threatened to cause a direct confrontation between central administration and the moneylenders (who could be merchants or landlords), although during Maitland's tenure (the future High Commissioner of Malta and the Ionian Islands between 1813 and 1824), money for loans became available to the tenants from the general treasury for specific periods of time.[63] No consistent policy, however, tackled the issue of indebtedness and it would take until 1839 when the Ionian Bank was founded.

The excesses of the elites troubled central authorities, especially during the successive French, Russian, and British administrations. Class antagonism, customary law and armed violence were often inseparable. A general proclivity towards violence seems to have been perceived as a general trait of Greeks, and Ionians in particular, by many Europeans at the time. In hindsight, some depictions of Ionians by British contemporaries might seem comical, yet they

[60] Yannoulopoulos, 'State and Society', p. 47.
[61] Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands,' p. 91; Gallant mentions a difference between 25 to 300 per cent (*Experiencing Dominion*, p. 111)!
[62] Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion*, p. 111.
[63] TNA CO 136/1088, *Defence of Maitland's administration*, William Meyer, Corfu, 19 November 1816, written as a 'Reply to the supposed Speech of the Times or to the misstatements of the Chronicle', 1822, p. 123.

were no different from the stereotype of the 'noble savage', combining violence and virtue. One traveller writing in 1799 for example, wrote about 'the Greeks of Zante and Cephalonia subject to the Venetians' were 'famous for stabbing with knives', despite them 'having grand and noble features … and the heads of Apollo'![64]

It might be obvious that for the British who landed on the islands for strategic reasons, powerful elites and armed locals posed a threat and a potential security concern, when the former established a central administration. This exact threat was highlighted by Count Mocenigo, a high-ranking Corfiote aristocrat, to William A' Court – the British ambassador in Naples – when he told the latter 'if General Maitland expects to keep them in good humour for any length of time, he will be greatly disappointed'.[65] The British, who sought the monopoly of violence in colonial society, had encountered similar systems to the private '*bravi'* armies elsewhere, most characteristically in India. The peasants there were often recruited into groups of armed men hired by landholders for their protection, and were called 'thugs' by colonial authorities. Resistance by these groups to attempts by colonial administration to impose control was common across Northern India during the early-nineteenth century.[66] In the contemporary experience of British in the Mediterranean, and perhaps more similar to the Ionian system of *bravi*, were the Sicilian hired gangs. These gangs that belonged to an old communal tradition and were a response by the village communities to central intrusion during the brief British occupation of the island during 1811-1814.[67] Arguments about the real or perceived 'violent' nature of Ionians aside, cultural representations were often used to legitimize imperial presence and the establishment of 'a strong and executive Government supported by the authority of the Protective State', as James Campbell the civil commissioner of the Ionian Islands at the time (1812-1815) mentioned to London.[68]

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[64] W. Eton, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire* (London, 1799), pp. 342, 346.
[65] W.C. Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations of Sir Thomas Maitland* (New York, 1969 [1939]), p. 180.
[66] Kim A. Wagner, *Thugee. Banditry and the British in Early Nineteenth-Century India* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 173, 179.
[67] Roselli, John, *Lord William Bentinck & The British Occupation of Sicily* (Cambridge, 1956); Robert Holland, *Blue-Water Empire. The British in the Mediterranean since 1800* (London, 2013), pp. 20-24.
[68] TNA CO 136/1, *Report on the Ionian Islands now Under the Protection of Great Britain,* Campbell to Bathurst, 15 July 1813.

Anglo-Ionian connection and British governance in the Mediterranean

Connections between England and the Ionian Islands, particularly Zante and Cephalonia, date back to the early-sixteenth century when a consulate was established. These commercial connections were the result of the currant trade, which was yielding an annual profit of £11,500.[69] Epstein dates the beginning of the currant trade to 1533.[70] In these trade networks, the English consulate in Zante created connections with other consulates and various trading outposts across the Ottoman Empire: Aleppo, Smyrna, Salonica and elsewhere.[71] Merchants brought currants and olive oil to England from mainland Greece and the Ionian Islands in exchange for tin, wool, and cloth.[72] There are examples in the late eighteenth century of currants being bought in the fair of Senigallia on the Adriatic coast by manufacturers from Manchester.[73]

British travellers and adventurers also journeyed the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans for all sorts of purposes; from spying to traveling for leisure and the collection of classical antiquities (with the last two being often indistinguishable). Perhaps one of the most famous cases is Elizabeth Mortley Montagu's letters on her travels in the Ottoman Empire and her introduction of the smallpox inoculation to Britain, based on her observations there.[74] The beauty of the Ionian Islands was noted by many European travellers, sometimes in stark

[69] W.D. Wrigley, *The Diplomatic Significance of Ionian Neutrality, 1821-1831* (New York, 1988), p. 45.
[70] Maria Fusaro, *Political Economies of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England, 1450-1700* (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 10, 44; M. Epstein, *The Early History of the Levant Company* (London, 1908).
[71] A.C. Wood's, *A History of the Levant Company* (Oxford, 1935), is a classic work on the company; See also, Christine Laidlaw, *The British in the Levant. Trade and Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 2010).
[72] Gekas, 'The commercial bourgeoisie', p. 56.
[73] TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu 24 November 1797, p. 286. For the history of Senigallia in particular: Olga Katsiardi – Herring, *Lismonimenoi orizontes Ellinon emporon. To panigiri sti Senigallia (18os – arches 19ou aiona)*, [*Forgotten horizons of Greek merchants: the fair of Senigallia (18th-beginning of 19th cent.)*], (Athens, 1989)
[74] With the last two being often indistinguishable. Cases of women travellers were not uncommon. Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762) or Elisabeth Craven (1750-1828) are perhaps more known: Lewis Melville, *Lady Mary Wortley Montagu: Her Life and Letters (1689-1762)* (London, 1925); http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19029?docPos=2

contrast to the 'industrious' but also 'violent' nature of Ionians, particularly in Zante and Cephalonia.[75]

The British presence in the Mediterranean at the turn of the nineteenth century, however, was markedly different than the perhaps romanticized version of peaceful coexistence that characterized previous periods. The exact nature of the British connection with the Ionian Islands during the early nineteenth century is still a contested issue, begging to answer the difficult issue of whether this connection was colonial or not.[76] Such a preoccupation with the nature of British rule in the islands is most evident in the discussions in Ionian historiography about the constitution that was drafted for the islanders in 1817. Most works have placed an overwhelming emphasis on either the character of the British governor or the legal culture that British officials sought to impose on the islands. While both of these aspects were important, we do need to illuminate other aspects that also played a significant role. This thesis argues that the constitution in the islands was not a mere exercise of imposing British constitutional culture, but was shaped by other realities as well.

Constitutional experiments took place in Corsica, Sicily, Malta and the Ionian Islands during wartime. Most works on the nature of British rule in the early nineteenth century downplay significantly the broader context of the British presence in the Ionian Islands and the Mediterranean in general, where British officials had to consider other regional, but nevertheless more pressing concerns, like strategic objectives or military expenditures.

It needs to be emphasized here, that the thesis does not treat these constitutional experiments as parts of a coherent intellectual project in imperial thinking comprising the British Mediterranean as a whole, but rather as individual outcomes of wartime pressures, presenting similar strategic and political concerns. Such an example is the little studied case of the Anglo-Corsican kingdom, from 1794 until the Royal Navy's temporary withdrawal to

[75] W. Eton, *A Survey of the Turkish Empire* (London, 1799), p. 346.
[76] Panayiotis Kapetanakis, *Naftilia ke emporio ypo Vretaniki Prostasia. Ionio Kratos (1815-1864) [Shipping and commerce under British Protection. Ionian State (1815-1864)]* (Athens, 2015), pp. 268-281; Robert Holland, 'Patterns of Anglo-Hellenism: A 'Colonial' Connection?', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 36: 3 (2008), pp. 383–96.

Gibraltar in October 1797.[77] Another example is Sicily, where another short-lived constitutional experiment took place in 1806 under William Bentinck's administration.[78] Of immense strategic importance for the British during the Napoleonic Wars, Sicily was the main outpost and a crucial entrepôt, the Headquarters of British troops in the Mediterranean.[79] The failure of the constitution in Sicily caused negative reactions towards Bentinck's administration from other British officials, including Thomas Maitland. Strategic considerations were as significant – and surely more immediate – in these constitutional experiments in wartime than a 'desire to universalize the Anglo-Saxon way of life'.[80]

In any case, one might understand very little about British constitutional experiments in the Mediterranean, unless these endeavours in the area are considered within their historical and military contexts. This premise is essential when we will consider the wider implications of British presence on the Ionian Islands later on. In short, this thesis is more concerned with the history of the British Mediterranean not as an intellectual project and a coherent political unit in imperial thinking, but rather as a site where varied imperial projects presented similar characteristics; not a history *of* the Mediterranean as a regional unit, but a history *in* the Mediterranean, a crucial difference in studies on the Mediterranean.

[77] Compared to others, English-speaking literature on the Anglo-Corsican kingdom is seriously lacking. For example, see Desmond Gregory, *The Ungovernable Rock: A History of the Anglo-Corsican Kingdom and Its Role in Britain's Mediterranean Strategy During the Revolutionary War, 1793-1797* (London, 1985); Elisa A. Carrillo, 'The Corsican Kingdom of George III', *The Journal of Modern History*, 34:3 (Sep. 1962), pp. 254-274.
[78] Roselli, *Lord William Bentinck.*
[79] I would like to thank Robert Holland for informing me of the British Headquarters in Sicily. The discussions I have had with him have been very helpful in clarifying what seems to be in hindsight a chaotic period in history.
[80] Carrillo, 'The Corsican Kingdom', p. 254.



Map I. The Ionian Islands in 1830. Source: Robert Holland, Blue-Water Empire. The British in the Mediterranean since 1800 (London, 2013), p. xviii

Literature Review and conceptual frameworks

Earlier historiography on the islands was influenced greatly by the Union with Greece in 1864 and the Greek irredentist *Megali Idea* (Great Idea) of the nineteenth century. *Anglokratia* has been the topic for many works in Ionian historiography. In the nineteenth century, almost all of them were preoccupied with the union of the islands with Greece, *Enosis.* Historical-writing in the late nineteenth century on the islands was dominated by works of writers such as Panayiotis Chiotis or Ermannos Lountzis.[81] Works in Greek by historians such as Chiotis' *History of the Ionian State* (1874-1878), who came from the island of Zante, have formed a historical canon on the history of the islands under a nationalist light.[82] These works are still considered standard authorities on the period of British rule (*Anglokratia* in Greek), also because of the irreplaceable primary material they utilized, since lost to German bombings and the destruction of libraries in Zante and Corfu during the Second World War.[83]

Admittedly, one cannot help but note that even in Modern Greek historiography the islands are struggling to find their place: although 'designed to give a general overview of the recent trends in Greek historiography', for example, Kitroeff's 1989 overview article only mentions an Ionian historian once, and does not mention the history of the islands at all.[84] Some works have adopted a strong focus on the islands' connections with the Greek state after the 1830s, while others consider the wider developments across the empire and tend to view the protectorate as an example of a failed colonial experiment; both tendencies, however, take the union with Greece as a major milestone.

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[81] Chiotis, Panagiotis, *Istoria tou Iouniou Kratous apo systaseos aytou mechri Enoseos (eti 1815-1864), 2 volumes (Zante, 1874-1878), [History of the Ionian state from its formation until the Union with Greece (1815-1864)];* H. Lountzis, *Peri tis Politikis Katastasis tis Eptanisou epi Eneton* (Athens, 1856) *[On the political situation of the Seven Islands during the Venetians].*

[82] Chiotis (1814-1896) was a teacher in secondary education on the islands. His history is a textbook on the history of British rule in the islands.

[83] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 17; Calligas, "'The Rizospastai', p. 302.

[84] Alexander Kitroeff, 'Continuity and Change in Contemporary Greek Historiography,' *European History Quarterly,* 19:2 (April 1989), pp. 269-299.

Historiography of the Ionian Islands: Key Issues.

The historical works mentioned below have provided different perspectives in Ionian historiography, following nevertheless a certain trajectory throughout time, the period of British rule (1815-1864): James Tumelty's thesis 'The Ionian Islands under British administration' for example, was essentially a work on the history on foreign relations, colonial policy and their impact on 'British administration', focusing exclusively on official correspondence. His story was a story of failures and mistakes from the British perspective, which ended in the union with Greece. Eleni Calligas' thesis 'The Rizospastai' (the Radical-Unionists) chose a perspective closer to Greek history, with a sharper focus on social, rather than political, history. More recent works were the works by Thomas W. Gallant and Maria Paschalidi. Both of these works followed a cultural and postcolonial turn, discussing at length modes of discourse, everyday forms of resistance, and cultural representations. Lastly, Sakis Gekas' recent work has been closer to the interests of this thesis, but also focused on discussing the economic and political controversies of the protectorate mentioned above, which led to the union with Greece. This section discusses these works and summarizes the key issues in Ionian historiography.

Largely because of the protectorate's peculiar place as a half-colony, historiography of British rule in the Ionian Islands has often perceived the place of the islands in the empire as anomalous, with the phase of state-formation passing through a long period of experimentation. Historians of the islands have been at pains to find parallels and establish comparisons between similar state structures, globally or across the empire at the time. In many ways, the present thesis argues that this is the case in Ionian historiography because of two major conceptual paradigms dominating historical writing on the islands: the creation of the Greek State and the assumption that there was a uniformity of the British Empire throughout the nineteenth century. This section will analyse the problems occurring from the first approach.

Following the same chronology of the whole period of *Anglokratia*, Tumelty's thesis was explicitly about British administration on the islands.[85] His thesis was submitted in 1952, when decolonization was well under way across the empire. Although often neglected, Tumelty's thesis remains a standard text on the subject.[86] British rule and the constitutional character of the administration was the main topic of his work, tracing how the political nature of the protectorate was deeply influenced by its first governor, High Commissioner Thomas Maitland. His study was influenced by contemporary tendencies in historical writing which favoured the history of international relations and Britain's role worldwide.[87] Following a similar approach in chronology as later studies, Tumelty's main argument was that the protectorate was problematic from the beginning; governing the islands became even more difficult after the Greek Revolution of 1821 as the impact of political nationalism grew also on the islands. His thesis has been used by other historians as a main source for understanding the Anglo-Ionian government (or Ionian State). C.A. Bayly, for example, drew on it to explain Maitland's system as an ideal example of 'proconsular regimes' developed in the Mediterranean, South Africa and elsewhere, after the Napoleonic Wars.[88] But Tumelty's study had also problems: his starting point seems also to be the union with Greece, describing the union as a culmination of an inevitable process. Perhaps he was influenced by debates on decolonization and the transfer of power from colonial to nation states in Britain during the 1950s. Also, in terms of the wider literature, his thesis was written before seminal developments in imperial history took place, such as Robinson and Gallagher's famous article on the imperialism of free trade.[89] As expected for a work of his time, this study was not concerned much with the wider politics of the empire, nor with technologies of power such as new forms of knowledge in colonial governance.

[85] Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands'.
[86] Neville Thompson, *Earl Bathurst and British Empire* (Barnsley, 1999), p. 275, n. 65.
[87] Most commonly in the Cambridge history series: J.J. Holland Rose, and A.P. Newton (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. 2, The growth of the new Empire, 1783-1870* (Cambridge, 1940); Sir A.W., Ward, and G.P. Gooch, *The Cambridge history of British foreign policy, vols. 1,2* (Cambridge, 1922-1923).
[88] C.A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the world, 1780-1830* (London, 1989), p. 194.
[89] Tumelty's thesis was written before Robinson and Gallagher's article, thus he could not take this into account: 'The Imperialism of free trade,' *The Economic History Review* vi (1953), pp. 1-15; Simon J. Potter, *British Imperial History* (London, 2015), pp. 21-26.

Written considerably later, Eleni Calligas' thesis was interested in the development of the radical-unionist movement of 'Rizospastai' (Radicals) in the islands. The thesis, which was submitted to the University of London in 1994, also studied the period of British rule as a whole.[90] Calligas' thesis was about the growth of nationalism in the Ionian Islands, and the political struggles of some Ionians for union with Greece from the 1840s onwards, the Radical-Unionists. Influenced by studies on nationalism so prominent among leading scholars at the London School of Economics at the time, the aim of Calligas' study was to historicize Greek-Ionian nation-building and to trace its origins in Ionian politics. Again, although the period of the thesis was 1815 and 1864, her starting point seemed to be the union with Greece and thus her work was preoccupied with tracing the origins of the political movement of the Unionists. In short, Calligas' thesis was a useful case-study of how local social and political aspirations were related to political nationalism in Greece, but offered very little on imperial networks or official thinking in Britain.

Since the time of Calligas' thesis, historians of the Ionian Islands such as the works discussed next, have placed a greater focus on cultural and social history. Works on the Ionian Islands have been concerned with the impact of colonialism overall, and narratives of modernity.

With a strong background in the fields of archaeology and anthropology, Thomas Gallant's book *Experiencing Dominion* (2002) is essentially a compilation of articles published during the 1990s, on the colonial period of Ionian history.[91] Evidently inspired by the 'golden age' of social and cultural histories, as well as by a post-colonial form of analysis, the essays examine how colonialism operated on different levels. Gallant looks at different aspects of daily life on the islands during *Anglokratia,* including popular protest, Ionian stereotypical characteristics, gender roles or charitable institutions. Put together, and drawing on theories from cultural history and anthropology, *Experiencing Dominion* wants to explain what Gallant calls 'colonial experience'. Rather descriptively, the book acknowledges three consecutive

[90] Calligas, "'The Rizospastai'.
[91] Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion.*

phases during *Anglokratia*: the early period from the beginning of the protectorate in 1816 until the creation of the Greek State in 1832, the 'Reformist' period in the islands (1832-1848), and the period when the islands became 'ungovernable' until the final union with Greece (1848-1864).[92]

However, in reality there is little interest in explaining the 'colonizers' view, even though the book wants to capture 'the *experience* of imperial rule shared by Britons and Greeks'. This book was seminal more for the inspiration of engaging more with cultural history and anthropology, than for its coherence of argument. Gallant's book has been criticized since then, for the use of evidence it presents, for 'downplaying contradictions and 'privileging continuities' in the primary material.[93] Similarly, and with good reason, the book has been criticized for taking little account of the diversity of Ionian society, which consisted of Jewish, Catholic and Greek Orthodox religious communities, and Italian, Turkish and Greek elements.[94]

Maria Paschalidi's thesis *Constructing Ionian Identities* (2009) can be located within the new imperial history approach. More concerned with wider politics and cultural representations across the empire than was the case for earlier scholars, Paschalidi stated her interest in examining colonial 'difference' from the outset. Clearly influenced by post-colonial and post-structuralist forms of analysis, Paschalidi's thesis discussed metropole and colony within a single analytical frame. Her work was influenced by older as well as more recent works on national identity and the relation between metropole and the colony: Catherine Hall's work, Edward Said's *Orientalism*, Frederick Cooper and Anne Laura Stoler's *Tensions of Empire*, to name just a few.[95]

Like earlier work, Paschalidi's thesis addressed colonial governance during the whole period of British rule (1815-1864), but placed a greater emphasis on the connections between political practices, colonial discourses and power. She claimed that British understandings of

[92] Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion,* pp. 7-14.
[93] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 22-23.
[94] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 24.
[95] Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, *At Home with the Empire. Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge, 2006); Ann Laura Stoler, and Frederick Cooper (eds.), *Tensions of empire: colonial cultures in a bourgeois world* (California, 1997); Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978).

the Ionians 'led to complex negotiations of otherness, informing the development of varieties of colonial rule'.[96] The thesis is generally written around two main themes: official discourses concerning race and ethnicity, and the global dimension of colonial rule 'set in the context of political reforms that occurred in Britain and the Empire during the first half of the nineteenth century, especially in the white settler colonies, such as Canada and Australia'.[97] However, it is worth mentioning here, that there is in fact very little information in Paschalidi's thesis on colonial expansion during the early nineteenth century, nor on any parallels with other colonies. The impression is almost as if colonial expansion started during Victorian times. Paschalidi provides some very useful insights regarding the free rein from London that some colonial governors had to experiment with different forms of government in the islands. However, like Gallant, she drew an overwhelming focus on cultural representations, with little explanation of how stereotypes on Ionian people actually worked to produce colonial power on the ground.

Most recently, the political and economic contradictions that made the islands a 'failed' colonial experiment are also the main concern of Sakis Gekas' recent book, *Xenocracy* (2017).[98] Drawing from a wide range of primary material in Greek and British archives, Gekas' book was well-researched and discussed developments with a consistent comparison to similar developments across the empire. *Xenocracy* is more economically and socially oriented than, for example, Paschalidi or Gallant's work. The book focuses more on the deteriorating conditions and contradictions between 'colonial liberalism and local radicalism' in the islands, instead of colonial discourse over Ionian identities, as Paschalidi did.[99] In regards to the early period of British rule in the islands, however, Gekas' book has been particularly useful for the writing of the present thesis due to his analysis of the Ionian 'commercial bourgeoisie', which was the topic of Gekas' PhD thesis.[100] We would expect more explanation, however, on the

[96] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 3.
[97] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 3.
[98] Gekas, *Xenocracy.*
[99] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* pp. 1-19.
[100] Gekas, 'The commercial bourgeoisie'.

political involvement of the Ionian 'commercial bourgeoisie' in Ionian political scene, or their connections with the elites.

All the works mentioned above have sought to explain the reasons for Britain ceding the islands to Greece in 1864. From a Greek perspective, the discussion on the circumstances for the union of the islands with the mainland offer a fresh, decentralized approach from conventional accounts which have systematically neglected regions in modern Greece that were under Christian and European rule. For years, historians of the Ionian Islands have debated how and why the islands indeed became ungovernable for Britain, creating at the same time a precedent in imperial policymaking in the Mediterranean, especially considering British entanglements in Cyprus or even Crete during the nineteenth or twentieth centuries.[101] However, to view the origins of the protectorate from the perspective of the union with Greece is misleading. In terms of periodization and chronology, the present thesis took to heart the warning stated in *Xenocracy,* that historians on the islands failed to avoid 'the cardinal sin of the profession and consider transitional what at the time seemed indefinite'.[102] On the negative, *Xenocracy* has been using the term 'colonial governmentality' to describe very different social and economic processes. For example, in Chapter four ('Colonial Knowledge and the Making of Ionian governmentality') he associates themes which are assumed to encapsulate the characteristics of the modern state (i.e. state surveillance, regulation of movement, integration of statistics in governance) but offers no sufficient evidence that these were consistent policies of the Ionian State, or why these were different from previous rulers.[103] At the same time, notions of governmentality are not entirely clear: on the one hand, the book recognizes that 'colonial modernity in the Ionian Islands … was very much the result of

[101] See for example the discussion in '1864: The end of colonial rule?' (Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 325-336); Bruce Knox, 'British policy and the Ionian Islands, 1847-1864: nationalism and imperial administration', *English Historical Review*, 99: 392 (July 1984), pp. 503-529; C.C. Eldridge, 'The Myth of Mid-Victorian "Separatism"; the Cession of the Bay Islands and the Ionian Islands in the Early 1860s', *Victorian Studies*, xii (1969), pp. 331-346; Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands'.
[102] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, p. 9.
[103] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* pp. 101-127.

Ionians', but on the other the term is frequently used to describe the 'rule of difference' or how the Anglo-Ionian State was regulating Ionian lives to conform with European modernity.[104]

Categories of rule, colonial knowledge and governance in early-nineteenth century

There is another strand of literature in imperial history that explores the relationship between cultural representations, stereotypes and colonial rule.[105] Similar concerns appear in Ionian historiography. The aim of this section is two-fold: first to discuss how Ionian historiography has explored colonial knowledge and rule, and second, to discuss some works in imperial history that helped to shape the framework of the thesis more broadly.

Two problems are recurring in Ionian historiography: firstly, the tendency to read travellers accounts and official correspondence in the same field; and secondly, the assumption that British officials were using stereotypes solely to create categories of rule. This was not only the case, and British officials were often heightening such knowledge, playing out on widely accepted notions of Ionians amongst British officials in London, but to defend their own reputation. Such an example is the case of Parga in chapter five. Finally, the section looks at relevant literature on colonial governance in the early-nineteenth century that illuminate broader tendencies of colonial rule at the time of the British protectorate in the Ionian Islands.

Regarding cultural representations, in *Experiencing Dominion*, Gallant's book examined stereotypes and cultural analogies that he perceived British officials sought to construct identities and categorize Ionians in order to rule them: 'whether it was as Oriental poohbahs in bourgeois garb, Balkan Hottentots, or swarthy Paddies, one overarching conclusion flowed from any one of these identities: the Greeks were a baser, uncivilized race that was unworthy and incapable of self-rule'.[106] Cultural representations, however, were rarely homogenous or even applicable in the Ionian case, and the mere fact that *Experiencing Dominion* presents

[104] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* pp. 7, 103.
[105] Ballantyne, 'Colonial Knowledge', esp. pp. 187-195.
[106] Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion*, p. 55.

diverse British approaches to Greek (and as an extent, Ionian Greek) cultural identities as a coherent project, is quite problematic.

There is little question of the existence of cultural stereotyping in the British world during the nineteenth century, but we do need to question whether the existence of stereotypes explains everything there is to know about colonial rule. Therefore, the emphasis placed in *Experiencing Dominion* on 'swarthy Paddies, Black Irish' etc. is not entirely helpful. Indeed, during the early years of British rule in the islands, it is in fact anachronistic, as it gives very little evidence that cultural analogies were a recurring practice amongst officials in the empire, especially between Ionians and the Irish. Gallant's book reflects a broader excessive focus on colonial discourse and cultural depictions of Ionians, drawn almost exclusively from travellers' accounts. *Experiencing Dominion* is thus little concerned with official views of Ionians.[107] Connections between stereotypes, colonial knowledge and rule are at best implicit, and there is little evidence to show how cultural stereotyping directly influenced governance. The present study addresses the question whether such stereotypes were utilized in colonial governance to create social and cultural categories, looking for more explicit mention in official correspondence of these stereotypes and their influence on policy.

Maria Paschalidi similarly views identity-formation and specifically the ways that Ionian identities were articulated in official discourse, as a central prerequisite in forming a logic of government.[108] More explicitly, for Paschalidi, such stereotypical characteristics often seemed to be justification amongst British officials of why the islands should be under British protection: because, according to the British 'colonial discourse', they were unable to govern themselves. However, this study argues that in the case of the islands, such overemphasis on colonial difference and Ionian representations in order to explain colonial rule, is largely misplaced. Clearly, many British officials were as freighted as many other Europeans who travelled to the islands and the mainland with preconceived ideas, who expected to see descendants of ancient Greeks, and were often disappointed. However, British perceptions of

[107] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 23.
[108] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities'.

the Ionians were hazy and rarely uniform. After all, a myriad of cultural, religious, social and political differences were prevalent amongst Greeks themselves, not only in the Ionian Islands but also across the Greek-speaking world.

To bring an example on the methodological issue on travellers' accounts and official correspondence. Many British who travelled in the islands and published travellers' accounts after – most of them military and medical officials who served in the Ionian Islands – had been very vocal in characterizing Ionians and Greeks in general. All of them distinguished between Greeks on the islands and the mainland, and none of them stayed in Greece for too long. For example, Tertius Kendrick, a medical official who served under Maitland, wrote about the 'Septinsulars' (Ionians): 'The Septinsulars are implicated two ways: - the first, in committing piracies and robberies on the Albanian, Moreot [Morea, modern Peloponnese], and Turkish coasts; the second, in devising means to liberate themselves by treachery from the British government'.[109] In theory, Maitland would have agreed with Kendrick on his characterization of Ionians as intriguers. Traveller's accounts, however, were rarely adopting something more than general characteristics and there can be many objections here over the reception of such works by British officials: there have been no explicit mentions of these authors for example in official correspondence, or evidence that these works were considered as something more than 'bedtime stories' by contemporaries. Kendrick's work, for example, is very seldom referenced by other contemporary authors, yet he is referenced by modern works as an authoritative source in describing British representations of Ionians.

Paschalidi, for example, includes Kendrick in other travel texts about the islands, written between 1822 and 1864: 'the travellers were unable to reconstruct Ionian culture in its totality and, like travellers elsewhere, they selected details in Ionian culture and used them to represent the culture as a whole'.[110] There was, therefore, a crucial difference between cultural representations and how representations directly affected British governance in the islands,

[109] Tertius Kendrick, *The Ionian Islands* (London, 1822), p. ix.
[110] Apart from Kendrick, the authors Paschalidi mentions are: William Goodison, Frances Maclellan, Edward Lear, Thomas Ansted and Viscount Kirkwall (Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 44).

and these depictions should not be taken as self-evident or benchmarks of how British officials were thinking about the islanders.

As previous sections have tried to show here, the bulk of the information that was kept in governmental records came from consular officials, agents, or other officials in the localities. British officials who served in the Ionian Islands were generally consulting these reports. The role of the governor, however, was decisive when organizing information, or the ways and extent that such representations would be integrated in official thinking. These were typical characteristics of colonial governance in the early-nineteenth century.

C.A. Bayly's *Imperial Meridian* for example, constitutes one of the more characteristic analyses of colonial governance at the time, up to date. *Imperial Meridian* sought to revise Whig interpretations of imperial history. One aspect of his book, particularly useful in comparing British expansion in the Mediterranean with elsewhere in the empire, was his examination of 'proconsular despotisms'. By proconsular despotisms Bayly meant the 'prevailing ethos of loyalism, royalism and aristocratic military virtue' cultivated by most colonial governors. This was widely compatible with 'the aims and attitudes of the regimes of the new conservatism in Great Britain'.[111] Colonial governors had a free rein whilst the Colonial Office was politically weak. These 'revivified colonial regimes' were based on racial subordination and the fear of republicanism. This vice regal despotism, Bayly tells us, was not so successful in some areas such as Ireland, but was more successful in others such as in the Eastern Mediterranean.[112] Similar characteristics of personal despotism of colonial governors were evident in Canada, Australia and India. Bayly's book is useful in making global comparisons of colonial state formation and will be useful in further comparing the case of the Ionian Islands with the development of the colonial state elsewhere.

Jon E. Wilson's *The Domination of Strangers* (2008) examined the issue of colonial governance in India during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centuries. The book was influenced by debates on the emergence of political modernity in Europe and the rest of the

[111] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian,* pp. 194-195.
[112] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian,* p. 199.

world, conducted by sociologists and philosophers such as Max Weber and Michel Foucault, as well as by historians such as Eric Stokes and Oliver MacDonagh. Wilson's input was different, as he claimed that such policies did not develop from a 'confident desire to transform South Asia' but by the 'anxious, insecure attitude to Indian society'.[113] Wilson came to agree with C.A. Bayly on his argument regarding the crisis of the old aristocratic order.[114] Transitions in colonial governance in India from early colonial rule onwards, were one of the main concerns of Wilson's work. He noted that one of the most crucial characteristics of British rule in India was the emergence of an 'abstract, objectivising style of thought' where British officials were ruled by the 'instinct to classify and generalise' Indian forms of life.[115] This thesis poses similar questions on the ways that British administration in the Ionian Islands collected and particularly organized information on the islanders, and the extent that this process was similar as elsewhere in the empire at the time, i.e. India.

Structure and Summary of Chapters

Chapter one provides a historical overview of the period of Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the Mediterranean from 1797 until British troops landed on the islands in 1809. Focusing on this period, the chapter examines the shift of British official attitudes towards the Mediterranean and particularly the importance that the islands started to play in British strategy. In terms of communications and 'grand strategy', it argues that the islands were not considered a passage to India by British officials, but rather as a strategic outpost in close proximity to the Ottoman Empire which gradually grew in importance in wartime. It argues that the turning points towards the occupation of the islands were the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 and the Treaty of the Dardanelles in 1809. The islands were ordered to be occupied by Lord Collingwood, a decision which did not come from metropolitan quarters, but from officers serving in the Mediterranean.

[113] Wilson, *The Domination of Strangers*, p. 4.
[114] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian, passim.*
[115]Wilson, *The Domination*, p. 12.

Utilizing the case of the British consul in the islands, Spiridion Foresti, chapter two examines the impact of information that British officials received on the islands through consular networks, and how this particular consul opened channels of communication with nearby areas for the British. Furthermore, Foresti was an important 'go-between' who took part in local power networks and played an active role in promoting Britain's presence. Supporting British protection, he was convinced that British rule would improve the social and political conditions in the islands. However, under the new colonial administration he was removed from office on charges of corruption and was marginalized from administration. His case is indicative of the anxieties of Maitland's administration about what he perceived to be the influence of the Ionian elites, and particularly regarding how the new administration was relying on patronage and direct control of information instead of devolution and the establishment of institutions and state mechanism.

Chapter three looks at the period when a provisional government was established in the islands, from their occupation in 1809 until the islands passed under Britain's protection in 1815. During this time, three successive civil commissioners managed the administration of the Ionian Islands. While administration in the islands was put into an indeterminate state until the formal cession, this period was yet very formative in cementing British presence in the region. In order to show how imperial presence was solidified, the chapter discusses how British presence in the islands acted as a nodal point for information and intellectual networks, as well as economic integration in the region. As such, it explains how, contrary to the ambivalent status of the islands amongst European powers, the establishment of overlapping networks in the islands played also a crucial role in British considerations at the diplomatic table.

Chapter four explores disease-control, statistics and official information-gathering more broadly, by a closer examination of the plague that broke out in Corfu between 1815 and 1816. The aim of chapter four is two-fold: on the one hand, it studies plague-control and similarities as well as differences between the British and the Venetian practices in controlling the disease in the islands. On the other hand, it examines how information accumulated from the plague in Corfu was synthesized and organized. More specifically, it observes how British and Ionian officials sought to control the disease, and how the accumulated medical data was organized. It

argues that the collection of medical knowledge and statistics was rarely part of a carefully thought-out official strategy, but rather the outcome of individual experience, military measures, and metropolitan debates on scientific knowledge. In all respects, the efforts of military and medical officials alike – both British and Ionian physicians – had substantially utilized previously held institutions and local networks, and were aiming more to the improvement of the Venetian institutions than their radical transformation. Overall, the relationship between gathering information and state measures was more related to disease-control in the islands, or to medical debates in Britain, and more loosely related to the growth of the Anglo-Ionian state and institutions in the islands. In this way, the chapter finds common ground with relevant studies of Britain in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, than with works on the mid and late-nineteenth century empire.[116]

The period after 1816 in the islands was marked by anticipation amongst the Ionians as for the new administration, which was identified with the character of its high commissioner, Sir Thomas Maitland. Ionian historiography has emphasized Maitland's despotic style of rule and the definitive role he played for the future ambivalent status of the protectorate as a half-way colony, whose ambivalence became indefinite under the Constitution of 1817. Chapter five, then, examines the formative period between 1816 and 1819, and specifically how dependent the political and constitutional character of the protectorate was on the experience, personality and ideology of its new high commissioner. The chapter also argues that the reasons for the ambivalence of the protectorate were not merely constitutional as is often assumed, but owed to broader – and certainly similar with other parts of the empire – characteristics of early-nineteenth century colonial governance, where the role of the British governor was central. Methodologically, at this deeply unsettling stage for the islands, this study takes issue with Foucauldian approaches that associate political control with a more 'scientific' approach on governance for the period under study.[117] While British officials indeed sought to record the population, and 'scientific' approaches to governance in the form of population registers etc., were increasingly becoming part of European state structures,

[116] For example, Innes, *Inferior Politics.*
[117] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* pp. 13-15, 101-108.

circumstances in the Ionian Islands allowed for mixed approaches to governance, and which were more dependent on the British governor.

Chapter six discusses two developments that ended the origins of the protectorate which started in wartime and ended during early 1820s: the Greek Revolution that began in 1821 and the increasing metropolitan pressures on colonial governors to systematize and to process statistical information from the colonies, which is known as the information revolution. In both of these developments, British governance of the islands was closely connected with Maitland's administration. Starting from the peasant rebellion that broke out in the island of Santa Maura in 1819, one rebellion followed another culminating in the crisis that broke out in the 1820s. During that time, British officials proclaimed martial law for prolonged periods of time, in response to the possibility of the revolution which was threatening to spread to the islands. In the mainland, it would be the beginning of the creation of the Greek state, and the protectorate would thus enter into a new phase where Ionians could look to this entity, should they become disappointed by the Ionian State. British officials were successful in enforcing 'tranquility' in the islands and in maintaining control over the protectorate, but this period marked another phase of *Anglokratia*, where this thesis ends.

Chapter 1: Prime movers and the wartime origins of Anglo-Ionian connection, 1797-1809

> 'Among the numerous essential benefits accruing to Great Britain from the possession of Corfu is to be reckoned the very important one of its being an observatory over the whole of European Turkey. By knowing the movements and occurrences that take place within and proper measures may be taken by Great Britain accordingly, either of preparation of counteract, of cooperation or of palliation'.[118]

The above quote was made two years before the occupation of the islands by British troops in 1809, by a British official and a long-term resident in the region. William Meyer, a consular official, was convinced the islands would lend Britain several advantages, unlike official circles in London who were more ambivalent about making British presence permanent in this part of the Mediterranean. The thesis argues that the quote above summarizes the place of the Ionian Islands in the empire, whose main strategic importance for Britain in the nineteenth century was information and geopolitical influence, rather than commercial profit. However, as existing historiography has already shown, the Anglo-Ionian connection marked the beginning of a longer period of ambivalence in London about their place in the empire. This chapter illuminates the origins of this connection.

[118] The quote is part of one of Meyer's long reports on the islands, titled 'Some Political and Military Details of the Island of Corfu …', kept today in TNA FO 42/9, Meyer to George Canning, Kew, Surr[e]y, 12 December 1807.

Protection, geopolitical imperatives and the establishment of the Anglo-Ionian connection, 1798-1801

After an agreement between the victorious Quadruple Alliance (Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia), the Ionian Islands passed under British protection with the Treaty of Paris (November 1815). The new protectorate was named *The United States of the Ionian Islands*. According to the treaty, the islands would form 'a single, free, and independent State under the denomination of the United States of the Ionian Islands', which, in turn would be placed 'under the immediate and exclusive protection' of the United Kingdom.[119] British protection should '…secure to the islanders the full exercise of their religion, a joint degree of civil liberty, and the freedom of commerce. … in conjunction with the principal inhabitants'.[120] As Judith Blow Williams wrote, 'disillusionment with the old type of colony and both the ever-present threat and the opportunities of war dictated a new type of holding: a small strategic spot, preferably an island, easily defensible, and at the same time capable of tapping a populous potential market'.[121] These wartime acquisitions were overseen by several departments of the British government instead of by one.[122] The Ionian Islands belonged to the same category of holding.

As we will see in the next chapters, the Ionian protectorate was nominally an independent state, but in reality was governed as a colony. For good reason, historians prefer the terms semi-colony or half-colony to describe the protectorate.[123] In fact, the official language of protection and the legal ambiguity that followed the Treaty of Paris has been emphasized as pointing to the peculiar and anomalous place of the islands within the empire.[124] While this thesis takes into account how this legal ambiguity played out in imperial thinking, it focuses more on studying how wartime origins and later security imperatives shaped constitutional development and imperial presence in general on the islands. Indeed, when

[119] Articles I and II in Appendix F. *The Treaty between the Allied Powers respecting the Ionian Islands. 1815* in Henry Jervis, White-Jervis, *History of the Island of Corfu, and of the Republic of the Ionian Islands* (London, 1852), pp. 201, 292, 293.
[120] TNA CO 136/300, Bunbury to Maitland, London 16 August 1815.
[121] Judith Blow Williams, *British Commercial policy and trade expansion, 1750-1850* (Oxford, 1972), p. 4.
[122] Andrew Porter, 'Introduction: Britain and the Empire in the Nineteenth Century' in *The Oxford History of the British Empire. The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 1999), p. 4.
[123] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 3-6; Kapetanakis, *Shipping and commerce*, esp. pp. 268-281.
[124] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 79, 88, 166, 181.

considering these wartime origins and the decision to send British troops to occupy the islands in 1809, it is contingency that should be emphasized over any long-term official thinking. At the same time, while the political content of protection and its wartime origins is a recurring theme throughout the present study, it would be useful first to examine some typologies and misconceptions about the strategic place of the islands.

In some ways, Charles James Napier's typology of the islands might seem characteristic of the matter. Napier was a British officer who served as a Resident (governor) on the island of Cephalonia, and who later became known as the 'terror of Sind', serving as a governor in Sindh, modern-day Pakistan.[125] In his book *The Colonies* (1833), he divided the 'colonies of England' into three categories: the first consisted of those which were important to Britain 'from their extent of territory and rich productions', like the East and West Indies; the second consisted of colonies with an importance in war and in commerce without producing much wealth, like Gibraltar, Malta and Bermuda; in the third category were the Ionian Islands, Canada and the Cape. These colonies, Napier wrote, had not contributed much to war or wealth, but had 'an extent of territory and population united to a political and commercial importance, that, by good government, may become productive of wealth and power to Great Britain'.[126] Although Napier's observations were written in a later period, he emphasized the direct economic or political advantages that might accrue to Britain through its control of the islands, their as-yet unrealized potential to become a profitable entrepôt and a model-colony.

[125] Sir Charles James Napier (1782-1853) served as the governor of Cephalonia between 1822 and 1830, and not between 1809 and 1816 as is mentioned before (Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 96). The years he was a governor in the island he later described as 'the happiest in his life'. Born in London, he later established connections with Ireland when his family moved in Celbridge, Co. Kildare, in 1785. Because of Ireland, Napier became aware of bad government and the misery of the colonized. During the Greek revolution of 1821, he became a passionate supporter of Greek independence. After having served in the Peninsular and American wars (1808-1814) and the Ionian Islands, Napier was appointed in Bombay (1841) and then became a Governor of Sind, modern-day Pakistan (Ainslie T. Embree, 'Sir Charles James Napier', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* (Oxford, 2004), available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com.bris.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-19748 (December 2016)).

[126] Sir Charles James Napier, *The Colonies: treating of their value generally-of the Ionian Islands in particular* (London, 1833), p. 1.

The Ionian Islands should be studied within the framework of wartime maritime acquisitions like the Cape (taken from the Dutch in 1806) or Mauritius – both formally ceded in 1815 – as the product of conquest.[127] Furthermore, the importance of the islands in maritime communications and commerce, as well as the strategic leverage that the islands would provide for Britain in her relations with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, makes the islands an interesting case of Britain's acquisitions in wartime.

Aside from trade, controlling sea lanes brought advantages in maritime communications and the collection of military and economic information. For example, the British consul in the Ionian Islands, Spiridion Foresti, in correspondence with foreign secretary William Grenville in 1793, noted the lack of activity of an otherwise vibrant British commerce in western Greece and the Ionian Sea.[128] Overall, after the declaration of war in February 1793, significant delays and unexpected losses arose in communication and processing information to London with the detainment of British merchant ships in the region.[129] While in 1793 commercial traffic in the eastern Mediterranean had significantly declined, the state-controlled Levant Company had factories spread across the Ottoman Empire. Agents of the company were obtaining intelligence on trade fluctuations, but also valuable political information which was communicated to London. Intelligence from the Mediterranean, of course, was fragmented evidence, a result of commercial gossip, newspapers, and countless other sources of intelligence, often circulating in information markets such as Lloyd's Coffee House.[130] The war with France forced the British to speed up the race for information, and to systematize the collection of military intelligence.

Contingency is a factor that is generally acknowledged in Ionian historiography but rarely taken into account: the literature instead focuses on interpretations related to economic imperialism, or as a step towards global hegemony and as a 'stepping stone' to India, instead of the fine and shifting diplomatic balances of wartime and the unpredictable parts played by

[127] John Darwin, *Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain* (London, 2013), p. 37.
[128] TNA Foreign Office records (henceforth, FO 42/2), Foresti to Grenville, Zante, 10 March 1793, p. 6.
[129] TNA Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign (henceforth, SP) 105/25, London 16 April 1793, p. 395.
[130] Roger Knight, *Britain against Napoleon. The Organization of Victory 1793-1815* (London, 2013), p. 124.

individual military officers operating in the Mediterranean.[131] Focusing on the latter, this chapter explains how the Ionian Islands entered British strategic planning, the place of the islands in imperial thinking, as well as the information milieu of British officials in regards to the islands. As some relevant studies have explained, the islands began to be included in British strategic thinking during Napoleon's campaign in Egypt in 1798-1801.

Ensuring the security of communications played a large role in the decision to send British troops to the islands. But again, historical interpretations of imperial thinking in the early nineteenth century, and regarding the Ionian Islands in particular, tend to cast the circumstances of the post-Napoleonic era — even the mid-nineteenth century — back in time in order to explain the cession of the islands. When accounting for the prime movers behind the cession of the islands in 1809, for example, one of the most characteristic misconceptions among historians is the supposed significance of the islands to global communications, and specifically as an outpost on the overland route to India.[132] This assumption, that the cession of the islands was secured in order to enhance communications with India, is misleading. This assumption has gained remarkable traction among historians of the Ionian Islands, with very few exceptions.[133] While the overland route to India through Egypt and the Suez isthmus would take less time to travel in theory, the passage was nevertheless much more unstable and hazardous, as Napoleon's campaign to Egypt had shown. Furthermore, Britain had to rely on the Ottoman government for overland routes, in a period where Anglo-Ottoman relations were not stable.[134] It would take until the building of the Suez Canal in 1869 for overland routes to India via the Mediterranean to become safer from banditry, war and political turbulence.

Sea lanes past Africa and the Cape can be posited as a more realistic example of passages to India.[135] Sailing times round the Cape would vary between four months to a year,

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[131] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 74-79; Tumelty's work is an exception ('The Ionian Islands'), *passim.*

[132] Kapetanakis, *Shipping and commerce*, pp. 38, 44, 85; Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 81.

[133] But Chircop, 'The British Imperial Network', pp. 6, 7, 43, 195.

[134] John S. Galbraith, 'The 'Turbulent Frontier' as a Factor in British expansion', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2: 2 (Jan., 1960), p. 151.

[135] Kerry Ward, ''Tavern of the Seas''? The Cape of Good Hope as an Oceanic Crossroads during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries' in J. H. Bentley, R. Bridenthal, K. Wigen (eds.), *Seascapes. Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges* (Honolulu, 2007), p. 137.

with six months being a 'rough average'.[136] While travelling times were shorter, the route to India in the southern Atlantic and Indian oceans was safer and secured by troop movements and the establishment of a chain of coastal stations in St. Helena, the Cape and Mauritius.[137] During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, an attack on India through southern Africa and the Cape was more possible, but it was especially the importance of the Cape as a military entrepôt and its proximity to India which became apparent during the wars with France. As Wellesley told Dundas in 1800: 'the importance of the Cape in its relation to India increases every hour; and the connection between the settlements becomes more intimate in every view of our military, political, and commercial interests'.[138] In contrast with the Cape, there were no explicit mentions associating the Ionian Islands with routes to India during the wars with France.

Misconceptions about the place of the islands in sea routes and maritime communications can be attributed to Russian plans to invade Britain's territories in India in 1801, which were quickly abandoned. Also, they derive from the confusion in official correspondence as to Napoleon's strategy, where French attempts to conceal strategic targets by leaking false information were quite common. As Robert Holland wrote, 'blurring places and military logic, underlines a persistent difficulty in explaining Great Britain's role in the Mediterranean'.[139] As we will see, the importance of the Ionian Islands lay on being an 'observatory to the whole of Turkey', providing significant advantages in monitoring communication and traffic at the entrance to the Adriatic and the Balkans to any power that controlled them.

As we will see later, the place of the islands in maritime communications indeed played a key role in imperial thinking, but more in regards to the 'closed system' of the eastern Mediterranean and the shifting realities of war. In terms of naval communications and

[136] P. J. Marshall, 'Introduction' in P.J. Marshall (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, volume II. The Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1998) (henceforth *OHBE*), p 14.
[137] John McAleer, ''The Key to India': Troop Movements, Southern Africa, and Britain's Indian Ocean World, 1795-1820', *The International History Review*, 35:2 (2013), pp. 296-300.
[138] Quote from McAleer, 'The Key to India', pp. 298, 314.
[139] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 13.

information, what needs to be emphasized is that the islands entered British war plans because the Royal Navy was starved of information in the eastern Mediterranean. This chapter, therefore, examines the origins of the official Anglo-Ionian connection, as well as the wider unexpected complexities that British officials experienced with their involvement in the area. This revision makes a case for a British defensive strategy against potential French attacks to India, rather than a carefully thought-out plan to secure India via naval posts in the Mediterranean.[140] Robert Holland, for example, mentioned the importance of Egypt for the British not as a stepping stone to India, but 'in a mirror-image of Napoleon's own fascination', and a 'useful element in the struggle to gain leverage over the future of the Ottoman Empire'.[141]

In an eighteenth century military fashion, British military engagements in the Mediterranean (like in Malta) were primarily considered bargaining chips for later negotiations. British ships initiated a blockade of the island in 1798, which ended with the landing of British troops on the island under Captain Ball to fight alongside the Maltese, and the French surrendering the island in 1800. But the continued British presence on the island was far from settled.[142] Under the Treaty of Amiens (1802) the British agreed to withdraw from the island; Nelson thought of Malta as 'a useless and enormous expense' and several naval officers agreed with him. Pitt the Younger also shared similar sentiments.[143] On the other hand, debates regarding the fate of Malta were raging on in the British parliament. Considerations on abandoning Malta were also met with fierce reactions, mostly from Tory politicians.[144] But the decisive strike against the French was the battle of Aboukir in 1798. French commercial traffic was diminished from Marseilles to Turkey and the French navy was temporarily expelled from

[140] On French policies, see Vernon John Puryear, *France and the Levant. From the Bourbon Restoration to the Peace of Kutiah* (California, 1941).
[141] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 13.
[142] I would like to thank Robert Holland for his very helpful comments on an early draft, as well as this particular comment.
[143] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 12.
[144] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 13.

the Mediterranean.[145] As relevant works on the Mediterranean have shown, however, British naval victories did not lead to long-term naval hegemony.[146]

Napoleon's campaigns of 1796-1798 and the implications for the Ionian Islands

It was within this context of blurring strategic aims that Nelson's incursion in the Mediterranean took place. Strategically, French campaigns in Italy (1796) and Egypt (1798-1799) brought Napoleon's army into the eastern Mediterranean. The entrance of French troops into Venice brought the end of the Venetian Republic with the Treaty of Campo Formio (October 1797). French troops occupied the Ionian Islands as a result, abolished aristocratic privileges and established a more egalitarian system in 1797, causing (as would be expected) intense social upheaval. Local councils were established and Trees of Liberty were planted. Jacobin clubs were created in Cephalonia and Zante.[147] The story about the islands entering British military plans after 1798 is more or less told, but it will be repeated here, emphasizing the importance of the islands in communications and the collection of military information, rather than economic motivations.

As said before, Napoleon's successes in Italy brought French armies into the eastern Mediterranean and threatened the allies' military capabilities in the region. After all, for French strategy the islands became increasingly important as commercial and strategic keys to the Levant. Acknowledging the importance of the islands, Napoleon wrote to Talleyrand (the French foreign secretary under the Directory) that, if the French had to choose between all Italy and Corfu, they should keep the latter.[148] But to understand the importance of the islands for British strategy in 1798, one has to look at the broader changes that occurred in systematizing information-gathering in wartime. In previous wars during the eighteenth century, like the American War of 1776-1783, fleets – British and French alike – were often scattered in distant

[145] A.C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (London, 1935), p. 187.
[146] Piers Mackesy, *The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810* (London, 1957).
[147] Calligas, ''The Rizospastai'', pp. 23-26.
[148] Walter Frewen Lord, *The lost possessions of England. Essays in Imperial History* (London, 1896), p. 270.

waters, blundering 'aimlessly' around America.[149] Problems of communications and military intelligence were addressed with greater care during the wars of 1793-1815. Overall, the turn of military officials to intelligence-collection matched a broader interest in knowledge accumulation, but for the purposes of war: the Hydrographic Department was created by the Admiralty in 1795, for example.[150] The process of centralizing knowledge into an office was not without problems: to a great extent naval and military information depended on individual initiatives.[151] In fact, a successful integration of military intelligence owed much to their organization by experienced officers, most characteristically in the case of Wellington's information networks in the Peninsular Campaign, or Nelson's networks in the Mediterranean.[152]

Perhaps learning from previous mistakes in communications during the wars of the eighteenth century, Nelson in particular took great interest in obtaining accurate and, if possible, timely information. In the Mediterranean, he utilized in the best way possible any information networks available. Surprisingly, Nelson's published correspondence has been barely utilized in Ionian historiography, although it is particularly illuminating in regards to early British entanglements in the Ionian Islands; even more usefully, to distinguish between any putative grand strategy for imperial expansion and the reality of the pursuit of short-term military objectives.[153] Most important for maritime communications was the connection between William Hamilton, the British Ambassador to the Kingdom of Naples (1764-1800) and Spiridion Foresti, in the Ionian Islands. Foresti – who was under surveillance by French authorities in the islands as a British agent – constantly and promptly sent information to Hamilton on the movements of the French fleet, on assemblage and dispatch of naval stores

[149] N.A.M. Rodger, 'Sea-Power and Empire, 1688-1793' in Marshall, *OHBE*, II, p. 181.
[150] Richard Drayton, 'Knowledge and Empire' in Marshall, *OHBE,* II, p. 248.
[151] On this, see for example Roger Knight, *Britain against Napoleon. The Organization of Victory 1793-1815* (London, 2013), pp. 285-293; Michael Durey, 'William Wickham, the Christ Church Connection and the Rise and Fall of the Security Service in Britain, 1793-1801', *The English Historical Review,* 121:492 (June 2006), pp. 714-745.
[152] Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, p. 287.
[153] Horatio Nelson, *The Dispatches and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson with Notes by Sir Nicolas Harris Nicolas* (London, 1845).

and on the number of ships available to the French.[154] Napoleon's expedition to Egypt is a characteristic example of how dependent the Royal Navy on information from the Mediterranean. The fact is often referred to, but is rarely taken into account by historians of the islands, that British naval intelligence was lacking, and that Nelson's squadron was far from supplies in the Mediterranean.[155] After the British victory against the French fleet in Aboukir bay (August 1798), Foresti was able to identify French ships that fled the battle of Aboukir, and briefly found refuge in the port of Corfu, being reported as English prizes when in reality they were French ships. The role of Foresti and consular networks will be discussed later, in greater detail.[156]

Meanwhile, the British presence in the Mediterranean, particularly after the victory at Aboukir, raised questions for officials as to the form the British presence should take in the region. British governments from Pitt onwards increasingly saw a dilemma 'as to whether the British aim in the Mediterranean was simply to restore the *status quo ante bellum*, as Pitt himself preferred, or whether a more lasting commitment was being hammered into place'.[157] This dilemma persisted throughout the war, and not only in regards to British possessions in the Mediterranean. Most British considerations were 'fundamentally defensive, financial, and naval rather than aggressively Imperial and territorial'.[158]

The presence of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean in 1798 might be viewed as another example of how the parameters of British foreign policy were changing in wartime. Firstly, there were immediate military and diplomatic objectives: orders that were sent to

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[154] C.I. Chessell, 'Britain's Ionian Consul: Spiridion Foresti and Intelligence Collection', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies,* 16:1/2 (2006), p. 60.

[155] Michael Duffy, 'British Naval Intelligence and Bonaparte's Egyptian Expedition of 1798', *The Mariner's Mirror,* 84:3 (August, 1998), p. 278.

[156] William Wyndham Grenville (1759-1834) was a foreign secretary between 1791 and 1801, a prime minister in the government that was sarcastically called 'ministry of all talents' between 1806 and 1807, and the leader of the Whig Party (1807-1817). Grenville, a personal friend to Pitt, was committed in economic reconstruction after the loss of the American colonies and was responsible for the Canada Act of 1791 which repealed certain parts of Quebec Act in 1774 (Information from P. J. Jupp, P. 'Grenville, William Wyndham, Baron Grenville (1759–1834)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: . http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/11501?docPos=19 (December, 2016).

[157] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 12.

[158] Michael Duffy, 'World-Wide War and British Expansion, 1793-1815' in Marshall, *OHBE*, II, p. 184.

British officials serving in the Mediterranean emphasized the importance of maintaining collaboration with the allied powers of Austria and Russia. For example, the orders that Nelson received during the 1790s were to guard the coasts of Sicily and the Adriatic, and to assist Ottoman and Russian forces operating in the eastern Mediterranean, avoiding giving any cause for further suspicion to the Russians.[159] Ensuring collaboration with its allies was the paramount aim of British foreign policy, especially in cases of continental military operations when accurate communication between officials was needed.[160] Equally, however, the growth of Britain's role in the region led to significant suspicions of other European powers present in the region, particularly regarding threats to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, a concern that played out in British foreign policy since the beginnings of the so-called 'Eastern Question'. British officials like Nelson were frequently concerned with keeping Russian influence away from the eastern Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire.[161]

The Septinsular Republic

Reflecting the political strife they were embroiled in due to class antagonisms, as well as the strategic significance the islands had for European powers, the islanders were divided into different political parties, each supporting France, Russia or Britain. Often, European agents operated in the islands either by promising foreign protection to the Ionians, or by fuelling social tensions. For example, in the case of the French consul in Zante, Constantin Guys: the consul set the building of the French consulate on fire in 1796, in order to place the blame on anti-French sentiments among the Ionians.[162] For Russia, on the other hand, the islands would provide a gateway to the Mediterranean, especially after 1798.[163] But at the same time, Ionian social groups and political factions saw the occupations of their islands by French, Russian and

[159] Dundas to Jervis, 3rd October 1798 in Nelson, *Dispatches*, III, p. 143,144.
[160] TNA FO 42/3, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 19 January 1799; TNA FO 42/3, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 23 January 1799.
[161] Nelson to Spencer Smith, Vanguard off Malta, 26 October 1798, in Nelson, *Dispatches,* III, p. 160; Nelson to Spencer Smith, Naples, 7 October 1798 in Nelson, *Dispatches*, III, p. 145.
[162] Karapidakis, 'The Heptanese', p. 157.
[163] Yannoulopoulos, 'State and Society', pp. 40-42.

later, British troops, as opportunities to forward their own claims, whether for social reform or personal ambitions. This became more evident when the islanders were given nominal independence in 1800. As Calligas characterized this period of turmoil and political 'experimentation', it 'unleashed powerful ideas that were not given time to work off their novelty into a sustainable compromise', remaining as a source of inspiration for Ionians who genuinely wanted social and political change.[164]

Responding to the threat of Napoleon's campaign in Egypt, the Russians allied with the Ottomans in 1799, an alliance which was perceived by a British observer as 'an unnatural state of things between those two powers'.[165] In March of the same year, Russian and Ottoman forces took control of the Ionian Islands from the French. After the occupation of the islands, the new authorities established the Septinsular Republic with the help of local collaborators: a nominally independent state under joint Russian and Ottoman protection, offering at the same time limited self-government to the Ionians. The new state had the 'fundamental principles of a constitution analogous to those of the modern Republic of Italy' whose 'true effect' to the islanders could not be determined yet, as Foresti wrote later to Nelson.[166] Details of the new Republic became known to Ionians through public proclamations. Count Mocenigo, a powerful Corfiote aristocrat, characterized by Foresti as the 'engine that runs the machine', was the Russian plenipotentiary and became the president of the 'infant' state.[167] In reality, Russian interventions were frequent, particularly in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Septinsular Republic.[168] The new state consisted of the seven major islands and several important coastal towns in mainland Greece, which had previously belonged to the Venetian sphere of influence.[169] The creation of the new Republic was welcomed by many on the islands who genuinely wanted deep political and social reforms, but it would nevertheless be but a passing phase in this politically chaotic period on the islands.

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[164] Calligas, 'The 'Rizospastai'', p. 22.
[165] TNA CO 136/2, Meyer to Campbell, Corfu 1st August 1814, p. 148b.
[166] TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Nelson, Corfu 2 July 1803, p. 45b.
[167] TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Nelson, Corfu 2 July 1803, p. 48a.
[168] Karapidakis, 'The Heptanese', pp. 165-166; Calligas, "'The Rizospastai', pp. 26-27.
[169] Mavrogiannis, *History of the Ionian isles*, II, p. 305.

The Septinsular Republic was the first independent Greek state in modern history, and, despite foreign protection, created an important point of reference for Ionians. In terms of research, a fuller picture might be drawn by studying Russian and French archives, though not as part of the present thesis, but rather as a multilingual collaborative project. There is, for example, one work on the period of the Septinsular Republic with a particular emphasis on Russia, which could be used as a point for further study.[170] The Republic – which would have a short life (1798-1807) - was a legal and political entity on its own with its own consulates in places like Malta and the Black Sea. Passports were issued under the supervision of the ministers of the Septinsular Republic, Capodistrias[171] and Mocenigo and have been described by historiography as the first time when 'the passport was invented as a crucial tool of public administration'.[172] This is inaccurate, however, as passport controls are hardly an invention of the nineteenth century.[173]

The creation of the Republic gave to many Ionians the prospect of creating a central authority that would keep the long-lasting social and political antagonisms – and particularly the power of the Ionian elites – in check. For others, it gave prospects of employment, patronage or climbing the social ladder. Successive administrations under foreign protection, and administrators constantly meddling with political and social hierarchies fed into centuries-old antagonisms, throwing the islanders into political turmoil which often ended in armed clashes between different factions on the islands. From the so-called 'Byzantine Constitution' in 1800, which was drafted under the close supervision of the Tsar, one constitution succeeded the other, finally resulting in the constitution which was drafted in St. Petersburg and delivered

[170] James Lawrence McKnight, 'Admiral Ushakov and the Ionian Republic: The Genesis of Russia's First Balkan Satellite' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1965).
[171] Ioannis Kapodistrias (1776-1831), a Corfiote politician and later Greek Prime Minister. He originated from a noble family in Corfu and an influential person in Russian foreign policy, most famously a Russian plenipotentiary in the Congress of Vienna. He was a particularly known figure amongst European courts and diplomatic circles (Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna. Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Harvard, 2014); C.M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria: The founder of Greek Independence* (London, 1973).
[172] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, p. 117.
[173] For example, Torpey mentioned the case of a statute in 1381 which forbade soldiers and merchants to leave England without license, or the case of Czarist Russia in 1725, when Peter the Great put forward 'enhanced documentary controls on movement' in order to boost the military capability of his country (John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 18-19.

to the Ionians (1803).[174] These constitutions, especially the one of 1803, theoretically provided the basis for the constitution that was drafted during British rule in 1817.

Constitutional experiments in the Mediterranean empire in the early nineteenth century were inseparably connected with concerns over military capabilities and expenditure, more than with exporting legal uniformity across the empire. As we will see later, this diversity of locally-implemented versions of the 'rule of law' by British officials owed much to wartime origins, regional concerns of imperial policy and the governors' previous experiences and ideologies. It is a crucial characteristic of early nineteenth century colonial governance.[175] The constitution of 1803 of the Septinsular Republic reflected similar imperatives and provided the theoretical basis for the later constitution under British rule. For contemporaries like Foresti, the defence of the new state was dependent on foreign troops, but was unable to sustain a military force with local revenues: 'I do not see how it is possible for this Republic to maintain its independence, deprived as it is of force of its own; and without some foreign military it is impossible for it to maintain its own internal tranquility', adding that the revenues of the islands, amounting to about 300,000 Spanish dollars, could support a garrison of up to 2,000 men. Campbell confirmed Foresti's observations that the islands had to rely on British revenues to maintain a garrison.[176]

But the creation of the Septinsular Republic should not be studied only in isolation, like previous historical works on the islands have done, but also need to be viewed in its Mediterranean and global dimensions.[177] In the period following Aboukir bay and the birth of the Republic, many saw the British presence in a favourable light across the Mediterranean. Even more, in the Ionian Islands this rising 'Anglomania' seemed to be enforced by British assurances in return. This enthusiasm also encompassed British literary traditions and culture,

[174] Wrigley, *Ionian Neutrality*, p. 41.
[175] Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, *Rage for Order. The British Empire and the Origins of International Law, 1800-1850* (Cambridge, 2016), especially pp. 1-13.
[176] TNA CO 136/2, no. 35, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante 1 March 1814, pp. 20a-b.
[177] Exceptions have been works like Gekas' *Xenocracy;* Holland, *Blue-Water Empire;* Chircop, 'British Imperial Network'.

perhaps most commonly associated with Ugo Foscolo's work.[178] Nelson's victory, for example, was celebrated by gathering crowds across the Mediterranean, such as in Naples or Malta.[179] On the Ionian Islands, more islanders, disappointed with the French and Russian occupations, started to see the British as protectors of their independence and commercial security. British officials like Nelson utilized consular and diplomatic networks in order to collect information on enemy movements and politics, but also to disseminate information, particularly the assurances of the Royal Navy to protect Ionian commerce and the independence of the Republic. Consuls on the spot like Foresti, who came from the island of Zante and knew the language and politics, proved invaluable in this sense. In fact, it can be presumed that in the absence of any military presence, these brokers were personifying British assurances to the islanders.

Addressed directly to the islanders, Nelson's proclamation was circulated among the islands. The proclamation was written in Italian and Greek, and was circulated in Corfu, Cerigo, Cephalonia and Zante in October 1798. Nelson promised that if the 'provisional government' of the islands hoisted the British flag, the protection of the Royal Navy was assured, without any tax or 'contribution'.[180] He also added that, if the inhabitants expelled the remaining French troops, 'all the Admiral' wanted was 'French shipping and property, both of war and merchandize'.[181] 'Upon the whole', he declared, his only wish was to 'deliver good men from tyranny and oppression'.[182] Nelson's promises regarding the protection of Ionian commerce were officially confirmed by a letter from Grenville to the British ambassador in Constantinople, Lord Elgin, in January 1801. Britain acknowledged the creation of the new state and declared that the security of its ships — under the flag of the new state or the British flag — would be

[178] Ugo Foscolo (1778-1817) was born in the island of Zante. A writer, freemason and a revolutionary, in the last years of his life Foscolo lived in England and frequently contributed to *Quarterly* and *Edinburgh Review.* It is very possible he often acted as a link between Ionian circles in the islands and the Greek community in Britain (Information from Sandra Parmegiani, *Ugo Foscolo and English Culture* (New York, 2011).
[179] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire,* p. 25.
[180] 'Admiral Nelson to the inhabitants of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, and Cerigo', 9 October 1798 in Nicolas, *Dispatches*, III, pp. 147, 148.
[181] 'Admiral Nelson to the inhabitants', 9 October 1798 in Nicolas, *Dispatches*, III, p. 147.
[182] 'Admiral Nelson to the inhabitants', 9 October 1798 in Nicolas, *Dispatches*, III, p. 148.

guaranteed by the Royal Navy.[183] The defeat of the French fleet in Aboukir, then, seems to have been the catalyst for a widespread and rising tide of 'Anglomania'.

Predictably, the use of excessive language and hyperbole by Ionians writing to British officials was not only a product of aristocratic vanity, but was also a reflection of the intense political shifts and differences in the islands at the time. Nobles from Zante sent Nelson a sword and a cane as gifts, claiming that his victory had 'liberated this part of Greece, which had fallen an involuntary victim to French rage'.[184] The inhabitants of Zante greeted 'the great nation of Britain' who saved them from 'the horrors of anarchy and destruction'. Now that the seas were 'free', the 'august voices of Religion, of Nature, of Justice, of Humanity were, without terror, heard among us'.[185] Moreover, several members of the 'Septinsular' government were to be sent to London in order to ask for the continuance of British protection.[186]

As we saw before, every foreign intervention or attempt to impose central administration stirred old social and political divisions on the islands. Currant traders in Zante or Cephalonian seamen were asking for British protection, while many Corfiote nobles preferred Russian protection as a means towards re-establishing their titles and lands. Foreign protection acquired a completely different meaning for many Ionians, depending on their social class or political affiliations.[187] Similarly, differences among the islanders extended to local politics, or ecclesiastical jurisdiction between the Catholic and the Orthodox Churches which, crucially, involved rights over land. In fact, the mention of religious affiliation in official correspondence often blurred the lines between religious and ethnic identities: Greek culture was considered inseparable from Orthodox faith by many, including Greeks both on the islands and the mainland. For example, a report in 1815 mentioned: 'with the exception of about sixty seven families, dispersed in the different islands who profess the Roman Catholic religion, the rest of the population is of the Greek faith'.[188]

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[183] Mavrogiannis, *History of the Ionian isles*, II, p. 342.
[184] Nelson to the Presidi of Zante, Palermo, 21 December 1799 in Nicolas, *Dispatches*, IV, p. 151.
[185] Nelson to the Presidi of Zante, Palermo, 21 December 1799 in Nicolas, *Dispatches*, IV, p. 151.
[186] TNA FO 42/3, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 15 October 1799.
[187] Karapidakis, 'The Heptanese', p. 154.
[188] TNA FO 42/16, Report by George Foresti, 3 January 1815, p. 23.

To summarize the previous sections, one episode in 1801 was characteristic of the political turmoil and confusion that were prevalent at the time in the islands. On the night of the 19th of February, a group of inhabitants in Zante hoisted the British flag on the ramparts of the fortress, causing a reaction from the local garrison, whose attitude was quite lukewarm at the time, considering several of Foresti's letters to foreign secretary Hawkesbury, the later Earl of Liverpool (1808) and prime minister between 1812 and 1827.[189] In a state of utter confusion, the consul 'could not be certain' that 'the affair had not been brought by the arts of the Russians', but the British flag remained hoisted for months despite the islands being nominally under Russian protection.

The threat of French invasion, 1803-1805

From 1807 onwards, sending British troops to the islands became increasingly inevitable, particularly when Tsar Alexander signed an alliance with Napoleon. The role of Anglo-Russian relations – and particularly how official anxieties and strategy affected the administration of a strategic outpost like the Ionian Islands – has very often been neglected, or significantly downplayed in Ionian historiography as a trivial factor, which tends to view Britain's ascendancy as a global power after 1815 as an almost natural phenomenon. Meanwhile, the first British attempts to integrate secret and open military intelligence in the 'Depot for Military Knowledge' in 1803, which held maps and significant information on geography, lagged significantly behind its French counterpart ('Bureau de Renseignments'). In fact, a successful integration of military intelligence was achieved only at a personal level, most characteristically in the case of Wellington's information networks in the Peninsular Campaign later, or Nelson's networks in the Mediterranean.[190]

It was in the Treaty of Tilsit, historians argue, when the provinces in the Greek mainland were 'brought within the active margins of European conflict'.[191] However, this had taken place

[189] TNA FO 42/4, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 22 September 1801.
[190] Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, p. 287.
[191] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 19.

already three years before. In the period after 1803, which the rest of the chapter will focus on, Anglo-Russian relations were characterized by ambivalence, and so British efforts sought a balance between striking a permanent alliance with Russia against France, and containing French designs outside the Ottoman Empire.[192] Being at the epicentre of British and Russian policies in the Mediterranean, it was on the Ionian Islands, in close proximity to the mainland, where British and Russian officials cooperated closely, in order to gather information about a suspected major French invasion in the region between 1804 and 1805.

There were differences among British officials in regards to the islands, as previous historians have mentioned, particularly between 'high politics' and agents on the spot. For high-ranking British officials, strengthening the presence of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean in order to support the islands was a controversial issue. George Elphinstone, Viscount Keith (1746-1823), for example, who was the Commander-In-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet at the time, was more concerned about other matters.[193] Referring to him, Foresti mentioned to Grenville that Elphinstone 'did not think that the inhabitants of them [the Ionian Islands were] sufficiently steady or united on their principles to warrant him to give any very decided support. His Lordship added, that other affairs of greater moment claimed his attention, and any step of this sort would certainly commit the British with the Russians and the Turks'.[194]

Compared to parliamentary discussions on Malta or Sicily for example, there were no dilemmas over Britain's lasting commitment to the Ionian Islands. But, as has already been mentioned above, British attitudes towards the islands changed after Aboukir and the Septinsular Republic, particularly as distrust of Russians by officials like Nelson grew, despite the alliance between Britain and Russia and the formation of the Third Coalition later on (April 1805). British officials were oscillating between suspicion and alliance against the common

[192] Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Oxford, 1994), pp. 261-262; Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean,* pp. 45-51.
[193] George Keith Elphinstone (1746-1823), a Scot, was a naval officer and a politician. In his early career he served in the American War of Independence. He took part later in the expedition against the Cape and Dutch positions in India and Ceylon between 1795 and 1797. In 1799 he became a Commander-In-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet, succeeding St. Vincent.
[194] TNA FO 42/4, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 27 February 1801, p. 79a.

enemy, the French, until the emerging political equilibrium among European powers in 1815. Distrust nevertheless persisted after the war and, as this thesis will argue, affected crucial aspects of imperial thinking in the early years of the protectorate. The cession of the islands cannot be explained by judging its inherent qualities for British officials, but by its place in geopolitics and the balance of powers in Europe.

Since the creation of the nominally independent Septinsular Republic, the islands were perceived to be in the Russian sphere of influence. The British foreign secretary, Hawkesbury, was trying to get the court in Saint Petersburg to strike a defensive alliance against France. The British encouraged the Russians to bring more troops to the islands and the mainland in order to guard them from French attack, and the Russians asked for naval protection from the British. On the Ionian Islands, Russian troops were consistently strengthened, reaching 9,000 troops by March 1804. Through the Septinsular Republic, Russia had ensured her presence in the fortified harbour of Corfu and a chain of coastal towns in western Greece, controlling commerce and coastal navigation in the Adriatic.[195] Supplementing the British consular presence, London sent agents to the Islands after 1804, principally to contain French designs, but at the same time creating friction with the Russians.

Despite the Septinsular Republic declaring a brief neutrality in 1803, Britain's presence was becoming more frequent in Ionian politics: the British consul, Foresti, was appointed by Downing Street as Resident in the Ionian islands, aiming to 'cultivate the most unreserved intercourse and good understanding with the Russian Ministers at Corfu, and that you will cooperate with him in every measure which may tend to promote the independence and security of the Republic of the Seven Islands'.[196] At the same time, the consul continued to pass information to London, covering political developments on the islands and enemy movements: in December 1803, he was the one who warned London about the possibility of a French attack on Corfu and the Morea in mainland Greece.[197] Nelson ordered his captains to respect Ionian neutrality and to protect Ionian vessels in case of French attacks, as long as Ionian ports did not

[195] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, pp. 35, 37.
[196] TNA FO 42/5, Downing Street to Foresti, 8 July 1803, pp. 30-31.
[197] TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Hawkesbury, 16 December 1803, p. 76a.

shelter enemy privateers.[198] The ability of Ionian ships to trade under the flag of the Septinsular Republic, which would be recognized by Russia, Britain and the Ottoman Empire, brought significant gains to Ionian shipping and commerce.[199]

Foresti's appointment as a Resident in the Septinsular government was clearly political. British agents along with Foresti were dispatched from London to the islands as well as western Greece, in order to gather information about a possible French invasion in the area.[200] Especially from 1803 onwards, the British penetrated local networks in the mainland, exchanging, for example, ammunition and promises of military aid to local pashas for information on enemy movements and politics in Constantinople. Strategically, the access of local pashas to information on enemy movements and the land would prove invaluable to the Royal Navy, and they would become central figures in Nelson's information networks in the eastern Mediterranean. By maintaining agents on the spot like Foresti, London had acquired invaluable access to information from the mainland and the Ottoman Porte. It was at this stage that Anglo-Ottoman relations would crystallize into a fragile and fluctuating alliance, and at the same time, effectively stabilize Britain as an intermediary between the Ottoman government and other European powers.

The 'irretrievable step was taken': the impact of the Treaty of Tilsit on Anglo-Ionian relations, 1807-1809

Despite Nelson's impressive, and final, victory at Trafalgar in 1805, the French armies were far from defeated. The Napoleonic victories against the Austrian and the Austro-Russian armies in Ulm and Austerlitz respectively in the same year are cases in point.[201] Always fragile, Britain's position in the Mediterranean became even more precarious in the absence of supporting Austrian and Russian land forces on the continent. Either way, the British

[198] Nelson, *Dispatches,* V, pp. 88, 89, 166, 270.
[199] Kapetanakis, *Shipping and commerce*, pp. 82, 83. The Ionian fleet was estimated by Foresti at the time, at about 500 vessels (TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 26 May 1803, p. 19a).
[200] TNA FO 42/5, Downing Street to Foresti, 1 February 1804, pp. 128-129.
[201] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, p. 212.

contribution to the coalition forces in Europe before 1808 was primarily naval. Disappointed with Britain's lack of substantial contribution in war on the continent, and with a Russian army exhausted after a decisive French victory in Friedland (June 1807), Tsar Alexander signed the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807.

The signing of the treaty came as an absolute shock, particularly to British officials serving in the Mediterranean who became clear advocates of the idea that the Royal Navy should occupy the islands. Meyer wrote to Hammond that the treaty was an 'irretrievable step' and the ministers of Russia were 'victims of disappointed ambition', suggesting the occupation of Corfu by British troops[202]:

> The expulsion of the French from Corfu would disconcert the enemy; would deeply depress their influence in the Levant; would exile the Greeks, wary and bigoted, to seek the protection of the sovereigns of the Seas, whom they know to be Incorruptible protestant Christians; would deter the Enemy and his confederates from subverting so easily the Turkish Empire; perceiving the impassable barrier drawn across the Northern frontier of the Morea. Such an operation would convince the nations of the South and the western Asiatics, now the objects of Russian and French delusion, of the irresistible energy of British power, when unaided, would make it again respected where it is now the maxim to work at it, to execrate it![203]

According to Tilsit, the Russians agreed to aid France against Britain, and France agreed to aid Russia against the Ottoman Empire in return. As a result, British policy became close to the Porte. As previous historians have mentioned, after the treaty the British embassy in Constantinople became the vantage point for the British in the eastern Mediterranean.[204] British officials now had to face multiple challenges: the threat of invasion by Napoleon – in both Britain and Britain's possessions in India – as well as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, for which the French and Russian emperors were already making contingency plans.[205]

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[202] TNA FO 42/9, Meyer to G. Hammond, Kew Surr[e]y, 4 December 1807, pp. 251-256.
[203] TNA FO 42/9, Meyer to G. Hammond, Kew Surr[e]y, 4 December 1807, pp. 251-256.
[204] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 19.
[205] Katherine E. Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte. Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (New Jersey, 1999), p. 11.

Moreover, Russia agreed to join Napoleon's 'Continental System' and as a consequence of the treaty declared war on Britain, isolating her. Russian trade with Britain, supplying naval stores and grain coming from the Black Sea, closed after 1807.[206] Never integrating fully into Napoleon's 'Continental System', Russia kept a rather neutral stance towards Britain and did not engage in full-scale military conflict. The fact that Russia relinquished her possessions in the Mediterranean was a new reality, which created the circumstances for Britain to send troops and to occupy the islands two years later. It was only after Napoleon's invasion of Russia (1812) that trade relations between Russia and Britain were fully restored.[207] The Treaty of Tilsit was also crucial for the Russian presence in the Adriatic and the Ionian Islands. The strategically important port of Cattaro (modern day Kotor, Montenegro) and as mentioned above, the Ionian Islands, were ceded to France under a secret article of the treaty.[208]

By 1807, Corfu had become a major military depot in the eastern Mediterranean for all European powers involved. The French established a force of about 7,000 troops there, a garrison which was characterized as 'enormous'.[209] Spiridion Foresti wrote to Lord Collingwood, Commander-In-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet, in August of the same year that the Treaty of Tilsit was so important that it 'almost established the future destiny of Europe'.[210] He perhaps wrote with some hyperbole in order to provoke a military reaction from London, but he nevertheless expressed a genuine concern for the British at the time: Tilsit indeed looked like it sealed Britain's fate. The French occupying troops would be able to organize provisions and expeditions against British positions in Sicily or Egypt.[211] In a state of panic, official anxieties about a potential attack on British possessions in India, accompanied by a renewal of fears of

[206] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean,* p. 10.
[207] Hugh Ragsdale, 'Russian foreign policy, 1725-1815' in Dominic Lieven (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Russia. Volume II. Imperial Russia, 1689-1917* (Cambridge, 2006), p. 519.
[208] Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's integration of Europe* (New York, 1991), p. 27; Panayiotis Kapetanakis, "The deep-sea going merchant fleet of the Seven Islands during the time of British conquest and protection and the Cephalonian prominence (1809/15-1864). Fleet and ports, cargoes and sea-routes, maritime centres and seamen, entrepreneurship and networks, society and shipowning elites" (Unpublished PhD thesis, Ionian University, 2010 – in Greek), p. 37.
[209] British Library (henceforth BL), Richard Church papers, Add MS 36,543, f. 142a.
[210] TNA FO 42/9, Foresti to Collingwood, Corfu, 11 August 1807, p. 154a.
[211] TNA FO 42/9, Foresti to Collingwood, Corfu, 11 August 1807, p. 155a-b.

the invasion of Britain itself, seemed to come roaring back.[212] Robert Adair, a diplomat, for example, forwarded information to the new Secretary of War and the Colonies, George Canning (appointed March 1807) and the Governor-General of India, Lord Minto, about 'a plan for such an attack' (against India) through Persia which was 'undoubtedly formed'.[213]

Aside from speculations about Napoleon's perceived targets, French attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire played a great role in British strategic thinking. The Treaty has been referenced in passing in Ionian historiography often,[214] yet it was an important milestone towards the final occupation of the islands by the British. Occupying the islands gave significant advantages to the French, particularly in regards to communication channels with the Ottoman government. From Corfu, the French could enter into a 'constant intrigue with the Greek subjects of the Porte' but also strengthen their presence in the Ottoman Porte.[215] Meanwhile, under close surveillance by the French authorities in the islands, consuls who served in the islands were able to convey crucial information to London about Napoleon's designs on the east.[216]

Then the 'irretrievable step' in Tilsit made British connections with the Greek mainland inseparable from their policies in the islands. As we saw before, and as we will also see in the next chapter in greater detail, British communications with local pashas were instrumental in collecting information in the period 1803–1805. Ongoing secret communications, for example with Ali Pasha of Ioannina, were established to predict French designs and became of crucial importance for the British, especially following Britain's isolation after 1807. In a rather reciprocal relationship, British officials played upon the pasha's personal ambitions and his quarrel with Russia, while Ali sought to consolidate his power in the Ottoman Empire with the help of the British.[217]

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[212] Knight, *Britain Against Napoleon*, p. 274; Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean,* p. 212.
[213] Adair to Canning, Vienna, November 28, 1807 in Robert Adair, *Historical Memoir of a mission to the court of Vienna in 1806* (London, 1844), pp. 292, 293.
[214] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 68; Calligas, 'The Rizospastai', p. 27.
[215] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, p. 213.
[216] TNA FO 42/9, Meyer to George Canning, Kew, Surr[e]y, 12 December 1807.
[217] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, p. 341.

Withdrawing from the Mediterranean became the new reality for Russian foreign policy.[218] This thesis argues that Russia's withdrawal started the countdown for British troops to occupy the islands. Suspicion between Russia and the British was mutual and did not subside even after Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, when the latter and Britain became firm allies. Most characteristically, Anglo-Russian rivalry would reach a climax over the growth of Russian influence on the flourishing trade on the Lower Danube and in Greece during the revolution in 1821-1822.[219] At the beginning of negotiations in Vienna, Meyer summarized the complicated relationship between Russian government and the local population, and what Britain's involvement should be in the area:

> … the moment Great Britain retires from the key islands Russia will immediately reappear on the stage of the Levant, so familiar, so partial to her … [and will claim the] the powerful unanimous support of an whole long oppressed enthusiastic people, (deserted) by other nations, professing the same religion and cherishing the same political views![220]

Meyer's concerns were shared by other British officials later, and the same anxiety was evident at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, as seen in the case of Castlereagh on the eve of the Congress of Vienna. On the Ionian Islands, individuals and networks with connections to Russia were immediately suspected of Russian expansionism by British officials, particularly in the post-Napoleonic era. These claims of Russia's supposed expansionism in the Mediterranean were exaggerated, but nevertheless affected (to an extent) British governance in the islands. We will see more of these wartime concerns that stemmed from Anglo-Russian relations, and how these were articulated in the diplomatic negotiations at the end of the war in the next chapters.

The loss of the islands to the French after Tilsit also created a more immediate problem for the Royal Navy: a lack of depots for colonial goods and manufacturing, as well as for

[218] Ragsdale, 'Russian foreign policy', pp. 526, 527.
[219] Paul Cernovodeanu, 'British Economic Interests in the Lower Danube and the Balkan Shore of the Black Sea between 1803 and 1829', *Journal of European Economic History,* 5:1 (Spring 1976), p. 120; TNA CO 136/2, Meyer to Campbell, Corfu, 1st August 1814, pp. 148a-b.
[220] TNA CO 136/2, Meyer to Campbell, Corfu, 1 August 1814, p. 151b.

shipbuilding and repairs, in the eastern Mediterranean. Napoleon's continental blockade forced commerce to enter Europe via the central Mediterranean, particularly through smuggling. Nevertheless, the aim of the blockade — to strangle British exports and isolate the British — would soon become redundant and dissolve. Malta, for example became a major entrepôt. By 1808 the island was already absorbing approximately 12.6% of British exports, mostly for onward transmission.[221] As Alexander Ball – the British governor of Malta at the time - noted in 1807, the only limit to the expansion of Maltese trade was the shortage of storage space.[222] But British possessions in the Mediterranean were primarily temporary contingencies of strategic and military importance, and secondarily of long-term commercial value.

To sum up what may seem in retrospect an incredibly chaotic period: from Nelson in 1798 to the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, for British officials the Ionian Islands belonged to the Russian sphere of influence. The treaty of 1807 shocked the British and was considered by many an irretrievable step of Russian policy. It is often mentioned in Ionian historiography, but its actual importance to the occupation of the islands by British troops is downplayed: it seemed to justify British distrust of Russia, and allowed for a greater accommodation between Ottoman and British interests, particularly those of Ali Pasha who saw the British as reliable allies to support his ambitions in the mainland. The withdrawal of Russia from the Mediterranean gave the British the opportunity to increase their influence over the Ionians and Greeks in general, and to look for a secure outlet for trade and shipbuilding.

As for the 'prime movers' behind the occupation of the islands, there have been attempts in historiography to relate British expansion and particularly the occupation of the islands to the needs of the metropolitan economy. Panayiotis Kapetanakis, for example, argued that the establishment of colonial rule in the islands was meant to secure British commercial interests in the eastern Mediterranean, a development related to two parameters: the opening of the Black Sea and the desire to acquire more favourable terms in Ionian exports. According

[221] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 16.
[222] Desmond Gregory, *Malta, Britain, and the European Powers, 1793-1815* (London, 1996), p. 215.

to such interpretations, it was domestic demand as well as developments in the periphery that provoked the occupation of the islands:

> The interest of Britain over the Ionian Islands is dated much earlier than 1809 and her decision for the gradual occupation of the islands and their inclusion into her colonial possessions. As research has shown, the most important reason which lead Britain to the islands, during the years before the 19th century, was trade and was related to the necessity of acquiring favourable terms in one of the main products of the islands, but also main ingredient in British dietary habits, which was currant. This commercial interest of British for the Ionian Islands will begin to acquire political characteristics with the Revolutionary wars (1792).[223]

Kapetanakis' interpretation sought to connect the history of the Ionian Islands with broader developments in the empire, what is known as the rise of the Second British Empire. But as this chapter shows so far, to privilege economic reasons such as the currant trade over diplomatic and military circumstances – particularly following Tilsit – would be misleading.

British involvement in Ottoman politics and chimerical theories after Tilsit

So far, this chapter has tried to explain that the decision to occupy the Ionian Islands was not due to a 'prime mover' like trade or the passage to India. If there was any grand strategy among British decision-makers, it can be outlined as primarily to contain France, to secure the Ottoman Empire and to ensure Britain's home defence. At the same time, the exact nature of Britain's involvement in the Mediterranean sparked much controversy in Britain, in Parliament as well as among the wider public.[224] Although this is not the topic of this thesis, it is worth mentioning that a number of publications circulated in Britain, particularly travel

[223] Kapetanakis, "The deep-sea going merchant fleet', p. 317.

[224] Debates between the 'blue-water' school and supporters of the balance of powers in Europe. See Daniel A. Baugh, 'Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815', *The International History Review*, 10:1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 33-58. Also for a broader perspective, see Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, volume II. The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760-1914* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 268; Holland, *Blue-Water Empire,* pp. 27-30; John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power* (London, 1989), pp. 48, 49.

literature, and a broader intellectual and cultural interest in the 'Orient' grew.[225] Such an example is John Usko's *Brief Narrative* (1808).[226]

In order to understand the change of mentalities in regards to Britain's role in the eastern Mediterranean in this last section of the chapter, we will briefly examine new diplomatic developments and the parallel interest in the east that was sparked in Britain. Then, we will examine the 'peripheral' factors that played out in the decision to occupy the Ionian Islands by British troops. Essentially, this particular section, and the wider chapter as well, build upon Tumelty's thesis concerning the importance of British officials on the spot, and of Ionian collaborators, in the final decision to establish the British Protectorate in 1815, which will be discussed in a later chapter.

Although secondary compared to military and strategic considerations, there were also commercial considerations behind the occupation of the islands. A significant development in British commercial policy as well as diplomacy, for example, was the 'opening up' of the Black Sea grain market in 1809. In 1807, a few months before Tilsit, a British fleet under Admiral Duckworth tried to force the Ottoman government to join the Anglo-Russian alliance and to open the straits of Dardanelles and the Black Sea trade. Duckworth failed to force the straits and a combined British expedition to Alexandria also failed, resulting in a war which ended two years later with the Treaty of the Dardanelles in January 1809.[227] The treaty fully restored older Anglo-Ottoman capitulatory treaties of 1675 and, more recently, 1802, and gave a boost to British trade in the Black Sea: a tariff of 3 per cent on British imports was charged, and the properties of British merchants were restored.[228]

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[225] The literary phenomenon that Edward Said described as 'Orientalism' (Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978)).
[226] John Usko, *A Brief Narrative of the Travels and Literary Life of the Rev. John F. Usko* (London, 1808). Usko (1760-1842) came from Prussia and was naturalized as an English subject in 1808. He was a theologian and one of the few experts in Oriental languages. He traveled extensively in the Levant and was appointed as a pastor in the Anglican Church in Smyrna from 1783 (Maria Kostaridou, 'I Metavasi tou Pastora Usko sti Vretania: Periegetike Grammateia kai Orientalismos' [The transition of Pastor Usko to Britain: travel literature and Orientalism'] in Ilia Chatzipanagioti-Sangmeister (ed.), *Taxidi, grafi, anaparastasi. Meletes gia tin taxidiotiki grammateia tou 18ou aiona* (Athens, 2015) [*Travelling, Writing and Representation Studies on Eighteenth-Century Travel Literature].*
[227] TNA FO 93/110/1B, 'Translation of a Treaty of Peace and Amity between Great Britain and the Ottoman Porte', signed in 5 January 1809.
[228] TNA FO 93/110/1B, 'Translation of a Treaty of Peace and Amity between Great Britain and the Ottoman Porte', signed in 5 January 1809, Article VI, Cernovodeanu, 'British Economic Interests', p. 107.

The British mission, led by Robert Adair, managed a great diplomatic achievement by effectively securing British trade in the Black Sea and ending the French monopoly at the same time.[229] Most importantly, a secret article ensured Britain was a principal ally of the Ottomans against the French, and potentially a mediator in the case of a Russo-Ottoman war. According to the article, the British paid £300,000 and offered assistance to the Ottomans 'should France unjustly declare war against the Sublime Porte'.[230] British assistance would come in the form of military protection of Ottoman harbours and islands in the Mediterranean, defending the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Dalmatia, and supplying the Porte with guns and powder. Even Britain's role as a mediator with Russia was explicitly mentioned. At the same time, she had to respect the integrity of Ottoman territories.[231] Signing the treaty seemed to confirm to British officials the old notion among British officials about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire which was believed to be underway. Britain became the most important European ally to Ottoman interests. Ruptures between French-Ottoman relations had also taken place a few years before, when Ottoman territories in the Balkans were threatened by French invasion in 1804-1805, particularly in mainland Greece. These developments in the eastern Mediterranean had an impact on how many British officials viewed Britain's political and military presence in the region.

Notions of Ottoman decline caused a broader interest among the British public. In Britain, some intellectuals called for Britain to play a greater role in the Mediterranean. Works on Britain's new role caused great controversy and were called 'chimerical' by many. These works encouraged Britain's 'blue-water' policy, and saw Britain's role in the Mediterranean in the light of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Gould Francis Leckie (1767-1850), for instance, was one such interesting case who advocated for a more lasting British presence in the region. Leckie was a British landowner living in Sicily from 1801 to 1807, and associated with the British who resided in the Mediterranean at the time, such as the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the Civil Commissioner of Malta Sir Alexander Ball, and Sir John Moore, the famous Scottish

[229] TNA FO 93/110/1B, 'Translation of a Treaty of Peace and Amity between Great Britain and the Ottoman Porte', signed in 5 January 1809, Articles III-VI.
[230] TNA FO 93/110/2, 'Separate and Secret Article', Dardanelles, 5 January 1809, p. 2.
[231] TNA FO 93/110/2, 'Separate and Secret Article', Dardanelles, 5 January 1809, pp. 3, 5.

commander of British forces in Spain.[232] As mentioned before, Leckie's *Historical Survey* was published in 1808. Leckie's main argument was that Britain should focus on her naval dominion, as 'the safest policy seems to be to look to ourselves for that security which we have hitherto founded on a precarious balance, and which has cost us so much treasure to maintain'.[233] Britain should play a major role in what was seen by Leckie and many of his contemporaries as the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire: the British should consider the creation of an independent Greece under British protection, as this would be 'a necessary step' as 'a secondary maritime and military power between the two continents'.[234] Respecting local customs and religion, he suggested Crete, Cyprus and the Ionian Islands as ideal outposts for British protection.

To draw explicit connections between Leckie's grand-strategic plan and British military operations in the Mediterranean would be an exaggeration. After all, Leckie's views were considered 'theoretical' among decision-makers and he was characterized by several newspapers of the time as a 'chimerical theorist'.[235] His ideas on Britain becoming an 'insular empire' were more controversial when they became public in 1808 than they would become later in nineteenth century, and the lines between the 'blue-water' school and supporters of the balance of powers were not always clear. To a large degree, imperial thinking was still shaped by the notions of the eighteenth century and, in terms of policy, the issue of the level of Britain's military commitment to the continent.[236] Moreover, following the shock of Tilsit and the enforcement of Napoleon's continental blockade, Britain's isolation became a reality and would hardly be pursued further by policymakers. But coming from his recent experience in Sicily, Leckie's work saw the acquisition of naval stations and outposts like Sicily, Malta or the Ionian Islands in their Mediterranean context. His ideas about an independent state under British protection, instead of the acquisition of territorial possessions as colonies, started to gain influence in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. And the nature of these regimes should

[232] Diletta D' Andrea, 'Great Britain and the Mediterranean Islands in the Napoleonic Wars – The 'Insular' strategy of Gould Francis Leckie,' *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 16:1/2 (2006), p. 81.
[233] Leckie, *Historical Survey,* p. iii.
[234] Leckie to Sir John Moore, August 1807 in Leckie, *A Historical Survey*, pp. 26, 27.
[235] D' Andrea, 'Great Britain and the Mediterranean Islands', p. 86.
[236] Baugh, 'Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815', pp. 57, 58.

be constitutional, as the 'tyranny of Asiatic despotism' should be confronted by a British constitution.[237] Nevertheless, it was a growing mentality among British officials, which quickly gained ground during the French Revolution and the wars of 1793-1815, that Britain would be secure only by controlling the seas, allowing for the expression of views of theorists like Leckie.

The occupation of the islands, 1809

To move back to the matter of the occupation of the islands, in terms of decision-making, more pragmatic targets were pursued in 1809, defined by concerns about military capability, logistics and costs. In the Mediterranean, official thinking was clearly cantered on Sicily and Malta, and not on the Ionian Islands. For the Prime Minister, the Duke of Liverpool, a military expedition to Cephalonia and Zante made sense only in regards to strategic considerations on Sicily and ideally in the hopes of avoiding high costs: 'if the permanent or temporary occupation of those or any others of the islands … would tend materially to the security of Sicily, without the necessity of [engaging] the British military force at this time in that sea, the expedition might upon that ground be judged expedient; But, when it is considered how large a part of the disposable force of the British army is already in the Mediterranean', whereas out of 16,000 men, 10,000 were stationed in Sicily.[238] In another letter to Stuart, Liverpool mentioned 'the superior importance' of Sicily, where in all of Stuart's arrangements of troops he should 'consider the security of Sicily and Malta as primary objects'.[239]

To show such ambivalence towards the Ionian Islands compared to Sicily or Malta was common. Even as late as 1815, Castlereagh was considering delivering the islands to Austria during the Congress of Vienna. As was mentioned before, the decision to occupy the islands was not part of a grand strategy regarding the region. But as Ronald Hyam noted, 'decisions are

[237] Leckie, *A Historical Survey*, p. 8.
[238] TNA War Office (henceforth WO) 6/56, Liverpool to John Stuart, Downing Street, 29 November 1809, to pp. 88-89.
[239] TNA WO 6/56, Liverpool to John Stuart, Downing Street, 30 December 1809, p. 92.

not taken by trends or abstract phenomena, but by individuals in very small inner groups'.[240] In the case of the islands, this 'inner group' consisted of British military officials who had served on the spot and were convinced of the potential benefits that possession of the islands would bring to Britain. New circumstances, and particularly the loss of Sicily after 1806, seemed to encourage more military officials to turn to the eastern Mediterranean in search of secure naval depots. Moreover, information networks that operated in the Mediterranean obtained valuable local knowledge for British ministers, convincing them of the importance of the islands as a British possession after 1815. Decision-making over the occupation of the islands was thus shaped by the 'dictates of strategy and war'.[241] Tumelty's thesis concerning the primacy of British officials on the spot in the decision to occupy the islands, although depressingly Anglocentric, is still valuable and often downplayed.[242]

In 1809, the Austrian army was destroyed in the battle of Wagram and Napoleon's army entered Vienna. Austria's own ambitions in the Adriatic – including her claims on the Ionian Islands – were thwarted, and British troops in the Mediterranean were entirely exposed to a French attack.[243] With the Austrian armies neutralized, and the Royal Navy unable to support any troops in the continent, military opportunities available to the British were mainly at sea. Responding to calls from Ionian captains in Malta for support, Lord Collingwood sent troops to occupy the islands in September of the same year. The decision to occupy the islands came rather spontaneously from Collingwood, who wrote later: 'I hope that this last expedition will be approved in England by His Majesty; but I have undertaken it without instructions, and on my own responsibility. The General seemed rather averse to it, and doubtful whether he could safely spare the troops from Sicily'.[244] British troops were meant to hoist the flag of the Septinsular Republic and not of Britain, which would show to 'signify to the native inhabitants'

[240] Ronald Hyam, 'The primacy of geopolitics: the dynamics of British imperial policy, 1763-1963', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 27:2 (1999), p. 28.
[241] Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands', p. 1.
[242] Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands', see Introduction.
[243] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, p. 332.
[244] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, p. 355.

that it was not a conquest, 'but the expulsion of the French, to liberate them from bondage'.[245] Ionians '*should not be given to understand, that the British forces are intended to garrison the islands*, as it is expected their own troops will be able to maintain their independence, when the enemy is expelled'.[246]

Eventually a British expeditionary force of about 1,900 troops attacked French forces in the Ionian Islands and captured the islands one by one.[247] Foresti followed the British troops under General Oswald in Zante and then in Cephalonia. About 7,000 French troops and their auxiliary forces under General Donzelot delivered Corfu with her strong fortifications in 1814, after a blockade by the Royal Navy. Ionians were exhausted by war and intense political struggles in the islands, and British officials were careful to maintain the façade of Ionian independence until the formal cession of the islands in 1815. British intervention was sought by most, and in most British landings there was no resistance. Depending on the influence of the British party in the islands and old commercial connections, in islands like Zante or Cephalonia British troops were welcomed as liberators. Organized committees sent their acknowledgments to British officials from Ithaca, Cerigo and Zante.[248] After the surrender of Corfu, other British officials who served on the islands echoed Meyer and Foresti's observations on the importance of keeping the islands. James Campbell, for example, wrote to Colonial Secretary Bathurst in 1814: 'This very important subject [of keeping the islands] having naturally occupied my own mind and attention … as well as that of the other servants of His Majesty, to whom you now pleased to confide the interests of Great Britain in this quarter, in the accompanying address of Mr. Meyer, you will have before you the ideas which have presented themselves to us, and towards which, as they will spread … for themselves, I have only to solicit your Lordship's indulgence and favourable consideration'.[249]

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[245] Copy of Vice Admiral Lord Collingwood's instructions to Captain Spranger, of H.M. Ship Warrior, respecting the attempt to deliver the Ionian Islands, in 1809, Off Toulon, 3 August 1809 from Parliamentary Proceedings (Hansard T.C., *Parliamentary debates,* New Series, **XII**, 1816, p. 547).

[246] My Italics. Copy of Vice Admiral Lord Collingwood's instructions to Captain Spranger, of H.M. Ship Warrior, respecting the attempt to deliver the Ionian Islands, in 1809, Off Toulon, 3 August 1809 from Parliamentary Proceedings (Hansard T.C., *Parliamentary debates,* New Series, **XII**, 1816, p. 547).

[247] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 19.

[248] TNA FO 42/11, Foscardi, Martinengo etc. to Canning, Zante, 9 December 1809, p. 229.

[249] TNA FO 42/15, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 5 August 1814, pp. 24-25.

Conclusion

The chapter outlined the lineaments of British occupation of the islands. It mapped out the developments that turned the islands from one of England's main trade partners in the Levant to an 'observatory to the whole of Turkey' within a couple of years. It showed how the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 was primarily the catalyst for the occupation of the islands and how the Treaty of the Dardanelles created prospects for future profits and the expansion of British trade. The signing of the treaty of 1807 between Russia and France, and the subsequent conquest of the islands by British troops gave significant leverage and advantage to British representatives in the negotiations that took place in the aftermath of war. Meanwhile, these developments took place at a time when many across Britain debated Britain's global role, perhaps also because of the abolition of slave trade in 1807. In this sense, works like Leckie's require further study. The aims of British policymakers in this part of the Mediterranean were clearly for strategic purposes and for reasons of communications and information. At the same time, the chapter examined the unprecedented developments in Ionian society and politics. Despite its brief existence, continuous foreign interventions and the close supervision of French, Russian and Ottoman rulers, the creation of the Septinsular Republic between 1799 and 1807 unleashed progressive ideas regarding governance and education.

Chapter 2: Consular networks and colonial bridgeheads. The case of Spiridion Foresti, 1797-1813

The previous chapter explored the reasons for the occupation of the islands by British troops, and the place of the islands as an observatory over the Ottoman Empire. But British rule was not established purely in terms of strategy. In this chapter we will examine more closely the networks and individuals who obtained and communicated information on the islands to British policymakers in the period between 1797 and 1813. More specifically, the chapter focuses on consular networks and on the case of Spiridion Foresti during the early period of Anglo-Ionian connection. Foresti was a British consul from the Ionian island of Zante, and an important source of information for the British in wartime. The chapter examines the terms and circumstances that led to his employment as a British consul as well as the ways in which his personal and professional background affected the information he passed on to British officials. Building on the existing historiography on imperial careers, the chapter asks how Foresti and his contacts contributed to establishing a 'colonial bridgehead' in the eastern Mediterranean.[250]

[250] Lambert and Lester, *Colonial Lives*, pp. 6-7; John Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion', *The English Historical* Review, 112:447 (June 1997), pp. 614-642; Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, 'Between Metropole and Colony. Rethinking a Research Agenda' in Cooper and Stoler (eds.), *Tensions of Empire. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997); Similarly, Pratt, Mary Louise, *Imperial Eyes: travel writing and transculturation* (London, 1992).

Information and consuls in the chain of command

There are recurring methodological problems when dealing with consuls or lower diplomatic officials in imperial and global history, especially when historians gauge the significance of lengthy reports and the copious amounts of knowledge that was passed on to London on commercial statistics, local customs or local politics. It is difficult, for example, to assess how crucial the information that the consul processed to London was, and how relevant it was to British policymaking in the region at the time. Of equal importance was the extent that consuls, or any local information brokers, maintained their own network of contacts and how they participated in local power networks. First, this section will briefly examine the professional environment of the consul and his role in the chain of command. Then it will provide the background to the history of the British consul in the Ionian Islands.

Nowadays, historians seem to be as condescending as higher-ranking officials – diplomats and military officials alike – were at the time towards consuls. Overall, the histories of consuls seem to be histories of neglect: on the one hand, viewed through the lens of traditional diplomatic history of 'great men', their presence in the empire is considered less than important, compared to the history of diplomats. On the other hand, viewed through the lens of cultural or social history, diplomats and consuls are neglected altogether. This has recently started to change, and historians who are drawn to examining the role of lower ranking officials, 'peripheral' figures and go-betweens, are also turning their attention towards consuls.[251] By acknowledging the multiple interconnections between Britain and her overseas areas of influence, these studies choose to focus instead on the importance of British officials

[251] Sara ElGaddari, 'His Majesty's Agents: The British Consul at Tripoli, 1795-1832', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 43:5 (2015), pp. 770-786; Katherine Arner, 'Making Global Commerce into International Health Diplomacy: Consuls and Disease Controlin the Age of Revolutions', *Journal of World History,* 24:4 (December, 2013), pp. 771-796; James Davey, 'Supplied by the enemy: the Royal Navy and the British consular service in the Baltic, 1808–12', *Historical Research*, 85: 228 (May 2012), pp. 265-283; the works of Ian Chessell on Foresti: 'Britain's Ionian Consul: Spiridion Foresti – British Protection to Greek Revolution (1810-1822)' paper submitted for Barcelona conference, 2014; 'Britain's Ionian Consul: Spiridion Foresti and the Return to the Islands 1807-1810', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 19:2 (2010), pp. 201-218; 'Nelson's Ionian Agent: Spiridion Foresti and Intelligence Collection for the British Mediterranean Commanders', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies,* 16: 1/2 (2006), pp. 45-61; Christian Windler, 'Representing a State in a Segmentary Society: French Consuls in Tunis from the Ancien Régime to the Restoration', *The Journal of Modern History,* 73:2 (June 2001), pp. 233-274; D. C. M. Platt, *The Cinderella Service. British Consuls since 1825* (London, 1971).

'on the spot'. In this sense, historiography on consuls also touches upon relevant debates in imperial and global history regarding colonial lives and imperial careers across the British world.[252]

The British consul was a male, low-ranking official working in the service of the Foreign Office. Depending on their region and the importance to British policy at the time of that region, consuls were not operating alone but were supported by a range of associates who answered directly to them. Hierarchically, the consuls were subordinates to diplomats, but they could also be promoted if their conduct was considered worthy. In the eighteenth-century eastern Mediterranean, the main centres of diplomatic activity were in Naples and Constantinople, particularly after Selim's reforms (1789-1807) in the Ottoman Empire. Consular networks existed in the Ionian Islands, in Patras, in smaller ports in the Aegean, and in the States of Barbary in Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli.[253]

Consuls, as mentioned above, are comparatively neglected in modern historiography. This neglect does not reflect only general methodological concerns of causality and historical significance, but its neglect seems similar to official mentalities and the chain of command in the Foreign Office during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Consulship was perceived by many British officials largely as a private – and profitable – affair as opposed to the 'selfless' service of the diplomat. However, it seems that distinctions between the supposedly impartial diplomat and the supposedly opportunistic consul were largely rhetorical constructs of their time, reflecting divisions within the officialdom of British foreign policy and politics more generally, rather than a reality.[254] Most of the time, the consul came from the merchant classes, whereas diplomats were drawn from the landed aristocracy. Moreover, there is no evidence that consuls were more driven by private interests than were diplomats. There are many examples of diplomats who accumulated massive economic and cultural capital from their service, several British ambassadors in the eastern Mediterranean among them; for example,

[252] Lambert and Lester (eds.), *Colonial Lives,* see pp. 1-31.
[253] The Barbary States were smaller independent states in Northern Africa consisting of modern day Tunisia, Libya and Algiers - which were loose protectorates of the Ottoman Empire - and Morocco, which was an independent state. (Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, p. 18).
[254] Platt, *Cinderella Service*, p. 1.

the famous Thomas Bruce, Earl of Elgin, who was ambassador to Constantinople between 1799 and 1803. Despite such distinctions within British officialdom, in most cases pragmatism prevailed: the British government would consider using any available individual who knew the region.

Consuls often encountered problems in communications and lack of instructions from London, which they solved by employing their own strategies and network of connections. Until Castlereagh's and Canning's reforms in 1815 and 1825 respectively, consuls – and occasionally diplomats - were poorly instructed by the foreign secretary regarding their actual responsibilities.[255] We do need to state here that British consuls (or consul-generals by another title), like Alexander Cockburn in Saxony for example, complained in 1809 that consuls were 'like lost sheep in the Wilderness, without any sort of instructions or any information respecting their duty, in consequence of which they have been obliged to follow the steps of their Predecessors, and they are generally considered by Merchants as doing more injury than service to the Trade which they are intended to protect'.[256] Supplemented by funds and port-fees as means for their subsistence, consuls were above all necessary agents and information brokers of the empire in their area of operation. It was only in 1903 that the consular as well as the diplomatic service systematized 'recruitment, control, transfer and promotion'.[257]

Reflecting his role as an information broker, the consul often established contacts and struck agreements that neither ministers in London, nor military officials on the spot, could achieve. He would give assurances to local notables in the areas the consul was operating in. One example of an agreement like this took place in the Balkans in regard to the supply of timber: after being contacted by the British consul, the British contracted the powerful Ali Pasha of Ioannina to secure the supply of timber, in return for territorial concessions or firearms. Ali was appointed by the Porte in 1787 as a governor and ruled the *pashalik* (province) of Ioannina, a territory which ended up consisting of much of today's Greek mainland and part

[255] Charles Roland Middleton, *The Administration of British Foreign Policy, 1782-1846* (Durham, 1977), p. 245; Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, pp. 19-20.
[256] Quote in Middleton, *Administration,* p. 244.
[257] Middleton, *Administration*, p. 244.

of Albania.[258] Such connections increased British influence over Ottoman politics and were established by small groups of individuals: the role of consular networks was paramount in this. Recent historiography has also explained amicable agreements between British consuls, Beys and various tribal leaders in Northern Africa, which benefitted both sides in different ways.[259] Acting as representatives of Britain in distant places, in most such agreements the consuls offered British protection and patronage.[260]

Methodologically, the role of consuls in the empire is better understood if one utilizes John Darwin's use of 'colonial bridgeheads': 'the bridgehead was the hinge or 'interface' between the metropole and a local periphery. It was the transmission shaft of imperialism and the recruiting sergeant of collaborators … whether British influence grew, or was transformed into formal and informal empire, largely depended upon the circumstances and performance of the bridgehead'.[261] While British influence initially depended on the 'colonial bridgehead' that the British consul established, the first formal government under British protection did its utmost to replace wartime sources of information.

Spiridion Foresti: consular networks and historical background

When considering microhistory or any study at a small scale – whether places, individuals or objects – historians have cautioned that it is dangerous to 'love too much' their subject. As Jill Lepore writes, 'getting too close to your subject is a major danger, but not getting to know her well enough is just as likely'.[262] Clearly the interesting stories of consuls as 'lost sheep in the Wilderness' of imperial frontiers warrant such a temptation. Equally interesting was the case of the British consul in the Ionian Islands, whose family, just like his

[258] Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte*; Dennis N. Skiotis, 'From Bandit to Pasha: First Steps in the Rise to Power of Ali of Tepelen, 1750-1784', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 2:3 (Jul., 1971), pp. 219-244; John W. Baggally, *Ali Pasha and Great Britain* (Oxford, 1938).
[259] Sara ElGaddari, 'His Majesty's Agents'.
[260] F. Robert Hunter, 'Rethinking Europe's conquest of North Africa and the Middle East: the opening of the Maghreb, 1660–1814', *The Journal of North African Studies*, 4:4 (1999), p. 12.
[261] Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians', p. 629.
[262] Jill Lepore, 'Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on Microhistory and Biography', *The Journal of American History*, 88: 1 (June, 2001), pp. 129.

counterparts in the Levant Company, had established old connections between England and the eastern Mediterranean, being stationed in the island of Zante, a place whose commercial links with England stretched back to the sixteenth century. Diligently and steadily, the British consul who was appointed in Zante, Spiridion Foresti, sent lengthy reports to the Foreign Office on exchange rates, local customs, Ionian politics, or on enemy movements and manpower in wartime; pretty much any information on economic, diplomatic or political interest was routinely shared with the Treasury and the Board of Trade.[263]

As microhistory examines the lives and careers of individuals, it also needs to examine their role in the broader environment. In the case of the Ionian Islands in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in the midst of social and political change. Conceptually, when referring to the policymakers of the late Victorian period as well as the multiple 'projects' of colonialism, Darwin called for a 'closer attention to the ethnographic, micro-economic and topographical characteristics of colonial and semi-colonial bridgeheads' in order to understand the information milieu in which British policymakers lived.[264] This study argues that such observations may be useful for the early nineteenth century as well. At the same time, it examines how – although inherently unequal – British and Ionian interests became compatible for brief moments, resulting in the consolidation of British rule in the islands. As we have already seen, various information networks operated in the eastern Mediterranean, which obtained and processed information for London using the Ionian Islands as vital links of communication with the mainland. For example, when a high-ranking official or agent was sent from London, he was passing through Corfu and was being informed by the local British consul about local politics, customs etc.

Most of the consuls were drawn from the English or local mercantile communities abroad who had strong ties with England, for example the Levant Company or the consulate in the Ionian Islands (Zante). The consuls often served long enough to identify themselves with the places where their posts were. In the early nineteenth century, consuls were appointed, in

[263] Middleton, *The Administration of British Foreign Policy*, p. 244.
[264] Darwin, 'Imperialism and the Victorians', p. 642.

several cases due to previous consular service of other family members. That was the case with Spiridion Foresti (1752-1822), originating from a wealthy family of merchants from Zante, and who became a consul on the same island in 1783. Previous works on Ionian historiography, mostly by Ian Chessell and Panayiotis Kapetanakis, have already discussed Foresti's role in British consular networks. This thesis builds upon these works.[265] Another case on the Ionian Islands was Peter Sargint, the son of John Sargint, also consul in the islands and predecessor to Foresti.[266] Similarly, the extended family of Pisani, from the island of Chios in Greece, of whom Bartholomew Pisani was the first dragoman (translator) for the British embassy in Constantinople.

Foresti's father had served as an officer with distinction in the East India Company.[267] Evidence about the life and service of his father in East India Company is scarce, except for a map of Calcutta drawn by someone called Foresti, and by Ollifres in 1742.[268]

Discovering Spiridion Foresti's story through these sources may seem like a made-up tale. Yet it can be illuminating as to the conditions in which British agents were recruited in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In 1789, Foresti was forced to leave his island, Zante, as he recovered stolen cargo from pirates from the island, and helped in the pirates' execution afterwards. After three attempts by the pirates' relatives on his life, Foresti asked for British protection, for the 'speedy removal' of him, his wife and children to a place of security, and a sum of money to ensure his removal and as a means of subsistence. British captains trading in Zante and two consuls from Leghorn – Sir Edward Astley and John Howard – supported his requests as 'acts of justice due to his distinguished merit'.[269] His requests were

[265] I would like to thank both of them for the exciting conversations regarding Foresti and the Ionian Islands: Ian Chessell, 'Nelson's Ionian Agent; 'Britain's Ionian Consul' and the paper 'Britain's Ionian Consul: Spiridion Foresti – British Protection to Greek Revolution (1810-1822)'; Kapetanakis, *Shipping and commerce*.
[266] Anonymous, *A Journal, kept on a Journey from Bassora to Bagdad; over the Little Desert, to Aleppo, Cyprus, Rhodes, Zante, Corfu; and Otranto, in Italy; in the year 1779. By a Gentleman, Late an Officer in the Service of the Honourable East India Company* (Horsham, 1784), p. 131.
[267] TNA FO 42/1, p. 115.
[268] I could not confirm whether this Foresti was the father of Spiridion Foresti, but it shows the implication of his broader family in British service, C. R. Wilson (ed.), *Old Fort William in Bengal. A selection of official documents dealing with its history. Vol. I*, (London, 1906), p. iii.
[269] TNA FO 42/1, p. 115.

accepted soon afterwards and Foresti relocated to Corfu.[270] These would be the first of several distinctions Foresti would receive during his career. From that point afterwards, his career as a consul really took off. This became evident in the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars with France in 1793, when he began corresponding regularly with Nelson during Napoleon's campaign in Egypt in 1798. In his long correspondence with British officials, Foresti was very often depicted by British officials as hard-working, and a staunch supporter of British protection on the islands.

Considering the fact that consuls rarely received clear instructions from London, the content of shared information was largely dependent on the consul's evaluation of circumstances and connections. Regardless of wide assumptions about the consul's role in British foreign policy, since 1649 they were considered state officials. During the course of the eighteenth century, they became increasingly identified with British national interests and part of an increasingly well-organized diplomatic service.[271] They usually received salaries on the king's civil lists, and often collected various fees from British merchants in the ports in which they resided.[272] Foresti, for example, received a salary of £200 per annum.[273] Lacking clear instructions from London, the consul was largely left to his own devices. In the eastern Mediterranean for example, British consuls cooperated closely on a variety of issues with merchants and officials of the Levant Company, as well as with various officials of the Ottoman Empire, from Constantinople to Barbary. D. C. M. Platt, for example, calculated that thirty-two consular stations existed in 1790 in the Mediterranean, out of forty-six overall.[274] The British consulate in Zante was a vital link in communications for the British with Constantinople, and Foresti corresponded frequently with the British ambassador in the Ottoman capital, passing intelligence to and from London, along with news of developments taking place on the islands.

Apart from his consular duties to communicate local news to the Foreign Office and overseas embassies, Foresti had private contacts on the Ionian Islands, in mainland Greece, in

[270] TNA FO 42/1, Foresti to the Duke of Leeds, Zante, 16 November 1789, p. 117.
[271] Platt, *Cinderella Service*, see Introduction.
[272] Middleton, *The Administration of British Foreign Policy*, p. 246.
[273] TNA FO 42/17, G. Foresti to Castlereagh, London, 6 October 1819, p. 250.
[274] Platt, *Cinderella Service*, p. 10.

Italian cities and in London. His connections were among Venetian officials, Ionian elites and merchants. For example, he heard about Britain's declaration of war on France (February 1793) from a Russian ship coming from Messina in March 1793.[275] Among his contacts in London was, for example, Frederick North, a well-known classicist and Maitland's predecessor as a colonial governor in Ceylon. Foresti was also in communication with the rapidly developing Greek and Ionian-Greek diaspora in the Black Sea and Constantinople. Since the mid-eighteenth century – and particularly after 1815 – Greek communities were spread across the Black Sea shores, engaging especially in shipping and the export of grain. For example, between 1785 and 1821, 37% of Greek captains who carried exports from the Black Sea originated from the Ionian Islands.[276] As a Greek, Foresti shared a common language, customs, and religion with Greeks on the mainland, allowing him access to information from local communities that very few British possessed. On the other hand, being 'confined' to an island, Foresti asked to be provided with the means to forward quicker correspondence to London via a boat express to Otranto.[277]

Historically, Foresti certainly warrants characterization as a 'go-between': 'someone who articulates relationships between disparate worlds or cultures by being able to translate between them'.[278] Foresti was ethnically Greek and his faith was Greek Orthodox, but his political affiliations and income were linked with the British state and foreign policy. This chapter thus contributes to relevant literature on brokers and 'go-betweens'.[279] His case raises questions of space and agency which are also raised through relevant literature, such as: where

[275] TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Zante, 10 March 1793, p. 7.
[276] Katerina Papakonstantinou, 'Anazitontas nees efkeries: oi Ellines sto emporio tis Mavris Thalassas sta teli tou 18ou aiona ['Seeking new opportunities: Greeks in the Black Sea trade at the end of 18th c.'] in Evridiki Sifnaiou, Gelina Harlaftis (eds.) *Oi Ellines tis Azofikis, 18os – arches 19ou aiona. Nees proseggiseis stin istoria ton Ellinon tis notias Rossias* (Athens, 2015) [*Greeks in the Sea of Azov, 18th – early 19th* centuries], p. 297.
[277] TNA FO 42/1, Foresti to the Duke of Leeds, Zante, 10 August 1790.
[278] Simon Schaffer, Lissa Roberts et al. (eds.), *The Brokered World. Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770-1820* (Sagamore Beach, 2009), p. xiv. But also, Martin Daunton, Martin J., Halpern, Rick (eds.), *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
[279] For example, Emrah Safa Gürkan, 'Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go-Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry', (unpublished PhD thesis, Georgetown University, Washington DC, 2012); Natalie Zemon Davis, *Trickster Travels. In Search of Leo Africanus. A Sixteenth-Century Muslim Between Worlds* (London, 2007); Colley, *Captives*, pp. 23-134.

did his political sympathies lie? Were his activities related to the institutions they sought to produce?[280]

Nelson's intelligence and the origins of British protection, 1797-1798

Consular service as well as his father's connections gave Spiridion access to news about both Ionian and British politics. But his network was extensive in terms of individuals as well: for example, he used his own contacts to enable the provisional government of the islands to employ skilful civil officials from all over the Balkans; namely, professors from the vibrant Greek – and particularly, Ionian – mercantile community in Constantinople. He liaised with almost every individual he could for intelligence when they stayed in Corfu in transit to the continent or the Porte.[281] In the previous chapter we saw how the islands entered British naval strategy and Nelson's plans in the Mediterranean.

This section examines Nelson's networks of information from the perspective of Foresti, Nelson's source of information in this part of the Mediterranean. The aim is to explain how the British gained greater access to Ionian society and how they acquired better knowledge of Ionian politics using Foresti's network of contacts and information. Furthermore, in a broader context, the fortunes and political life of Foresti and his family were linked earlier than the Napoleonic Wars with the historical phase of 'northern invasion': the commercial penetration of western and northern European shipping and products in the Mediterranean, followed by British naval hegemony in the nineteenth century. In fact, the decline of Venetian political and economic influence, and the subsequent rise of English trade in the Mediterranean has been an ongoing debate in Anglophone and Francophone literature at least since the 1930s.[282] The

[280] Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Some Afterthoughts' in Schaffer, Roberts et al., *The Brokered World,* p. 430.
[281] TNA FO 42/7, Foresti Mulgrave, Corfu, 28 May 1805, pp. 111-112.
[282] The list is huge. Fusaro, *Political Economies* and 'After Braudel. A Reassessement of Mediterranean History between the Northern Invasion and the *Caravane* Maritime' in Fusaro et al., *Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Braudel's Maritime Legacy* (New York, 2010), pp. 10-14; Richard T. Rapp, 'The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony: International Trade Rivalry and the Commercial Revolution', *The Journal of Economic History*, 35:3 (September 1975), pp. 499-525; Ralph Davis, 'England and the Mediterranean, 1570-1670', in F. J. Fischer (ed.), *Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England in Honor of R.H. Tawney*

concept of 'northern invaders' became so deeply ingrained in historical consciousness that it may seem today inevitable by many historians.[283] Therefore, studying such social and economic processes through the lens of small scale contexts – like Foresti's networks – might provide another perspective.

Foresti was very active in the early years of the wars with France. His correspondence with the Foreign Office is also useful in mapping out the network of connections he had access to. For example, in 1794 he sent information to Grenville – who was foreign secretary between 1791 and 1801, and a governor of a declining Levant Company at the time (1799-1821) – regarding corn shipments to France: sixty ships from the Greek islands of Hydra and Spetzes were shipping corn to various French ports via Genoa or Leghorn. These Greek ships were contracted by French merchants in the Levant (i.e. Salonica), and corn was sold at prices more than double the original cost.[284] But Foresti's locally-obtained information was found necessary during Napoleon's campaign in Egypt (1797-1798). As mentioned before, Foresti was the one that discovered the remaining two ships of war that escaped the destructive battle in Aboukir bay in 1798. The French ships had fled to Venice from Corfu and Foresti was able to identify the ships after comparing inquiries from locals and a report by Watson, the British consul in Naples.[285] The British consul tried to include the Ionian Islands in the imperial agenda as he was a supporter of British occupation of the islands.[286] But his role was not important just because of his tracking of enemy movements.

Victualling for naval stores was one of the consul's most crucial duties. Regarding raw materials and especially timber, Foresti was pointing to forests in mainland Greece as an excellent source of timber for ship-building and repairs since before the war broke out in 1793. The French had signed a contract with Ali Pasha of Ioannina between 1782 and 1791 to fell the

(Cambridge, 1961); Frederick C. Lane, 'Venetian Shipping During the Commercial Revolution', *The American Historical Review*, 38:2 (Jan. 1933), pp. 219-239. And of course Fernand Braudel's masterpiece, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, volumes one and two* (Paris, 1972 [1949]).

[283] With the exception of Molly Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century', *Past and Present,* 174 (2003), pp. 42-71.

[284] TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Zante, 14 July 1794.

[285] TNA FO 42/3, Foresti to Grenville, Venice, 28 September 1798, p. 90a.

[286] TNA FO 42/3, Foresti to Grenville, Venice, 28 September 1798.

trees, and had established a commercial house in the nearby town of Preveza. The pasha provided the cutters in exchange for firearms.[287] French merchants furnished timber for ship-building to Toulon from nearby forests and imported colonial produce from Marseilles for several years. Since then, however, this traffic had ceased.[288] It was a 'fatal' mistake, Foresti wrote to Grenville, that his predecessor had overlooked this and did not mention it to the British government.[289] With minimal expense, these forests could quickly provide for the building of six ships of the line and to allow the careening[290] of ten.[291]

Timber was a rare commodity, particularly in times of war. The effectiveness of the navy relied on its logistics: foodstuffs and naval stores being the most important. As for the latter, the Admiralty gradually became well aware of the shortage of the product, as it was becoming a growing problem for the Royal Navy, particularly during Napoleon's campaign in Egypt (1798).[292] Moreover, low supplies of timber after the treaty of Amiens (1802) and the cancellation of contracts with timber-suppliers due to corruption in the Baltic further increased that need. After 1809, Napoleon's continental blockade effectively brought an end to the Baltic timber trade, when the British government deliberately imposed high charges on the product in preference of Canadian timber.[293]

Canadian and Mediterranean timber trades became available, and the role of the consul was key in pointing out any new sources of the product he could trace.[294] Being on good terms with the contractor, forests in western Greece could become suitable for the construction of warships for the British at a low cost, and 'sufficient to answer the demands of any of the most

[287] TNA FO 42/11, Foresti to Canning, Malta, 14 February 1809, p. 40a.
[288] J. C. Hobhouse Broughton, *A Journey through Albania and other provinces of Turkey in Europe and Asia, to Constantinople, during the years 1809 and 1810, volume 1* (London, 1813), p. 74.
[289] TNA FO 42/1, Foresti to Duke of Leeds, Zante, 10 August 1790, p. 170.
[290] Careening, or 'to hove down' was the practice of beaching a vessel for high tide, in order to repair one side of the hull.
[291] TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 24 November 1797, p. 285.
[292] On the problem of timber shortage for the Royal Navy: Albion, *Forests and sea power*, and a different view in Knight, 'New England Forests'.
[293] Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People*, p. 276.
[294] J. Knight, 'Nelson and the eastern Mediterranean', p. 196; Marshall, 'Britain without America – A Second Empire?' in OHBE, vol. II, p. 586.

extensive naval powers'.[295] Agreement between the pasha and the British became easier after British plans for landing on the islands became more realistic. In 1809, Foresti sent a report to Canning titled 'Concise statement of the number, extent, produce and present condition of the forests situated in the territories of a powerful Ottoman official, Ali Pasha of Ioannina'. The document consisted of a very detailed report on the exact location of these forests, the size and quality of timber, and information on the shipping ports nearby.[296] Timber was finally secured in 1810, in return for territorial concessions to Ali.[297] In 1812, Castlereagh wrote to Foresti to ask Ali Pasha for his protection, so that the British could acquire timber from the shores of the Adriatic for shipyards in Malta.[298]

As the islands' economy and society were directly dependent on maritime trade, the same was true of political stability. This social process was developed to the point of creation of a civil society and a commercial bourgeoisie on the islands under British rule during the nineteenth century. In many ways, Foresti's case calls for further research into the origins of an English-affiliated political party, as well as into the extent that this group's interests and aspirations were associated with an identifiable 'commercial bourgeoisie' on the islands.[299] It seems that Foresti already considered British protection the better option for the islands by 1798. Most crucially, the benefits of such 'protection' – in whatever form – lay in the opening of Ionian maritime trade and the abolition of Venetian monopolies. Since Venetian rule, Ionian merchants were repulsed by tight regulations enforced by the authorities, who increasingly used the agricultural production and exports of the islands as an attempt to balance the Republic's losses in international markets. As mentioned before in this thesis, the Republic of Venice had enforced local monocultures (currants in Zante and Cephalonia, olives in Corfu) and the islands depended on imports of grain from the mainland or elsewhere (later the Black Sea).

[295] The forests in the Gulph of Arta, in the area of Preveza. The French had already employed engineers to take a plan of the region: TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 24 November 1797, pp. 284, 285.
[296] TNA FO 42/11, Foresti to Canning, Malta, 14 February 1809, no. 12, pp. 39-45.
[297] J. Knight, 'Nelson and the eastern Mediterranean', p. 202.
[298] TNA FO 42/13, Castlereagh to Foresti, Foreign Office, 22 March 1812, p. 1.
[299] Gekas, 'The commercial bourgeoisie'; *Xenocracy*, pp. 130-168.

As a result, the islands were dependent on nearby areas for importing foodstuffs and were often threatened by scarcity.[300]

It was at this stage that Ionians began to seek foreign protection from strict Venetian laws, and British protection started to appeal to many Ionians in wartime. Foresti was among Ionian merchants whose profits were affected directly: he wrote to Grenville about the duty of *Novissimo,* where all exports – particularly currants and olive oil - had to pass through Venice and pay high duties.[301] At this stage, however, Venice could not control the maritime traffic effectively, and Foresti might have exaggerated the strict enforcement of the measure. This strict economic control progressively made Ionian exports much less competitive; one example being currants from Zante compared to currants from the nearby Morea. A five-year trial abolition of this obligation by the Venetian Senate also proved to be very profitable for British-Ionian trade, as they could trade directly with the islands. The exact impact of abolition on British commerce could be confirmed by information from British merchants trading in the region.[302]

Economic imperatives also played a role in Foresti's preference of British protection. Resorting to an old tactic among seamen in the Mediterranean to avoid strict regulations, Ionian merchants hoisted neutral flags - such as Ottoman, or those from Jerusalem and Raguza - or became occupied in clandestine trade. Such practices became increasingly common during the Napoleonic wars. According to Foresti, many Ionians associated foreign rulers with commercial regulations and control, while the British were linked with the development of free trade. Indeed, further research into Ionian conceptions of the English during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is more than necessary in order to understand better the transformation of Anglo-Ionian relations as well as of Ionian society during that time. In any case, it was rather common during the earlier period for English merchants to circumvent Venetian commercial regulations no less than the Ionians.[303] Since 1798, Foresti assured

[300] Calligas,"'The Rizospastai', p. 15.
[301] Gekas, 'The commercial bourgeoisie', p. 56.
[302] TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Zante, April 1795.
[303] Fusaro, *Political Economies*, p. 121.

Grenville that 'if any English naval force, however small, should make its appearance in the neighbourhood of these Islands, the republicans [supporters of Revolutionary France] would immediately fall a sacrifice to their hatred. This is particularly applicable to Zante, where a constant and advantageous commercial connection with the English nation, has strengthened their natural sentiments'.[304] These obstacles that Foresti mentioned to Grenville were well known to Ionians who were affected by Ionian maritime trade, particularly the islands of Zante and Cephalonia. His family – as well as his island, Zante - were economically connected to British interests through the important currant trade.[305] Maria Fusaro had shown the importance of English commerce for the two islands, and the inability of Venice to incorporate the islands into her economic system: 'Zante and Cephalonia', Fusaro writes, 'developed autonomously to fulfil the demands of the English market, setting in motion a profound transformation in their social fabric that made them substantially different even from the other Ionian islands such as Corfu'.[306]

Foreign 'protection' and political information, 1798-1807

During Nelson's expedition to the Mediterranean, Foresti rose from the position of a consul and a broker to that of a political agent in the islands due to the invaluable information he obtained locally. This information helped the Royal Navy enormously during Napoleon's campaign to Egypt. At the political sphere, Foresti quickly became after 1798 a leading member of the 'English party' in the islands, which became increasingly active particularly during the French administrations of the islands (1797-1798, 1807-1814).[307] Ionians who supported British protection were a disenfranchised mix of aristocrats and merchants in the islands whose

[304] TNA FO 42/3, Foresti to Grenville, Zante, 11 March 1798.
[305] Fusaro, *Political Economies*, p. 125.
[306] Fusaro, *Political Economies*, p. 304.
[307] Known members of the 'English party' on the islands came from old aristocratic families and merchants in the islands: Antonios Commuto, Antonios Martinengo, Emmanouel Thetocky, Stefanos and Balbi Skordilis, Andreas Politis, Drakos Melissinos (Karapidakis, 'The Heptanese', pp. 176, 177).

interests had received serious blows due to war in the Mediterranean, and due to Venetian and later French restrictions on trade.

During the French occupation of the islands in 1797 Foresti, being a British agent, was in a precarious position in Corfu. In the meantime, he managed to smuggle valuable political intelligence out of Corfu, referring to political developments in the islands: 'Marks of discontent, by no means equivocal, have been shown by the inhabitants of Zante, and particularly those … under the direct government of the French', Foresti wrote to Grenville.[308] While the ostensible cause was the attempt to levy more taxes, he observed, the real reason was 'a rooted hatred to the French, and to the effects of the interruption of their commerce' with Britain.[309] Ionian men and women were giving frequent 'proofs of the rooted and invincible hatred … for every individual of the French nation'.[310] Indeed, the initial French occupation - which lasted only twenty months – brought mixed feelings to many Ionians. French authorities abolished Ionian aristocracy, proclaimed freedom of the press and planted the 'liberty tree' in Corfu. Amongst the least popular characteristics of French administration in 1797 and 1798 was anticlericalism. Although Foresti admitted that political opinions were by no means homogenous amongst the Ionian social strata, he consistently emphasized political commentary in favour of British protection.

Furthermore, individuals such as Foresti knew how Venetian information systems functioned at the local level, and especially how Ionian nobles utilized them. Examples like these were the channels of information that circulated from the towns to the countryside, and back: many Ionian aristocrats who lived in the towns were usually tightly connected with the peasants in the countryside through of tenancy or social relationships. Information was thus circulating between the towns and the countryside relatively quickly. Incendiary proclamations from the urban centres to rural areas could provoke rebellions, should they be combined with local grievances.

[308] TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 23 October 1797, p. 263.
[309] TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 23 October 1797, p. 263.
[310] TNA FO 42/2, Foresti to Grenville, Corfu, 21 December 1797, p. 297.

Harsh measures were taken by the French, in order to prevent the leaks of sensitive information from the town to the countryside, and in order to avoid agitated reactions from peasants who disliked French rule. Several aristocrats were imprisoned in Corfu in 1798. Foresti was well acquainted with these aristocrats, and could not suspect any other reason for their arrest other than 'circulating intelligence to the peasantry'.[311] Actions such as this increased a general state of dissatisfaction in the islands for the conquerors, allowing at the same time Foresti to play a greater role as a de facto representative of the British presence in Ionian politics. Information-gathering came at a personal cost for Foresti: shortly after the French occupation of the islands he was put under house arrest as an official of an enemy nation[312], and the whole of his personal effects were confiscated, worth 7,000 pounds.[313] He resumed communication with the Admiralty by using his contacts and by smuggling information to Nelson.

For the first time after years, change was in the air. In the period after the French occupation of the islands, Foresti's role as a political agent of Britain developed and subsequently came to play a greater role in Ionian power networks. The creation of the 'Septinsular Republic' in 1800 and the constitutions of 1800, 1803, 1806 gave an impression of political independence to many Ionians, even under the supervision of Russia. A class of Ionian reformers and intellectuals came to the fore during the new Republic, genuinely wanting the new government to implement deep changes to institutions traditionally controlled by the local aristocracy. Furthermore, literary societies were founded in the islands.

Some genuine efforts took place by the new Ionian government to restrain the power of the elites, reform local administration, education and commerce. The Septinsular government even appointed a historian to write the history of the new republic, Andrea Mustoxidi (1806).[314] Despite the strong presence of Russia and foreign protection, social and political changes were significant. Yet, old rivalries persisted and factions clashed like the Annini

[311] TNA FO 42/3, Foresti to Grenville, Venice, 28 September 1798, pp. 90a-b.
[312] He was put under house arrest in 31 July 1797. I owe this information to Ian Chessell.
[313] TNA FO 42/17, [signed] Foresti, St. James's Place, 21 October 1816, p. 63.
[314] Karapidakis, 'The Heptanese', p. 173; Mavrogiannis, *History of the Ionian Isles*, II, pp. 27-30, pp. 68-110.

and Metaxa families in Cephalonia.[315] Clamour for deep reform in all aspects of Ionian society multiplied. Islands like Zante and Cephalonia had been explicit in preferring British protection over that of other powers, while Corfu was less dependent on British trade and politically more divided. Meanwhile, social and economic differences between the islands persisted. Partly due to their older commercial connections with Britain, there were no feudal structures and jurisdiction in Zante and Cephalonia, unlike in Corfu.[316] These differences were known to London due to the information that British agents such as William Martin Leake, obtained on the ground when they were sent to Greece.[317] Meanwhile, in July 1803 Foresti was appointed by Grenville's successor as foreign secretary, Lord Hawkesbury (1801-1804), as 'his Majesty's Resident to the Republic of the Seven Islands', a position which superseded his place as a consul. He was urged to 'cultivate the most unreserved intercourse and good understanding with the Russian minister at Corfu … to promote the independence and security of the Republic of the Seven Islands'.[318]

Throughout the period of the Septinsular Republic, Foresti depicted the supporters of French influence on the islands in very dark colours. For example, he wrote to Hawkesbury about 'illegal proceedings' taking place in Corfu in 1803: these inhabitants 'were particularly warm in the French interests during the last wars', and their 'misconduct has been notorious … yet policy at present prevents both the [Ionian] government and Count Mocenigo [the Russian plenipotentiary] from using the severe animadversion those persons merit'.[319] According to him, Ionians who were attached to French interests were 'notorious' and belonged to 'that class who was the cause of all the disturbances … have affected these islands; Notwithstanding which many of them now occupy the most lucrative and important offices under this government, to the quiet astonishment and surprise of the lovers of order and moderation'.[320]

[315] Karapidakis, 'The Heptanese', p. 170.
[316] Fusaro, *Political Economies*, p. 305.
[317] TNA FO 78/65, Leake to Canning, Preveza, 13 March 1809, p. 22a-b.
[318] TNA FO 42/5, Hawkesbury to Foresti, Downing Street, 8 July 1803, pp. 30-31.
[319] TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 22 January 1803, pp. 8a-b.
[320] TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 26 May 1803, p. 18b.

Foresti thought that British protection would bring an end in these differences, and would ensure the political stability and economic prosperity on the islands.

But Foresti's observations to British ministers on the strategic significance of the islands, were backed up by other officials who served in the islands, such as the new consul who was appointed to the theoretically independent Septinsular Republic, Walter Rodwell Wright (1774/5 – 1826). He wrote the poem *Horae Ionicae: a poem descriptive of the Ionian Islands and part of the adjacent coast of Greece* (1809). Wright succeeded Spiridion Foresti as a consul in the Ionian Islands between 1803 and 1805, as 'Consul for the Republic of the Seven Islands'. He was also a scholar and had accumulated material about the islands. His library and archive were looted by the French authorities, destroying a work he was preparing on the history of the islands.[321]

We saw before how Ionian merchants had earlier tried to avoid Venetian regulations. Indeed, to an extent Venetian and French regulations on Ionian maritime trade made it less competitive, and war did not improve the situation. Traditional Ionian exports like currants were harmed, particularly compared to those of the Morea in the mainland. Yet, it seems that it was very widely assumed that, should the British seize control of the islands, they would abolish strict measures over commerce. Wright, for example, was convinced that British protection would make Ionian exports more competitive and would ensure the prosperity of their inhabitants. Writing to Mulgrave he warned about the influence of Russia in the islands, where the majority of their inhabitants shared common religious dispositions with the country of the Tsar:

> The commercial security and personal liberty resulting from the naval superiority and liberal policy of the British government, combined with the probable influx of British capital, would, I conceive, operate as an effectual counterbalance against the superior fertility and extent of the opposite peninsula (Morea). And these neglected Islands would be such protection be enabled to rival the produce and possibly the manufactures of the Morea.

[321] Seccombe, Thomas revised by Rebecca Mills, 'Wright, Waller Rodwell (1774/5–1826)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-30065?rskey=I3RJN1&result=1 (November 2016).

> While the comparative effects of the different systems of policy, which would most probably be adopted by the two protecting nations, would sufficiently prevent the extension of that Russian influence which must ultimately prove detrimental to the interests of Great Britain.[322]

Wright thought that the possession of the Ionian Islands would give Britain considerable advantages, particularly in regards to the main aims of British foreign policy in the region. He was concerned that, although the Septinsular Republic, being occupied by Russian troops, would present a 'strong frontier' against the 'attempts of a French armament', the greatest threat for British interests came from the growth of Russian influence in the area. Against the policy of Russia, he suggested 'immediate precautions' were necessary: for Britain to come to an agreement with Russia - to acquire either the Ionian Islands or the Morea. But because Britain was a maritime power, he suggested that the former would be a better outcome.[323]

Similarly, he sent information on the revenues and produce of the islands. Apart from an effective and strategic 'counterbalance' to the concerns mentioned above, the islands would prove to be an economic benefit as well: Corfu could provide an 'excellent' naval station and could be furnished with quantities of timber and hemp cordage from nearby areas. Its soil was fertile but 'extremely ill cultivated affording scarcely any other produce than a considerable quantity of oil', which was exported to Venice.[324] Santa Maura could also provide timber according to Wright, Paxo and Ithaca offered their convenient ports, Cephalonia its capable seamen and currants, Zante its currants which could generate revenues for the government worth £100,000 (Ithaca and Cephalonia currants worth £50,000), and Cerigo its wine, which 'might afford a considerable supply for British consumption'. The 'principal disadvantage' was for Wright the fact that the islands were dependent on mainland Greece for their supply of provisions, but the fertility of Corfu would offer a solution if policies of agricultural improvement were promoted.[325]

[322] TNA FO 42/6, Wright to Mulgrave, Zante, 26 February 1805.
[323] TNA FO 42/6, Wright to Mulgrave, Zante, 26 February 1805, p. 20.
[324] TNA FO 42/6, Wright to Mulgrave, Zante, 26 February 1805.
[325] TNA FO 42/6, Wright to Mulgrave, Zante, 26 February 1805, p. 21.

Like Foresti and other officials who served in the Mediterranean, Wright promoted the idea to ministers in London that the Ionian Islands could turn into an important entrepôt in the Mediterranean. But Wright did not stay for a long time in the islands, having a very brief consulship. In fact, only after a year of his appointment to Zante he expressed his wish to leave, seeking to acquire a position of 'superior value and consideration' in the recently established consulate of Alexandria (1803) or Raguza, should a consulate be created there.[326] He soon left the Ionian Islands and returned to England as his health had deteriorated 'from the heats of the past summer'.[327] It is difficult to assess whether Wright left the islands because he indeed suffered from illness, or because of lack of opportunities, or because he simply found the Greeks unbearable. But if there was another thing his brief presence in the islands had shown, that was Foresti's role as a guest for high-ranking newcomers from England, and therefore their first source of information.[328]

Foresti's role as a vital source of information was recognized by Nelson, who had established an extended network of information gathering in the Mediterranean, particularly during Napoleon's campaign in 1797-1798.[329] Writing to Evan Nepean in 1799, he acknowledged Foresti and the British consul at Tunis, Major Magra, as the '*only* ones … who really and truly do their duty, and merit every encouragement and protection'.[330] Foresti's 'zeal, spirit and assiduity' was commended also by Lord Grenville, and a couple of years later Foresti was promoted, something that did not occur very often in consular service. In fact, two years after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, he was recommended for knighthood. 'No native servant of His Majesty could have displayed a greater degree of zeal and fidelity, in promoting the interests of this country', the Earl of Vincent wrote much later to Foresti.[331] But as we will see later, despite his being apprised by other British officials all of his contacts could not protect

[326] TNA FO 42/6, Wright to Earl of Bristol, Zante, 23 November 1804, pp. 16, 17.
[327] TNA FO 42/6, Wright to Earl of Bristol, Zante, 23 November 1804, pp. 16, 17.
[328] TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 21 November 1803, pp. 68, 69.
[329] Nelson to Grenville, Palermo, 28 November 1799 in Nicolas, *Dispatches*, IV, p. 117; Nelson to Nepean, Palermo, 28 November 1799 in Nicolas, *Dispatches*, IV, p. 115.
[330] Nelson to Nepean, Palermo, 28 November 1799 in Nicolas, *Dispatches*, IV, p. 115.
[331] TNA FO 42/17, Earl of Vincent to Foresti, Rocketts, 25 July 1817, p. 77.

Foresti's reputation when the first High Commissioner in the islands excluded him from office and destroyed his reputation.

The threat of French invasion, 1804-1813

Ministers in London and officers in the Mediterranean were becoming more familiar with potential allies in the area through the information provided by Foresti. As a main informant, Foresti felt the need to provide London with all the information he considered necessary, as well as to establish links with important local contacts. The British authorities who were established later in the islands would substantially utilize communication channels that were opened by Foresti, for various reasons: naval stores, information on French and Russian movements; or, after the cession of the islands to Britain in 1815, political developments in the mainland. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one significant event that enhanced the British penetration of local information networks through Foresti was the threat of French invasion between 1803 and 1805. The next two sections explain particularly the importance of Foresti in two ways: first, in processing accurate military information to London, and second in establishing links between Ali Pasha and the British. In the long term, this connection would provide to the British a direct connection to the Porte, allowing them to play a vital part in the interplay between the ambitious pasha and the attempts by the Ottoman central government to control him. This alleviated, at the same time, the major anxiety Britain had over a potential war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. During this period, the consul reached the peak of his career.

Being an 'observatory to the whole of Turkey', Foresti was able from Corfu to obtain timely information on French plans, either from his contacts or from officers of the Royal Navy. He passed the news on to London. In December 1803, for example, his was perhaps the earliest report to Hawkesbury about the French expedition against Corfu and the Morea which threatened the Ottoman Empire.[332] The role of the British consul in establishing links with the

[332] TNA FO 42/5, S. Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 16 December 1803, p. 76a.

nearby Ali Pasha was paramount, as British policymakers often used the pasha's separatist tendencies as leverage over the Ottoman government. By 1810, Ali Pasha was more able to declare his alliance to Britain, as this would fall in line with the official policy of the Ottoman government, and would help Ali to prove his loyalty to the Porte. But at the same time, as will see, Foresti's role as an informant and a political agent changed dramatically after the landing of British troops in 1809 and particularly after 1813, when Foresti was released from his service as a consul and as an agent for the British government.

The anticipation of a large scale French invasion of the region kept the British in a state of alert, as they were convinced that the Ottoman government would not be able to contain the French. On the islands, distrust of the French became more evident in the following years, allowing the English party to solidify its presence as a major player in Ionian politics. This became increasingly evident in the years after 1804 with the threat of the French invasion. Subsequently, French agents were sent to gather intelligence in the Ionian Islands and mainland Greece. The neutrality of the 'Septinsular Republic' was threatened. Meanwhile, ships of the Septinsular Republic were detained by the French and the property of their subjects was sequestered. More attacks on Ionian ships had interrupted their commerce, forcing the Ionian government to communicate with Britain.[333] Closely monitoring French schemes in the islands, Foresti mentioned to Hawkesbury an incident which, according to him, was proof of Ionian distrust of the French. This event took place when the French emissary Romieux arrived on Zante: on the surface, the emissary went to the islands for diplomatic reasons, but in reality he went to gather information from supporters of France on the islands, and it was possible that he went there to incite revolt on the islands and the Morea.[334] In regards to revolt in mainland Greece, after unsuccessful rebellions over the past 40 years, Foresti speculated that it would be 'very difficult to excite the inhabitants of the Morea to revolt except they see a very powerful and sufficient force to support them'.[335] The government of the Septinsular Republic instructed

[333] TNA FO 42/8, Foresti to Mulgrave, Corfu, 8 February 1806, no. 2, p. 6; TNA FO 42/8, Foresti to Mulgrave, Corfu 10 May 1806, no. 18, p. 64.
[334] Karapidakis, 'The Heptanese', p.158; Mavrogiannis, *History of the Ionian Isles*, II, pp. 41-42; TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 12 May 1803, p. 15a.
[335] TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 12 May 1803, pp. 15a-b.

two Ionian noblemen to accompany him, as was the custom in Venetian times for men of distinction. In secrecy, however, they were instructed by the Ionian government to track his movements.[336]

The second major area of intervention by the energetic consul was the establishment of communication channels between Ali Pasha of Ioannina and the British: he had been mentioning the pasha to the Foreign Office since at least 1798. Foresti sent lengthy reports to London about the pasha's character, the ways he governed and his relations with the Ottoman government and other European powers.[337] Ali, an ambitious man, was a capable Ottoman official (the rank is also mentioned in official correspondence as *bashaw*) who sought to expand his *pashalik* to Albania and the Ionian Islands if he could, almost independently from the Porte.[338] During the wars of 1793 and 1815, he established multiple connections with France, Britain and Russia, constantly shifting his allegiances with characteristic ease to whichever power he thought a better fit with 'his ever more frantic bid to gain control of the territories'. Ali Pasha was an acute tactician who was secretly communicating with rival powers like France and Britain.[339] But in the course of war he slowly but steadily saw Britain as the ideal power to help him solidify his conquests and power in the Ottoman government. In 1803, the pasha confided to the Earl of Aberdeen, who travelled to Greece, possibly looking for classical antiquities, that 'he much wished the English to be his mediators with the Sublime Porte'.[340] After 1803, several British emissaries visited Ali Pasha, some of them also acting as spies on the pasha's conduct. Official correspondence between them and London testify to the importance the pasha put in British policy above every European power in the region. Among them was William Hamilton, the future British ambassador of Naples. Recruited from the Levant Company, John Phillips Morier was drawn from service in the company in order to serve as a consul-general in Albania for £3 per day in 1804.[341]

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[336] TNA FO 42/5, Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu 12 May 1803, p. 15a.
[337] For example: TNA FO 42/8, no. 25, Foresti to Charles James Fox, Corfu, 18 June 1806, pp. 101-106.
[338] A historical survey of the pasha's actions towards European powers is described in more detail here: K.E. Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte. Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece* (New Jersey, 1999), pp. 70-117.
[339] Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte*, p. 75.
[340] TNA FO 42/5, S. Foresti to Hawkesbury, Corfu, 16 December 1803, p. 78a.
[341] TNA FO 78/44, Downing Street to Morier, 13 January 1804, p. 4.

London sent instructions to Morier to resist French designs in the Ottoman provinces, and to urge Ottoman pashas, 'in the most forcible manner never to lose sight of this most important object, nor suffer themselves to be deceived by any assurances of the French government denying the existence of any such projects as are … to them. You will also inform the pachas that the King has not been inattentive to the dangers with which they are menaced nor to the means of averting them … You will also recommend to the pachas to be upon their guard against the designs of the numerous French emissaries who, as this government have … to believe, are most actively employed in the different European provinces of the Ottoman empire for the purpose of exciting disaffection and revolt'.[342] In the same document, the government instructed Morier to employ clerks, dragomans (interpreters) and janissaries from Ottoman service. The British ambassador in Constantinople would also furnish him the appropriate passes and letters of credit for pashas of western Greece.[343]

Foresti's local knowledge was again invaluable, as he would prove significant help even to a long-time resident in the Levant like Morier, particularly in terms of penetrating through barriers of language and culture when Greeks in the mainland would refuse to disclose information to the former. In 1804, for example, in one of his surveys to the mainland to gather information about the invasion, Morier wrote to London referring to his efforts to interview locals: 'they are so much upon their guard that I have not been able to persuade any of them to declare their sentiment to me'.[344] At this point, Foresti tried to establish communication to the nearby pashas in Greece, and to receive intelligence from outside the Ionian Islands. In 1809 he sent his son, George Foresti, to act as a British consul in Ali Pasha's court.

After the occupation of the islands by British troops in 1809, Britain's relations with Ali Pasha entered another phase: without any instructions from London, Ali insisted on meeting with British officials in private. In April 1810, he met a mission consisting of Foresti and Oswald, where he disclosed his wishes in regard to the instability and the ambivalent stance of the Ottoman government towards the French. Foresti informed Wellesley about the meeting and

[342] TNA FO 78/44, Downing Street to Morier, 13 January 1804, p. 5.
[343] TNA FO 78/44, Downing Street to Morier, 13 January 1804, p. 15.
[344] TNA FO 78/44, Tripolizza, May 5th 1804, Morier to [Hawkesbury?], p. 30a.

Ali's wishes to abandon the central government: 'If the government of Constantinople departs from its present engagements His Highness declared His Readiness to separate His Interests from the general government and make common cause with Great Britain and give all the assistance that his country affords'.[345]

Foresti's own involvement in Britain's relations with the pasha and subsequently, his worth as an intermediary and a 'native informant' changed after British troops landed on the islands. If, for British officials, the pasha was an ally who was never to be fully trusted, Foresti claimed otherwise. After having established his own network of informants in the pasha's territory, he emphasized the pasha's honest intentions early on.[346] Gradually, more British officials started to associate Foresti with 'Greek politics and the character of the country', sometimes questioning his utility directly or indirectly. Such an example were the comments of George Charles D'Aguilar – appointed later as a lieutenant-general in Hong Kong (1843-1848) – after being sent by Bentinck on a military mission to the pasha's court. For example, in 1812 D'Aguilar shared his concerns over Foresti in confidential correspondence with Bentinck:

> Mr. Spiridion Foresti is an <u>old</u> man, … himself on the long services he has rendered to the government. He rates these services <u>very highly</u>, and is disappointed if they are not appreciated in the same manner by others. He seems to think himself neglected and complains of receiving no [answers?] from your Lordship to his office at communications. From what I can gather he expected to have been fully instructed with the subjects of my mission. Even before I arrived here. He is jealous to a ridiculous excess of his own son – and even at open variance with him in consequence of his having accepted on the appointment of British agent at the court of Ali Pasha contrary to his express advice and recommendation. He is jealous indeed of anyone's interference there, and thinks no one calculated to manage the pasha – but himself.[347]

After many conversations with him D'Aguilar mentioned how Foresti seemed insistent on knowing all the information relating to the intentions of the British government towards the pasha. This persistence, as well as Foresti's own daily correspondence with the pasha through his son, placed D' Aguilar 'on guard', not willing to share any information. D'Aguilar based his

[345] TNA FO 42/12, no. 32, Foresti to Wellesley, Zante, 1 May 1810.
[346] TNA FO 42/7, no. 6, Foresti to Harrowby, Corfu, 28 January 1805, pp. 17-19.
[347] University of Nottingham Archives (henceforth NA), Pw Jd 240, D'Aguilar to Bentinck, Zante, 17 April 1812.

observations about Foresti on the fact that 'public characters are as justifiable and necessary, as they would be … and indecorous if they only concerned individuals'.[348] Surely, there was an emphasis on the fact that Foresti was a Greek and involved with Greek 'party politics'. Similarly, in another confidential letter, Oswald wrote to Bunbury that the 'great fault' of George Airey – the British official in charge of the islands at the time – had been that he had 'manifestly become the tool of Foresti and Siguro … instead of making them what they are calculated for useful instruments'. Foresti, Oswald continued, 'is a well-intentioned, intelligent man, but to a degree vain and full of party spirit … he is a Greek and therefore ought not to direct amongst the Greeks'.[349] Foresti's personal and professional downfall had begun.

D' Aguilar's comments about Foresti concealed 'information panics' that came out of British entanglements in local politics, revealing at the same time crucial weaknesses of the British position in the region; in the case of Foresti, particularly the lack of regular and different channels of information. It would become part of the British way of approaching the islands to question the reliability of 'native informants' or to abandon them altogether. Making a clean break with the previous informational and political order, the British governor — after the cession of the islands to Britain — centralized all powers and information-gathering in his hands. As we will see later, the colonial governor became the sole source of information communicated to London.

This thesis argues that Foresti's role as a 'go-between' who crossed cultural, linguistic and political boundaries makes for an interesting case to examine issues that are raised in relevant literature.[350] As we will see later in a greater detail, after the occupation of the islands by the British, Foresti tried to use his experience and connections in Britain to promote other projects, for example educational institutions on the islands. But it would be in the period after the cession of the islands that the previous information networks would be replaced by a new

[348] NA Pw Jd 240, D'Aguilar to Bentinck, Zante, 17 April 1812.
[349] Chessell, 'Britain's Ionian Consul', paper submitted for Barcelona conference (2014), p. 15; TNA CO 136/295, Oswald to Bunbury, 9 December 1812
[350] For example, Schaffer, Roberts et al., *The Brokered World.*

order, dominated by the governor's centralization of powers. During this period, Foresti and other Ionian collaborators would be marginalized and excluded from office.

French imperial administration and the occupation of the islands

Foresti wrote to Canning that Ionian commerce during the French occupation of the islands was totally interrupted due to heavy taxation. While a 'system of terror' silenced 'all remonstrance', Foresti wrote to Canning that the 'islanders still support themselves with the consolation of receiving British succour'.[351] Ionian merchants were forced to hoist the French flag, which was at war, instead of the Septinsular or the previous neutral flags they carried for their commerce before.[352] British properties on the islands, including Foresti's, were confiscated. The French authorities circulated a proclamation, according to which the islands were considered a conquered country and French territory. From this point onwards, British occupation of the islands would have been much desired. Ironically though, it was the British blockade from 1809 onwards that completely ruined Ionian commerce and pushed them further into scarcity.

By 1809, Foresti's views on British protection were already crystallized. Then, on the eve of British troops landing on the Ionian Islands, he privately shared his ideas with a confidant in Zante, also a member of the English party of great influence on the islands, Antonio Martinengo. As a concluding remark, it shows how convinced he was of the fact that British and Ionian interests coincided:

> Actuated by those sentiments which attach me to my country, and by the esteem which I entertain for your person, I have to acquaint you that this is the most likely moment to regain our political independence. … Be certain that the Protection of Great Britain is ready for the first summons, and that the British fleet will give you every assistance. If on the contrary this propitious

[351] TNA FO 42/9, Foresti to Canning, Malta, 3 October 1807.
[352] Kapetanakis, *Shipping and commerce,* p. 78.

> opportunity is allowed to escape, our islands must fear, on the first appearance of war between the Turks and France, an invasion from the former.[353]

Foresti's views about the advantages for the islands under British protection had not changed. Despite any potential personal or professional benefits he might have expected, he seemed genuine in his political views about the prospect of the British ensuring Ionian political independence and a government similar to the Septinsular Republic. When the occupation of the islands was decided upon in 1809, Foresti was in the leading team of the expedition, providing information on the land, including plans of Corfu, to Oswald.[354] The help he offered in organizing a provisional government under the British was acknowledged by British officials, including the commander of British troops at the time.[355] Other Ionian politicians also referred to Foresti's 'incomparable merit' in assisting in the British occupation of the islands. For example, Ionian politicians from Ithaca sent a letter to Canning to thank him for the 'recovery of the freedom' of their island from the French. According to them, Foresti's role was 'instrumental' for 'the prosperity and relief of the Ionian people'.[356]

Foresti's sympathies did not lie only with the political independence of Ionians and the restoration of the republic, but also with his countrymen in the mainland. In a rare disagreement with the pasha, when the latter asked for some 'Albanian outlaws, or Robbers' who fled to the islands to be delivered to him, the consul decided 'against giving these people up to him', as the British commander at the islands at the time, George Airey wrote to Bentinck.[357]

In 1813, however, the islands were considered de facto a British territory by London as well as officials on the spot, and thus all diplomatic functions – including consulship – ceased. Despite his release from British service, Foresti kept sending information to British officials and provided advice on Ionian politics and society. Following his release as a consul, Foresti had

[353] TNA CO 136/17, Foresti to Martinengo, Malta, 15 June 1809, Confidential, no. 2; Chessell, 'Britain's Ionian consul' (2014), p. 4.
[354] TNA FO 42/12, no. 38, Foresti to Wellesley, Zante, 20 February 1811, p. 113.
[355] Chessell, 'Britain's Ionian consul' (2014), p. 7.
[356] TNA FO 42/11, 'Provisional Committee of Government Ithaca' to Canning, Ithaca 29th Sept./11th Oct. 1809, pp. 218-222.
[357] NA Pw Jd 121, Airey to Bentinck, Zante, 17 April 1812.

bitter disputes with the first High Commissioner of the islands, Thomas Maitland, after a civil suit declared by his predecessor, James Campbell.[358]

It appears in Maitland's dispatches, however, that the civil suit might have been the pretext to get rid of the old consul. The commissioner wrote to Bathurst about this in 1816: 'it appears from everything I can learn … both from General Campbell, and Mr. Meyer, the Chief Secretary to the government that old Foresti has been playing a part hostile to our interests for a length of time; on the principle that if he got a Republic re-established he would get himself, made minister to it – and he has been considerably I apprehend an active organ against us', having an insider in the Ionian government who was communicating any information to Foresti was counteracting British views.[359] The case is indicative of Maitland's frequent interventions in confining the secretary's office 'to those whom I either knew personally, or who employed the perfect confidence' of Campbell.[360]

Personal antipathies certainly played a role in the dispute between Foresti and Maitland.[361] Foresti went to England in 1817 and came into contact with several of his old acquaintances – including the Earl of St. Vincent for example – but did not succeed in alleviating the accusations that were levelled against him. Foresti, as well as his whole family, was locked in a legal dispute that continued for years. Up until 1821, his son George Foresti continued to write to Bathurst about Foresti's family, seeking to reclaim Spiridion's deposit of 1,274 dollars that was confiscated by French authorities a couple of years before. This was in addition to the multiple memorials the father submitted for restitution of the confiscated amount to the Ionian government. After many rejections by the central administration on the islands, the son asked the British government to intervene, to no avail.[362] After many years of inactivity Spiridion Foresti's health deteriorated and he finally died in March 1822. Immediately following his death, Foresti's wife, Angiola, and children were unable to cover long accumulated debts and the family's debtors confiscated 'all movable and immovable property'. The correspondence

[358] TNA FO 42/17, Foresti to Castlereagh, St. James' Place, 21 October 1816, p. 63.
[359] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 25 February 1816.
[360] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 25 February 1816.
[361] Chessell, 'Britain's Ionian consul' (2014), pp. 16-18.
[362] TNA CO 136/18, no. 24, George Foresti to Bathurst, St. James' Place, London, 10 October 1821.

that his wife kept with what seemed to be the only remaining friend of Foresti's family in Britain, Frederick North, is kept in the British Library and is filled with desperation about the fate of the family. It is a valuable source for further research into Foresti's case.[363]

Spiridion Foresti's reputation was finally cleared after his death. As Chessell has noticed, these disputes with Maitland and his indifference in providing actual independence to the Ionians meant Foresti was gradually alienated from British interests. Foresti's reputation and property were quickly restored after Maitland's death in 1824. The summary of findings of the judge in the Admiralty High Court were the following:

> … that Sir Spiridion Foresti performed his duty to the captors with great fidelity, in circumstances of a very trying and difficult nature. It is clear that he did everything that was proper and just for the benefit of the parties as far as he could, in the hazardous state of public events. I am therefore anxious to give protection to this gentleman, who appears to have acted with perfect propriety as a prize agent, - with due attention to the interest of his principals, and with unimpeachable honesty.[364]

Foresti's lengthy reports to the Foreign Office ceased in 1813, when the islands fell under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office. After this point, any mention of his name in either Bathurst or Maitland's dispatches are scant and few. Suddenly, the main source of information for the British during the wars with France occupied no further place whatsoever in the new regime after the creation of the protectorate. But Foresti's exclusion from office was not only a product of personal antipathy, as Chessell mentioned. Rather, it was connected to a much broader change in the administration of the protectorate when Maitland became a governor. As we will see later, Maitland represented a radically different logic than his predecessors, where older sources of information were replaced by the centralizing tendencies of the new governor. In order to create a new 'rule of law', the previous class of informers and disaffected (from Venetian and French administrations) Ionians who placed great hopes in the British administration – the so called English-party – were accused of being 'intriguers', and were effectively removed from power.

[363] BL Ferrara-Foresti papers, Add MS 88900/1/28, Angiola Foresti to North, Zante, 26 April 1822.
[364] Chessell, 'Britain's Ionian Consul', pp. 18-19.

Conclusion

Scholars of microhistory have been cautioned not to 'love [their subject] too much'. This has often been the case with places, individuals, and objects. Perspective, then, is needed when focusing on the microscale. Furthermore, while many studies are concerned with the importance of local actors, fewer consider absences and why, specifically, previously important actors lost their credibility as information agents. This chapter has looked an example of the latter case. Despite his importance as a primary informant and agent of Britain in the islands until 1815, Foresti's case may say less about the occupation and the subsequent governance of the islands by Britain. His locally-obtained intelligence, drawing on his access to local networks – both on the islands and the mainland – were crucial in providing the British with broad access to the region, often at some cost to Foresti. Foresti's importance was demonstrated in various cases, such as his contribution to Nelson's intelligence networks, helping to anticipate an invasion in 1804-1805, and acting as a broker between the British and Ali Pasha. But this changed once British troops landed on the islands, when Foresti lost his privileged position as a major source of information. Cases such as Foresti's can be very illuminating as to how transitions took place during and after the establishment of 'colonial bridgeheads'. Furthermore, consideration of the role of local consuls, disenfranchised elites and supporters of British rule on the islands calls for a broader definition of the term bridgehead; one that acknowledges the brief coexistence – though inherently unequal – of imperial and local compatible aims.

Figure I. Sir Thomas Maitland (1759-1824). High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands and Malta between 1813 and 1814. Unknown artist, Thirlestane Castle Trust.[365]

[365] https://artuk.org/discover/artworks/lieutenant-general-sir-thomas-maitland-17591824-governor-of-malta-18131824-211089 (accessed online: 25/04/2018).

Chapter 3: Provisional government in the islands and the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, 1809-1815

When referring to the period 1809-1815, most studies in Ionian historiography have focused on the political and constitutional bases of the British protectorate as they were established in the Treaty of Paris (November 1815), approaching the case of the islands as a political and constitutional 'experiment' in the British Mediterranean. However, the establishment of links between British and local information networks on both the islands and the mainland were crucial precursors of the diplomatic negotiations which led to the creation of the Protectorate. Such links involved British officials balancing the demands of the nearby Ali Pasha, the Porte and Greeks. In this new scheme, British officials came into direct contact with local officials and networks, becoming thus more involved in local politics. During the early phases of the provisional government, British officials tried in various ways to connect the islands up with wider imperial networks and communication channels across port-cities and islands in the Mediterranean, in order to integrate regional economies and reinforce British political influence in strategic outposts. But as we will see later, this process brought significant challenges and anxieties for British officials. In some ways, this chapter is divided into two parts: first, it studies closely the changes and continuities in local networks that took place in the period after the war. Second, it looks at the diplomatic settlement regarding the Ionian Islands in Vienna and Paris.

Human intelligence and local alliances: Ali Pasha, 1809-1813

Being an 'observatory to the whole of Turkey', the islands were at the centre of the information exchange between the mainland and British outposts in the Mediterranean. When British troops landed on the islands, they were in the middle of overlapping networks of exchange. The consular connections of information that were established in wartime were maintained in the post-Napoleonic era. It is not true that, after the occupation of the islands in 1809, the British turned their attention 'to the possible economic advantages' and that relations with the pasha became primarily economic.[366] After establishing an effective 'colonial bridgehead' in the mainland, the pasha became a source of information on Ottoman politics that the British presence in the islands often consulted, even after the wars with France.

Early on, local information networks had informed London about the regional economies and networks of which the Ionian Islands were part: as we saw in a previous chapter, Foresti was writing to Foreign Office before the declaration of war with France in 1793, about woods suitable for timber in mainland Greece. Wright, Foresti's successor as a consul during the years of the Septinsular Republic, wrote in detail in 1805 about the trade of each island, as well as of the 'principal disadvantage' of islands like Zante that had to 'depend on the opposite continent for a supply of provisions', if Corfu could not provide.[367] Links with the mainland could simply cease to exist. British commanders who landed on the islands in 1809 were at the centre of such overlapping networks between the islands and the mainland. One very characteristic example, though different in many ways to the Ionian Islands, was the British presence in India; for example, when Cornwallis' government tried to make the Mughal emperor dependent on the British for information. As elsewhere in the empire, British political influence – meaning, the protectorate – was established after penetration of local information and commercial networks, and local rulers.[368] British connections with the mainland, and Ali pasha in particular, after 1809 were similar.

[366] Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte,* p. 114.
[367] TNA FO 42/6, Rodwell Wright to Mulgrave, Zante, 26 February 1805.
[368] Bayly, *Empire and Information*, p. 58.

But who was Ali Pasha, and why he was so important to the British presence in the region? Some explanation of the historiography and legacy of Ali Pasha needs to be provided here. In terms of historiography and public memory, even today's picture of Ali Pasha in Greece is painted with dark colours; always extreme, sometimes considered a cunning pasha and a mixture of every Orientalist stereotype possible, sometimes a ruthless governor, more often both. As Katherine Fleming noted, 'along with such other governors as Mehmet Ali of Egypt, Ali represented not traditional Ottoman despotism but rather a new breed of Ottoman governor who looked to the West rather than to the Ottoman bureaucracy for aggrandizement and political gain'.[369] Regarding the neglect of historiography – both Greek and English-speaking – on Ali's time, recent historiography on the pasha has been influenced by relevant debates on travel literature, colonialism, and particularly the debates on Orientalism, thus relying heavily on travellers' accounts. Fleming's work, for instance, also explained the importance of cultural stereotyping for both sides in the interactions between Ali Pasha and the British.[370] Although acknowledging the connection of many travellers to British policymakers, this study focuses on official correspondence instead, and the close ties that British officials forged with the pasha. Most crucially, Britain's policy in regards to the pasha, as well as the islands, largely depended on individuals.

Strategically, Ali was a dominant factor in the region, mainly as a barrier to a potential French invasion of Greece.[371] William Leake, an accredited agent of the British government, expressed his observations on Ali's role in the wider region to Wellesley in 1810, which were quite indicative of the dominant imperial thinking at the time:

> Conscious of the advantages he derives from the countenance of the Porte, he not only sedulously avoids showing any open contempt for the supreme government, but by a contrary conduct, has had the art to establish an influence with the ruling persons at Constantinople and in other parts of European Turkey, which, in some important instances, has determined the event of the revolutions at the capital, and has directed the decisions of the Porte in regard to its foreign relations with the powers of Europe. … it is with

[369] Fleming, *Muslim Bonaparte*, pp. 23-24.
[370] Fleming, *Muslim Bonaparte*, pp. 14, 25.
[371] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, pp. 346-348.

> great satisfaction, therefore, I declare my persuasion, that he will continue to be, to the utmost of his strength, a barrier upon this side of the continent, against the ambition of France, and may possibly save the Ottoman Empire from that destruction, which, without his assistance, seems almost inevitable.[372]

Britain's relations with the pasha were also essential in terms of exchanging intelligence. In wartime, regular information channels were established between the islands and mainland Greece through the pasha's court in Ioannina, northern Greece. George Foresti – Spiridion Foresti's son – who was a British consul in Ali Pasha's court at the time, was constantly passing intelligence on various matters onto British officials – ammunitions, the pasha or enemy movements, negotiations that the Porte was involved in – that circulated in the domains of the pasha. After the occupation of the islands by British troops in 1809, Britain's relations with Ali Pasha reached a new level: without any instructions from London, Ali insisted on meeting with British officials in private. In April 1810, he met a mission consisting of Foresti and Oswald, where he disclosed his wishes in regards to the instability and ambivalent stance of the Ottoman government towards the French. Foresti informed Wellesley about the meeting and Ali's wishes to abandon the central government: 'If the government of Constantinople departs from its present engagements His Highness declared His Readiness to separate His Interests from the general government and make common cause with Great Britain and give all the assistance that his country affords'.[373] For example, a courier 'from the Grand Vezier's headquarters' reached the pasha's court in November 1811, bringing news of the peace negotiations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire after the Russo-Turkish war. Foresti sent intelligence to Colonel Sidney Smith confirming Russia's continuing interest in the islands, unsuccessfully pressing Ottoman ministers to support Russia's claims.[374]

Geographical proximity added to the complexity of the situation. Other British officials on the spot, who were closer to the social milieu of the area, entertained more complex opinions on the character of such migration. They seemed to be well aware of local allegiances once British

[372] TNA CO 136/295, no. 3, Leake to Marquis Wellesley, Preveza, 21 February 1810.
[373] TNA FO 42/12, no. 32, Foresti to Wellesley, Zante, 1 May 1810.
[374] NA Pw Jd 97, Extract of a letter from Mr. George Foresti to Colonel Smith, Ioannina, 26 November 1811.

troops landed on the islands. George Airey, for example, wrote to Maitland and explained to him that,

> Those people who do take shelter in these islands from the resentment of the Pacha; and whom he styled robbers, are not so in the sense that we should … them in our own country. They are individuals of certain tribes of people, who from some cause or other and indeed from the [nature?] of the government, are almost always at variance with the Vizir. They possibly in their sort of predatory wars have had their villages burnt are living in the woods; and some of few when had proceed to take refuge in the neighbouring islands. Possibly one of the strongest arguments for the policy of not delivering up these people may be that it might materially hurt our interest with the Greeks, to see that we deliver up to the vengeance of the Vizir, those of their unhappy countrymen, who have taken refuge amongst us.[375]

Two of these 'robbers' were, for example, Ali Farmachi and the later commander-in-chief of the Greeks during the revolution of 1821, Theodoros Colocotronis, who had escaped the pasha by fleeing to the islands. Falling for the pasha's demands, as he was 'most anxious to get these men out of our hands', Airey wrote about the incident to William Bentinck. Airey was concerned that, due to their popularity among the Greeks, should British authorities deliver these men to the pasha, this would 'stain our national character', and cause the British 'to lose the confidence and affection of the people of these islands'.[376] To 'give up these men', Airey continued 'would possibly be, not only to ourselves in our own eyes, but in the eyes of the neighbouring nations, and indeed in the eyes of the pasha himself; he would probably laugh at our [measures?] at the same time that he gained his ends'.[377] But Airey did not stay long in the islands.

Although Bathurst was also aware of the distinction between refugees and bandits, on his dismissal Airey was probably considered too sentimental by many officials for differentiating between 'unhappy countrymen' and robbers. We saw previously how Airey's relationship with Ionians like Foresti, and the latter's political and ethnic sentiments were criticized by other officials. But as we will see later, the revolution of 1820 in the mainland dramatically increased

[375] NA Pw Jd 98, Airey to Maitland, Zante, 22 December 1811.
[376] NA Pw Jd 123/1, Airey to Bentinck, St Maura, 9 May 1812.
[377] NA Pw Jd 123/1, Airey to Bentinck, St Maura, 9 May 1812.

the influx of refugees and politicized many armed 'bandits', pressing the Anglo-Ionian authorities for more radical measures. This study argues that the origins of this relationship began during the period under study of the chapter. Such micromanagement, balancing between conflicting demands, with Britain becoming the intermediaries, were common for officials on the spot.

In regards to the pasha, apart from his influence in the wider region and the empire at large, historians of modern Greece very rarely acknowledge that the pasha was also in control of an extensive network of information. For example, Ali Pasha was able to communicate directly with Castlereagh 'through Your Excellency's channel from Vienna', as the pasha wrote to Campbell in 1814, asking for an introduction to the minister.[378] Being aware of the islands' dependency on the mainland for foodstuff and information, Bathurst was more concerned with maintaining good relations with Ali Pasha than with the Ottoman Empire at large. It was precisely the interconnection between local networks and British officials on the islands that allowed the British to penetrate local information networks.

Official priorities before Vienna

Settling crucial issues of foreign or colonial policy among heads of interested governmental departments in closed sessions with relative independence from the British parliament was common during the early nineteenth century.[379] In Britain, Henry Bathurst (1762-1834) was appointed Secretary of State for War and the Colonies under Lord Liverpool's government in 1812. Bathurst, a High Tory, was Colonial Secretary longer than any other minister. Bathurst's role in the decision-making of Britain's colonial policy was crucial: for the next ten years, he, Liverpool and Castlereagh effectively formed an inner cabinet. Like many other ministers of his time, the sheer workload Bathurst had to face as minister in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars was unthinkable by today's standards. As an example,

[378] TNA CO 136/3, Aly Pasha to Campbell, Previza, 27 April 1815; TNA CO 136/3, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 8 May 1815.
[379] Middleton, *The Administration of British Foreign Policy*, p. 8.

Neville Thompson mentioned that between 1812 and 1814 Bathurst exchanged over 500 letters with Lord Wellington.[380] Charles Greville, a family friend, described Bathurst as a 'very amiable man with a good understanding, though his talents were far from brilliant, a High Churchman and a High Tory, but a cool politician, a bad speaker, a good writer, greatly averse to changes, but acquiescing in many'.[381] Overall, Bathurst's public correspondence with other British officials on the topic of the Ionian Islands, preserved in the Colonial and Foreign Office papers, illuminate a rather careful approach towards local customs, although one that still considered British legal traditions and culture superior. In this sense, Bathurst suggested to Maitland that he collaborate with Spiridion Foresti.

More than diplomatic relations, Anglo-Ionian authorities and British civil commissioners had to negotiate matters such as fleeing convicts or refugees with Ali Pasha regularly. Ali Pasha's collaboration with British officials in the area on information and supplies became more frequent, particularly in 1811. Sir James Campbell succeeded Airey and was appointed by Bathurst as colonial governor on the islands in 1813 (King's Civil Commissioner), along with Meyer as Campbell's public secretary on the islands subordinate to Bentinck.[382] Including experience in the last two campaigns of the American War of Independence in 1781, he had pursued a military career in India, Ireland and in the Mediterranean from 1805.[383] His salary was paid by the islands' revenues and amounted to £2,000 per annum, along with a secretary (£800) and a treasurer (£600).[384] Campbell's administration is often neglected in the history of the islands, in favour of his much more decorated (and better connected in London) successor, Thomas Maitland. Appointing Campbell, Bathurst instructed him to 'cultivate the most friendly understanding' with the Greeks in general, probably referring to the wealthy Greek mercantile and shipping networks in the Aegean Sea. Historians have written at length about Greek

[380] Neville Thompson, 'Henry Bathurst, third Earl Bathurst (1762-1834)' in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,* available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1696?docPos=9 (February, 2016).
[381] Quote in Neville Thompson, 'Henry Bathurst, third Earl Bathurst (1762-1834)' in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/1696?docPos=9 (February, 2016).
[382] TNA CO 136/300, no. 2, Bathurst to Campbell, Downing Street 27 February 1813.
[383] H.M. Stephens revised by Stewart M. Fraser, 'Sir James Campbell (1763-1819)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-4506?rskey=n1sUS7&result=3 (March, 2016).
[384] TNA CO 136/300, no. 2, Bathurst to Campbell, Downing Street, 27 February 1813.

shipping, diaspora and trade networks in the British Mediterranean, but much less about imperial thinking.[385] Bathurst advised Campbell to form no 'public connections', being specifically aware of negative complications in Anglo-Turkish relations. By 'public connections', Bathurst meant to avoid any potential source of discontent for the Ottomans, such as friendlier relations with the Greeks, especially ones fleeing Ottoman authorities.

Bathurst was not vaguely concerned with Ottoman politics, but specifically with the relationship of the islands with the 'neighbouring provinces of Turkey', with a 'particular attention to the proceedings and disposition of the pacha of Ioannina'. Bathurst added, that 'it is certainly desirable that we should remain upon amicable terms with that powerful chief, and care should be taken not to give him any just grounds of complaint or hostility, by opening the Ionian Islands as places of sanctuary for the banditti who may fly from his territory. The Protection which the Albanian robbers find in St Maura and other islands, appears to be a principal cause of misunderstanding with the Turkish pachas, and you will endeavour to close this source of … and mistrust'.[386]

The next two sections explain how closely involved the first British administrators became with Ionian society during the period of the provisional government (1809-1815). While Ionian historiography is focused on the career and administration of the first High Commissioner, Thomas Maitland, the earlier period is not taken into account. Despite the constitutional and political 'limbo' that followed, these commanders followed a very different approach to governance than Maitland would. For example, Campbell seemed to be more conciliatory towards the interests of the elites, and more interested in turning the islands into 'a cultural magnet', drawing experts from across the Greek diaspora.

[385] Especially in Greek historiography the list is enormous. For example, Athanasios (Sakis) Gekas, 'Class and cosmopolitanism: the historiographical fortunes of merchants in Eastern Mediterranean ports', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 24:2 (Dec. 2009), pp. 95-114; Katerina Galani, 'The Napoleonic Wars and the Disruption of Mediterranean Shipping and Trade: British, Greek and American Merchants in Livorno', Paper submitted in workshop 'Social Groups and Practices of Trading in the Mediterranean, 17th – 19th centuries', Athens, 2008; I. Chasiotis, O. Katsiardi-Hering, E. A. Ampatzi (eds.) *Oi Ellines sti Diaspora, 15os-21os aionas* (Athens, 2006) [*Greeks in Diaspora, 15th – 21st c.*].

[386] TNA CO 136/300, Bathurst to Campbell, Downing Street, 27 February 1813.

From Foreign to the Colonial Office: the provisional government

Islands have been described in literature as sites 'where new forms of freedom (and control) can be imagined and implemented'.[387] There was definitely a prospect of implementing new forms of control among British officials who occupied the Ionian Islands. In fact, as we will see later in this chapter, Meyer represented the opinions of several British officials on the spot when he wrote to Campbell about the islands as a 'possession … [and a] solid and legitimate ground of war'.[388]

In 1813, the islands passed from the jurisdiction of the Foreign to Colonial Office. As has been emphasized, historians have been generally less willing to theorize the colonial state than to provide various functional descriptions.[389] As we have already established, the Ionian State which was created under the Treaty of Paris in 1815 was a rather peculiar case of a colonial state in the broader historical context of the British Empire: in theory an independent state, in reality a colony. Its constitutional and political origins have been amply documented, and more recent works have explained how the protectorate state regulated the daily lives of Ionians.[390]

Confusion among historians about how to categorize the Ionian State, however, rarely reflect similar confusion amongst British officials at the time. During the period of the provisional government until 1815, no major changes would take place, and particularly no 'material improvements into the practice of the courts of justice'.[391] During Campbell's administration, British officials took steps to consolidate their rule in the area, to integrate commercial activity, to encourage changes in the legislature and to promote projects for the 'moral improvement' of the Greeks. In all of these aspects of state formation, significant autonomy was left to the colonial governor and thus these initiatives largely depended on his efforts.

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[387] Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal and Karen Wigen (eds.), *Seascapes. Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges* (Hawaii, 2007), p. 16.
[388] TNA CO 136/2, Meyer to Campbell, Corfu 1st August 1814, p. 148a.
[389] John L. Comaroff, 'Reflections on the Colonial State, in South Africa and Elsewhere: Factions, Fragments, Facts and Fictions', *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture*, 4:3 (August 2010), p. 322.
[390] Gekas, *Xenocracy.*
[391] TNA CO 136/300, Bunbury to Count Cladan, War Department, London, 30 August 1816.

While the previous section explained British ties with the mainland through maintained contact with Ali Pasha, this section examines how a provisional government was formed in the islands and how British officials conceived of Britain's presence in the region. Then, it examines the movement of knowledge, products and people within a broader geographical scope across the Mediterranean.

From 1809 to 1815, the provisional government that was established by the British and their Ionian collaborators was not permitted by London to apply any major changes in the legislature or to Ionian society in general. The constitutional and political status of the islands would remain unresolved until the Treaty of Paris, and as it seemed later, for the whole period under study. Even the organization of the British archives concerning the Ionian Islands today is a testimony to the confusion that dominated diplomatic debates on the islands, as well as governmental jurisdiction in Britain: in the archives today, for example, there is a clean break from 1813 onwards, when the islands were perceived to be a 'colonial issue'; even though they were under temporary occupation under international law. Publicly, British officials had given every sign to the islanders that the new government would restore the old Septinsular Republic, an unfulfilled dream for many on the Ionian Islands. Brigadier General Oswald (1777-1840) for example, who was in charge of civil and military affairs in the provisional government between 1809 and 1812, circulated a proclamation which acknowledged the liberation of the Ionians from tyranny, the restoration of the 'Ionian Republic' and confirmed Britain's political and economic protection to the Ionians.[392]

Generally, despite assumptions about the Ionian character, there was a stark difference between how the urban and rural areas in the islands were viewed among British officials (the *cittadini* and *contadini* respectively). A British agent in official capacity wrote for instance to Canning a few of months before the occupation of the islands: 'You are undoubtedly well informed that in all the islands, and particularly in Corfu, the inhabitants of the cities have for a long time formed a class very distinct from those of the rest of the country: the former from long habits under the government of Venice having assumed the manners of that part of Italy,

[392] TNA FO 42/11, no. 27, Foresti to Canning, Zante, 17 October 1809, pp. 142-147.

while the others retain the clandestine features of the Greek nation'.[393] As mentioned before, Leake had served a successful military career abroad and was considered a reliable source of information because of his topographic surveys in the region.

Politically, British officials took steps to present the British presence to the Ionians as offering liberation from past tyrannies. As has been argued by historians of other parts of the British Empire, imperial rule was indeed 'built on the experience of rule and the construction of cultural difference of the old empires'.[394] In the Ionian Islands, for example, the British were consistently drawing comparisons with Venetian administration and legal traditions. As Fusaro noted, in the Ionian Islands there existed 'continuities in the cultural practices and modalities of governance'.[395] For example, continuity in terms of symbolism in the Protectorate was communicated to Ionians by adopting the Venetian Lion of St. Mark as an official symbol of the Ionian State. But the British also encouraged the use of Greek, which was not broadly used during Venetian times except by notaries.[396] Proclamations that were circulated in the countryside and towns were written in Italian and Greek and bore the Venetian lion of Saint Mark. References to Britain liberating the Ionians from tyranny were common from the very beginning of the presence of British troops in the islands. Essentially, the main assumption was that British rule was an improvement on the regime of earlier Venetian, as well as French and Russian, rulers. Stemming from a familiar line of critique in Britain since the sixteenth century – but perhaps also from contemporary debates on 'Old Corruption' at the time – the 'myth of Venice' gradually shifted, referring to the economic and social crisis of the Venetian Republic due to corruption, and thus feeding into an 'anti-myth of Venice', particularly during the

[393] TNA FO 78/65, no. 4, Leake to Canning, Preveza, 13 March 1809, pp. 22a-b.
[394] Cooper and Stoler, 'Between Metropole and Colony', p. 2.
[395] Maria Fusaro, 'Representation in Practice: The Myth of Venice and the British Protectorate in the Ionian Islands (1801-1864)' in Melissa Calaresu et al. (eds.), *Exploring Cultural History: Essays in Honour of Peter Burke* (London, 2010), p. 310.
[396] Peter Mackridge, 'Venise après Venise: official languages in the Ionian Islands, 1797-1864', *Byzantine and Modern Greek* Studies, 38:1 (2014), p. 69.

eighteenth century.[397] Being part of literary and political cultures of England, later Britain, since then, the subject has been debated much in historiography.[398]

As Bayly has mentioned in *Imperial Meridian,* controlling news and political commentary indeed reflected some of the Colonial Office's willingness to encourage 'subordinate forms of nationalism'.[399] Fostering such local 'reinvented traditions', Bayly wrote, was another strategy of promoting English institutions abroad, but also on the islands. Similar processes were also taking place within Britain. This policy of 'reinventing' attempts by indigenous people to rediscover their language, culture etc. had worked successfully in Scotland 'with the invention by Walter Scott and his generation of a Scottish mythology of national identity under the Crown'.[400] Although proclamations and news, in the form of rumours, were circulating the islands since Venetian times, it seems that diffusion of printed information originated in the Napoleonic Wars. A printing press was established by French authorities in Corfu in 1798.[401] A weekly gazette circulated later in Zante, mainly containing information on military developments, proclamations of the general government, exchange rates etc. Foresti acknowledged the importance of this 'war of words' when he wrote to Bentinck in 1812 – when Corfu was still under French occupation – referring to two papers that were published: one in Corfu and one in Zante.[402]

Both of the gazettes mostly contained information on military matters, thus allowing the dissemination of false or disorienting information on enemy movements. Foresti did not differentiate between French or Corfiote publishers in the publication of these papers.

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[397] Fusaro, 'Representation in Practice', p. 314.
[398] Fusaro, 'Representation in Practice', p. 314; James S. Grubb, 'When Myths Lose Power: Four Decades of Venetian Historiography', *Journal of Modern History,* 58 (1986), pp. 43-94; John Elgin, *Venice Transfigured: the Myth of Venice in British Culture, 1660-1797* (London, 2001); D.C. McPherson, *Shakespeare, Johnson and the Myth of Venice* (London and Toronto, 1990); Z. S. Fink, 'Venice and English Political Thought in the Seventeenth Century', *Modern Philology*, 38 (1940), pp. 155-172.
[399] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian,* p. 200.
[400] Bayly, *Impeiral Meridian,* p. 200.
[401] P. Mackridge, 'Introduction' in A. Hirst and P. Sammon (eds.), *The Ionian Islands: Aspects of their History and Culture* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2014), p. 4.
[402] The gazette in Zante (titled *Gazzetta Delle Isole Jonie*) was published weekly (usually every Saturday) in Italian, thus was accessible mainly to the educated middle and upper classes in the towns, who could read and speak Italian (TNA CO 136/153-155). Also: NA Pw Jd 2410, Foresti to Bentinck, Zante, 18 December 1812.

Competition around winning over the 'average' Ionian became stronger as British occupation became more stable in the balance of powers. British economic and political interests aside, most British officials on the islands were confident that they could bring 'moral improvement' and prosperity to the islanders. Rhetorically, the 'anti-myth of Venice' was feeding into British claims of 'moral improvement'. For British officials, however, cultivating friendly relations with the Greeks, as well as their 'moral improvement', were more programmatic than genuine.

Overall, championing the interests of the 'inferior classes of the community' by the abolition of titular offices and the elite's interests was a standard line in British discourse. Responding to London's requests for information on Ionian society, Campbell set up the British headquarters in Zante, liaised with Ionian aristocrats and the heads of the leading ecclesiastical establishments on the islands, the Greek Orthodox and Catholic Churches. Campbell collected information on revenues, customs, the judicial and educational establishment etc. from various appendages he received from his predecessor Airey, as well as from interviews with local collaborators.[403] These reports are kept today in the Colonial Office records and have been transcribed and published in Greece since the 1980s, but without any substantial historical analysis since.[404]

During Campbell's administration, Ionians were consulted on various matters, particularly in regards to the legislature. To a large extent, British initiatives were seen in a positive light during the period 1809-1815 by many Ionians who advocated reforms, particularly in the judicial and educational establishments. As elsewhere in the empire, models of governance were not simply implemented but also adapted to local contexts. Changing Venetian laws and constructing an efficient bureaucracy were indeed crucial in state formation on the islands.[405] In theory, the critique of Venetian 'corrupting influence' shaped British declarations about the implementation of new forms of control. Campbell's calls for regulation of the legislature were in agreement with many Ionians who advocated deep reforms in the

[403] TNA CO 136/1, no. 11 [enclosures], Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 15 July 1813; TNA CO 136/1, no. 11 [enclosed], Report on the Ionian Islands now under the Protection of Great Britain.
[404] But Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 80-81.
[405] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 79-96.

judicial establishment of the islands: one of Campbell's early initiatives, for instance, was to gather a committee consisting of knowledgeable Ionian judges and politicians in order to provide more accurate information for the legislature. According to them, the problems of the judicial establishment—and particularly of the criminal code—on the islands were, that the principle of legislation being still in force,

> …completed of a period in which the luminous principle of legislation philosophy were not yet displayed, drawn up in a language which is not understood at all by the lower classes and very imperfectly by lawyers and founded on the maxims of a government which is no more, it is not surprising if private individuals ignorant of the dictates of their own conduct are in the course of their actions and if the judges listening to their feelings, avoid to execute laws sometime contradictory, often …, and always very extravagant.[406]

These reforms were related to the Venetian criminal code on maiming and murder in the islands, as well as on the incomprehensible language of the legal system to the 'lower classes', 'excited by the pressing want of a salutary reform in their own legislature has been already manifested in past times by efforts which reflect the greatest honour on those who were the first promoters of this beneficial change'.[407] While Campbell found the institutions of the islands 'irreconcilable to English ideas, English usage and English principles generally', he wrote about the lower classes who had 'been made the instruments of a few ambitious and designing individuals among the higher orders, upon the basis of ancient vassalage or the feudal system'.[408] Moreover, for Campbell it was essential to abolish a 'number of superfluous offices' and 'honorary employments' left over from the Septinsular Republic, in order to contain the power of the 'passions and interests of the opulent patrician families'.[409] Issues of law reform and state-formation in the islands under British rule have been discussed elsewhere, in

[406] TNA CO 136/1, 'Translation. Upon the Criminal Code at present in use in the Ionian Islands with modifications of the same proposed and recommended'. Signed Giovanni Zambelli, Gio. Mignati, Francesco Muzzan to Campbell, Zante, 10 January 1813.
[407] TNA CO 136/1, 'Translation. Upon the criminal code at present in use in the Ionian Islands with modifications of the same proposed and recommended', Signed Giovanni Zambelli, Gio. Mignali and Francesco Muzzan to Campbell, Zante, 10 January 1813.
[408] TNA CO 136/1, no. 11, 'Report', p. 21.
[409] TNA CO 136/2, no. 32, Bathurst to Campbell, Zante, 11 January 1814, pp. 12a-b.

both Greek and English-speaking historiography.[410] As Maria Fusaro has already suggested, more comparative studies between British and Venetian legal traditions may prove to be particularly fruitful.[411]

'Moral improvement' and surveys – the hand of the state?

As has been mentioned, the period from the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries saw an unprecedented change in the islands. A new class of people across Ionian society had been advocating the 'modernization' of the islands, with the establishment of education or the implementation of deep changes in the legislature. As with the networks of military and economic information, the development of educational institutions on the islands overlapped with a rapidly growing 'commercial bourgeoisie' elsewhere in the Greek-speaking world. Ionian historiography has discussed at some length this Ionian bourgeoisie, which became increasingly vocal in public opinion on the islands, especially after the 1840s.[412] This thesis is more concerned with an earlier period, and examines the extent to which the first surveys were 'improvised'.

Studies in imperial history have been debating the impact of colonialism on local institutions and networks for some time now, with an overwhelming focus on India.[413] Equally, historians have also been aware of the strengths and limitations of 'modernist master narratives'.[414] Historical writing on *Anglokratia* on the Ionian Islands in particular, seems preoccupied with the impact of British institutions and discourse on Ionians, on whether the Protectorate was a successful 'laboratory' of modernity or not: whether seen in a positive or a negative light, the British presence in the islands as well as the Mediterranean more generally is presented almost as an unstoppable force for progress or cultural imperialism. For example,

[410] On law see Gekas, *Xenocrac*y, pp. 79-100; Calligas, 'Maitland's Constitution'.
[411] Fusaro, 'Representation in Practice'.
[412] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* pp. 287-324 and 'The commercial bourgeoisie'.
[413] See for example the very interesting discussion 'The first century of British colonial rule in India: social revolution or social stagnation?' in Stokes, *The Peasant and the Raj*, esp. pp. 20-28.
[414] Comaroff, 'Reflections', pp. 323-328.

there seems to be very similar concerns in relevant debates on British infrastructures, communications or large scheme projects for the 'moral improvement' of Ionians.

But such large schemes were severely limited by a lack of funds or the significant amount of initiatives that colonial governors had to undertake on the spot. But there has been little discussion overall about the limits of such impact. An important point of departure is Greek knowledge networks which pre-existed the British, between the islands and mainland Greece, as well as the islands and the rest of Europe. Knowledge, political opinion and economic information were transmitted through these networks. Viewed from the British perspective, this section will illuminate how British officials sought to penetrate these networks and how compatible such imperatives were with locals.

Overall, a hands-off approach prevailed in educational institutions in the earlier period of British administration. Education would become the work of individuals – British and Ionian alike – on the islands, and often obstructed by the fiscal problems of the government: such was the case of Frederick North, Maitland's predecessor in Ceylon and future founder of the first Greek university during *Anglokratia*: the Ionian Academy in 1824. Before that, the first time that funds were secured in a Greek state – even under foreign protection – for educational purposes were during the Septinsular Republic in 1805.[415] A university was founded during the French administration in 1808, but was abolished by Campbell, along with the press and an academy.[416]

Linguistically similar but politically diverse, Greek intellectual networks and communities in Europe of course pre-existed the nineteenth century. As Greek historians have mentioned, local identities and cultural backgrounds often mattered more than notions relating to a unique Greek national bourgeoisie, even less to a unique national consciousness in the Greek-speaking world.[417] Building on previous works, this study argues that the 'commercial bourgeoisie' of the

[415] Andreades, *Regarding the Economic Administration,* p. 35.
[416] Stewart M. Fraser, 'Sir James Campbell (1763-1819)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-4506?rskey=cDLtQ0&result=3 (March 2016).
[417] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 287-288.

Ionian Islands are a case in point.[418] Wealthy Ionian families sent their male youth to study law and medicine at European universities such as Paris, Padua and Venice. Greek communities abroad formed channels of communication and knowledge transfers between Europe and Greece, perhaps most famously Greek mercantile and shipping interests in the Black Sea. These changes also left their mark on the islands as well as the Greek mainland at large, both in terms of knowledge production as well as daily life. The rapid growth in literary production in late eighteenth century for example, called the *Heptanese School* (*Eptanesiaki Scholi* in Greek), is a classic example of the connections formed with western European countries.[419] At the same time, these changes widened the gaps between a literate middle and upper urban classes on the islands and the illiterate rural areas: according to one memoir of the time, for example, three-quarters of Ionians did not know how to read or write.[420]

In theory, it was among Bathurst's broader aims to establish strong links with Greek trade networks as well as to infuse 'moral improvement' in the Ionians. Though not explicitly articulated, this notion of moral improvement was mentioned frequently in Bathurst's instructions to Campbell when the latter landed on the islands. To explain these cultural strategies in early-nineteenth century empire in a comparative perspective, Bayly mentioned the example of Ireland and 'the revamping of the rituals of the Order of St. Patrick'.[421] Indeed, the British tried to promote 'subordinate forms of nationalism' in the Ionian Islands as well, mainly through education and trying to turn the islands into a cultural magnet for the Greek-speaking world. Bathurst informed Campbell of the prospect of establishing a Greek school or college, and a printing press with Greek types was shipped from Zante to Corfu, as a means of articulating information 'and to diffuse knowledge through the countries where the Greek language is spoken'.[422] Bathurst's orders to Campbell to aid the diffusion of knowledge to areas

[418] Gekas, 'The commercial bourgeoisie'.
[419] Ugo Foscolo, Dionysios Solomos or Ioannis Vilaras are amongst the most known examples. It was this literary production, around Solomos, that would later turn into folk poetry and towards a more (Greek) national literature, combining European literary trends and political nationalism (Roderick Beaton, *Folk Poetry of Modern Greece* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 8); Linos Politis, *Istoria tis Neoellinikis Logotechnias* (Athens, 2001) [*History of Modern Greek Literature*].
[420] Dixon, *The Colonial administrations,* p. 226.
[421] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian,* p. 200.
[422] TNA CO 136/300, No. 2, Bathurst to Campbell, Downing Street, 27 February 1813.

beyond the islands show that this initiative was not just about state-formation but also about establishing broader links with Greeks elsewhere. But in the end, it was due to individuals that an educational system was established. Foresti acted as an intermediary and used his own network of contacts across the Greek-speaking world. Not long after British troops landed on the islands, the consul received news from two famous Greek scholars at the time – Gregorius Constantas and Stephan Dukas - proposing to establish at their own expense, an Academy 'for educating the youth of their nation'.[423] Foresti's suggestions to Castlereagh in 1813 on Ionian education, for example, had many characteristics of the 'subordinate forms of nationalism' that Bayly described in *Imperial Meridian*:

> Many Greeks, on that account repair to Vienna and other parts of Germany as well as to Russia, at great expense and with great inconvenience, … would come with much satisfaction to these islands could they receive here the same advantages. And the idea that our government extends its protection to the revival of literature in Greece would attach the whole nation to our interests more than any exertion however great of beneficence or of power.[424]

Studying cases of 'go-betweens' – individuals who operated between British and Greek worlds – may help map out local intellectual networks but mostly how British officials tried to employ and penetrate such networks. At the same time, it might show the agency of such individuals and how they helped in associating western practices such as meritocracy with British rule.

Public instruction and local initiatives: the case of Plato Petrides

During the period under study, 'moral improvement' and public instruction was not part of a London-planned model of transforming the Ionian society, but came from the initiatives of interested individuals from both the islands and Britain.

[423] TNA FO 42/14, Foresti to Castlereagh, Zante, 3 April 1813, p. 26; TNA CO 136/1, Anonymous to Campbell, Zante, 25 June 1813.
[424] TNA FO 42/14, Foresti to Castlereagh, Zante, 3 April 1813, pp. 30-31.

Plato Petrides (1790-1852) was such an example of a 'go-between'. He came from the rich Greek community of Constantinople and was born in Argirokastro (modern day Albania), studied in London at the recommendation of Lord Elgin, and lived on the islands for most of his life (1813-1852).[425] Campbell employed him in December 1813 as 'Inspector of institutions of education' in the provisional government, and then of the *United States of the Ionian Islands* in 1819.[426] Petrides, who was also secretary to the Ionian legislative assembly, was later nominated a cavaliere of the Knight Order of St. Michael and St. George in 1833, and promoted to a knight commander in 1844.[427] Later he came to play an important role in the organization of education on the islands, and in the period under study he acted as a key intermediary between British officials and the Greeks. As Campbell wrote to Bathurst, the main reason for Petrides' appointment was the 'particular advantages of information he possess by his knowledge of the language and the numberless local peculiarities of the country'. His knowledge of Greece gave him the facility to penetrate 'into the real views and sentiments of the great mass of people in a manner not to be accomplished by any but one of their own body and religious persuasion'.[428] Individuals like Petrides, were appointed to key positions in terms of information-gathering or social policy, often extending the sphere of education or the diffusion of knowledge more broadly. Apart from gathering knowledge regarding pupil numbers, social status or the conduct of teachers, individuals like Petrides played an active role in effectively promoting British protection, often receiving a good salary in return.[429] His efforts, however, were directed more by his own personal experience in education.

Petrides had conducted perhaps the first survey in Ionian schools during British rule, but with measures he thought himself 'entitled to adopt'.[430] This report on the state of education took place almost thirty years before the first 'official printed Colonial Office report on the

[425] I took details about Petrides' life is in: H Meleti – Erga. Mastrodimitris, 'O Ioannis Vilaras opos ton eide o protos viografos tou Platon Petrides' [Ioannis Vilaras as was seen by his first biographer, Plato Petrides], *NEA ESTIA,* vol. 1115.
[426] TNA CO 136/1, no. 29 [enclosed], Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 17 December 1813.
[427] Charles R. Dodd, *The Peerage, Baronetage and Knightage of Great Britain and Ireland, including All the Titled Classes. Sixth Year* (London, 1846), p. 318.
[428] TNA FO 42/15, no. 45, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 1 August 1814, p. 15.
[429] For instance, Petrides was paid £400 per annum (TNA CO 136/14 [Hankey?] to Goulburn, 28 July 1820, p. 152a)
[430] TNA CO 136/3, Plato Petrides to Campbell, Corfu, 13 April 1815, p. 38a.

schools' (1843).[431] After a tour of the islands in 1815, Petrides outlined to Campbell his observations on the situation of the schools. In Zante, for example, he sought to reorganize a school into a model institution. Petrides wrote to Campbell about his efforts to reorganize the schools that had so far led 'a nominal existence'. The task proved to be challenging due to political events, but Petrides was encouraged by Campbell's 'indefatigable vigilance and attention for the promotion of the public good'.[432] After his departure from the island on June 28th 1814, he had left the school 4 professors and 135 students. As another observation, Petrides seemed content that a professor from Constantinople (Dr. Theodosius) replaced the local Mr. N. Mercati. By the 1st of January 1815, the particular school in Zante had 235 students.[433] Petrides' object was two-fold: first, to ensure that the system of schools was well regulated and organized, and 'to display to the inhabitants of Zante the great and real benefits expected to result to the country from the generous care of the British government'. Drawing from his academic background in Britain, or perhaps knowing exactly which words he ought to use, Petrides wrote to Campbell that 'good order, discipline and decency continued to prevail in the management' of the institution, even when he was absent.[434]

In order to conduct the survey, he organized a public examination in the presence of Colonel Moors, the chief of the local government and the head of the Church (Protopapas), 'part of the civil authorities, most of the nobility, with a great number of the public, concerned to fill up the hall and the rooms of the house'. The successful examinations on various taught topics were met with 'the unanimous applause of the audience'. Even those who were present and who used to encourage for a number of years 'the policy of ignorance and wretchedness', found themselves among 'the first who gave … the compliments of congratulation'. The next day, more parents applied for the acceptance of their children at the public schools.[435] Local

[431] Deborah Harlan, 'British Lancastrian Schools of Nineteenth-Century Kythera,' *The Annual of the British School of Athens*, 106 (2011), p. 331; Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations*, p. 226, n. 4.
[432] TNA CO 136/3, Petrides to Campbell, Corfu, 13 April 1815, pp. 38a-b.
[433] TNA CO 136/3, Petrides to Campbell, Corfu, 13 April 1815, p. 38b.
[434] TNA CO 136/3, Petrides to Campbell, Corfu, 13 April 1815, p. 38b.
[435] TNA CO 136/3, Petrides to Campbell, Corfu, 13 April 1815, p. 39a.

incidents like this became displays of British protection of education.[436] But at the same time, public examinations were not conducted only for reasons of propaganda, nor merely for gathering administrative information for the needs of schools. Meritocracy – even in theory – and the establishment of a system of mass education was an integral part of local reforming initiatives and of the Ionian State, having recently conveyed the patronage and infrastructure of British rule. Moreover, social and political tensions were at the heart of such projects. In these cases, British officials had a laissez-faire approach, and these projects depended more on private funds. Individuals like Petrides were pioneers in collecting information about institutions in the islands, not only in the Ionian Islands, but also across the empire.[437] Petrides was finally removed from office because of his clash with Theotoky. Writing to the Senator, Maitland acknowledged his support for Theotoky.[438]

The islands in an imperial system

We saw how British officials interpreted instructions from London in establishing connections with local intellectual networks. But during Campbell's administration, the islands were connected with other British possessions in the Mediterranean as well. Port-cities and strategic outposts were gradually integrated into an imperial system of communications, commerce and shipping and, to an extent, integrated into the Atlantic economy. The regulation of movement, information and capital took the form of documentation and passes; a practice, although not new, that nevertheless sought to integrate regional economies into a broader imperial network.[439] However, the creation of a system where products and capital, which had its origins in wartime period, would be little regulated but conducted under British protection,

[436] On education during *Anglokratia*, see for example Deborah Harlan, 'British Lancastrian Schools of Nineteenth-Century Kythera,' *The Annual of the British School of Athens*, 106 (2011), pp. 325-374; Georgios N. Leontsinis, *Zitimata Eptanesiakis Koinonikis Istorias* [*Themes in Ionian Social History*] (Athens, 1991), esp. chapters 16, 17, 18.
[437] Vicziany, 'Imperialism, Botany and Statistics'.
[438] TNA CO 136/1084, Maitland to Theotoky, Corfu, 29 May 1820, p. 156.
[439] For Venice, see for example: Eric R. Dursteller, 'Power and Information: The Venetian Postal System in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean, 1573-1645', in *From Florence to the Mediterranean: Studies in Honor of Anthony Molho* (Florence, 2009), pp. 601-623. I would like to thank Reinard Gluzman for suggesting me this article.

would also bring different challenges to British officials: along with its expeditions in checking transatlantic slave trade, the Royal Navy was policing the Mediterranean. British maritime rights – Ionians and Maltese included after 1815 – involved a series of difficulties which no high-ranking official would expect in the period before the war.

Comparative studies between the Mediterranean and other oceans are few.[440] Historically, there have been few studies that consider the islands within a wider imperial system, whether in the context of communications, trade or diplomacy.[441] Even less so, studies that consider the impact of the Royal Navy, and British presence more generally, on people and places in the Mediterranean 'beyond the poop deck'. Moreover, focusing more on terms of communication and knowledge, this thesis argues that pre-existing maritime networks and forms of social communication were transformed during the same period of the provisional government in the islands.

In many ways, war gave the incentive for the British to improve communications and the movement of knowledge. Despite Nelson's victory at Trafalgar in 1805, maritime communications and commerce were suffering, particularly because the Mediterranean was still packed with French – and until 1808, Spanish – privateers. The British were struggling to keep military or diplomatic communications with their allies open.[442] In Malta, a regular packet service was established in 1806, yet caused many complaints from the Post Office arrangements.[443] Referring to delays in the mails, for example, Foresti mentioned in 1810 that his letters were delayed for three months, due to the absence of 'public conveyance' between Malta and Sicily.[444] Measures were also taken to improve the postal service and communications. British packet losses occurred frequently and French privateer row boats were still operating in the Adriatic in 1813. In the same year, Campbell gave orders to establish an armed vessel, or packet, in order to maintain 'constant' communication between the Ionian

[440] But Heather Sutherland, 'Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 34:1 (Feb. 2003), pp. 1-20; Chircop also mentions this neglect ('British Imperial Network'), *passim.*
[441] But Chircop, 'British Imperial System'; Holland, *Blue-Water Empire,* see for example pp. 3-6.
[442] Knight, *Britain against Napoleon*, pp. 292-293.
[443] Mackesy, *War in the Mediterranean*, p. 18.
[444] TNA FO 42/14, Foresti to [Castlereagh?], Zante, 1 February 1810, p. 2.

Islands, Sicily and Malta. He also complied with Bathurst's suggestion to establish a post office in Zante. Apart from the main ports of the Adriatic, Malta and of mainland Greece, the postal service would have smaller branches in the rest of the islands, and would take letters from, and to, Malta, Sicily, Gibraltar, Tagus, Cadiz and other ports of Spain, as well as England. The service would also transmit letters to ports of the Ottoman Empire, such as Constantinople and Smyrna. There would be also an increase in customs charges on the islands, to cover these expenses.[445] Through Campbell's letters, there seems to be no mention of further connecting the islands with India, but with other ports throughout the Mediterranean.

Ports of the islands were linked with other ports in the Mediterranean via the postal service, like Gibraltar and Malta, developing into entrepôts and pushing forward British commercial penetration into Turkey and Northern Africa.[446] These ports were declared free; open sites for British and British-allied vessels that proceeded to another destination without being subjected to duties, except from a moderate 2% on the estimated value of the cargo.[447] Malta, for example, had already been declared a free port as early as 1801, while the ports of Zante and Argostoli in Cephalonia were declared free ports in 1813. News of the ports being declared free and 'heads of particulars' were circulated under official proclamations on the islands, communicated to British naval commanders in the Mediterranean, and were notified by the agent of the islands in Britain, Colonel Bunbury, at Lloyds Coffee House in London.[448]

But the islands were integrated into the British Mediterranean under an imperial system of documentation. Documents of identification across the Mediterranean gradually transformed into 'instruments of imperial protection'.[449] One of the ways of integrating the British Mediterranean was through the so-called Mediterranean passes. The result of bilateral treaties between England and the Barbary States, these were documents of identification which

[445] TNA CO 136/1, no. 14, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 9 August 1813.
[446] John Chircop, '*Pax Britannica* and 'Free Trade and Open Seas': Shifting British Informal Colonialism in North Africa, 1800-1860s', *Mediterranean Review,* 8:1 (June 2015), p. 39.
[447] TNA CO 136/1, no. 27, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 29 November 1813.
[448] TNA CO 136/1, no. 16, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 24 August 1813.
[449] Tristram Stein, 'Passes and Protection in the Making of a British Mediterranean', *Journal of British Studies*, 54:3 (July, 2015), pp. 602-631.

during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries became 'instruments of protection'.[450] These licenses ensured that English vessels would not be attacked by Barbary ships. English merchant ships would continue trading unmolested and prisoners were released.[451] In fact, vessels had to be built in Britain, and crews were to consist of at least three fourths British subjects.[452] The issuance of these passes provided to the captain of the vessel – and therefore the vessel itself – freedom of movement and trade, as the owners of such passes would not be attacked by corsair or pirate ships belonging to the Barbary States. These agreements—which gave considerable advantage to British trade over other Christian or Muslim powers – were generally respected by pirates from the Barbary.[453] In the case of Ionian vessels, passes were requested from the British government through the colonial governor. Passes were often temporary and were issued during Airey's command, for example in 1812.[454]

British policy in the region aimed at 'facilitating' the commerce of Greek merchant fleets of islands in the Aegean, like Hydra and Spezies, so that 'most of the traders' of these islands 'would willingly avail themselves of the British protection in receiving their trade with those ports'.[455] British maritime protection competed with Austrian and Russian interests, who sought to establish their commercial connections in the Levant and the Mediterranean, warranting the belief at the same time 'that the greatest Mediterranean facilities will be afforded by the Russian government to cover the Greek ships with the Russian flag'.[456]

The pass system would ensure that the British government integrated foreign and neutral shipping.[457] It also became an effective way of gathering information on merchant fleets, tonnage and crews. Demand for passes grew in British possessions in the Mediterranean

[450] Stein, 'Passes and Protection', p. 603.
[451] Nicholas B. Harding, 'North African Piracy, the Hanoverian Carrying Trade, and the British State, 1728-1828', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), p. 30.
[452] Joseph Chitty, *A Treatise on the Laws of Commerce and Manufactures, and the Contracts relating thereto: With An Appendix of Treaties, Statutes, and Precedents, volume I* (London, 1824), p. 496.
[453] TNA CO 136/1, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 11 September 1813, no. 17; TNA CO 136/1, Donell to Campbell, Algiers, 24 June 1813.
[454] TNA CO 136/1, no. 25, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 13 November 1813.
[455] TNA CO 136/1, [Separate] Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 30 November 1813.
[456] TNA CO 136/1, [Separate] Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 30 November 1813.
[457] Kapetanakis, 'The deep-sea going merchant fleet'; Chircop, 'British Imperial Network'.

like Gibraltar and Malta, including the Ionian Islands. Campbell, for example, who was the intermediary between the islanders and the British government, informed Bathurst in 1814 that the sixty Mediterranean passes that he received from the Admiralty were not sufficient for more than one fourth of the Ionian merchant fleet of 300 'square rigged vessels'. At the same time, 116 Ionian vessels, with only 66 of them belonging to Cephalonia, navigated already under the British flag.[458] There was a danger, as Campbell informed Bathurst, that these Ionian traders would finally acquire protection from the Russians or the Austrians.[459] Thus the mere practice of issuing passes had become a powerful instrument of imperial protection.

Campbell warned Bathurst in 1815 that British commerce, 'being connected more immediately with the Adriatic and Archipelago', should be 'opposed to the most ruinous depredations and losses by the enemy's privateers'. As a countermeasure, the Ionian government should issue letters of marque and reprisal, in order to allow Ionian cruisers to attack Britain's enemies. Under French rule, Corfu had become the 'general rendezvous' of the privateering system, which was composed of Corsicans, Genoese and Sclavonians.[460] Free marine transport from Cephalonia to the other islands was also established on the 10th October 1816, after an application by the Regent of the island, Rivarola. But due to the existence of the plague, Santa Maura and Parga were exempted from communications.[461]

British protection of Ionian maritime trade was utilized to further legitimize British presence on the islands. Britain had become the only naval power that could provide naval protection to all 'weaker powers'; risking a permanent expenditure. Castlereagh wrote to Bathurst in 1815, for example: 'I am afraid, as soon as we embark in the task of protecting the weaker powers, that every other power, even the Americans, will rely upon us for destroying, or keeping in port, the Barbary corsairs, and that the whole charge of the police of the Mediterranean will fall upon us'.[462] The issue of the islands was closely interlinked: '… nothing

[458] TNA CO 136/2, no. 36, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 1 March 1814, pp. 28a-b; TNA CO 136/2, Campbell to Barrow, Zante, 6 February 1814, pp. 30b-31a.
[459] TNA CO 136/2, Campbell to Barrow, Zante, 6 February 1814, p. 31b.
[460] TNA CO 136/3, no. 55, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 29 April 1815.
[461] Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State*, pp. 87-88.
[462] Castlereagh to Bathurst, Paris, 17 August 1815, in William Vane (ed.), *Memoirs*, X, p. 483.

should be done or said upon the subject, till the point of the Ionian Islands is finally settled. The great motive the Ionians have to become our subjects is that our flag being now the only one respected'.[463] In fact, as historians have discovered since, the area between the Ionian Islands and Calabria in Italy was one of the most preferred areas of Barbary corsairs during the early nineteenth century.[464] Shortly after the Congress of Vienna, assurances were given by the regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli to the British that Ionian ships under British jurisdiction would be respected.[465]

British maritime rights cemented its imperial authority and the role of the Royal Navy as a guarantor of the maritime trade. In the end, however, this brought more challenges than the British could counter, most notably the extraordinary costs of policing the seas, particularly after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. We will see later how issues of maritime security were closely related to the creation of the protectorate in the Ionian Islands. The next sections discuss how the changes mentioned above were played out at the diplomatic table, and how diplomatic negotiations in the aftermath of war decided British presence in the region.

Vienna politics and the creation of the protectorate

When representatives from the victorious coalition forces commenced negotiations in Vienna, a similar ambivalence over maintaining control of the islands was articulated in official correspondence. British statesmen were slowly withdrawing from continental politics in 1815, with Bathurst and the Earl of Liverpool the main proponents of this policy.[466] In Vienna, Castlereagh negotiated with Ioannis Capodistrias, a man who 'professed a Liberalism which, though mainly inspired by a wish to help his own Greek countrymen, yet was undoubtedly sincere and intelligent enough'.[467] Meanwhile, and particularly after the Treaty of Tilsit, the Ionian Islands had completely justified their place as an 'observatory to the whole of Turkey', a

[463] Castlereagh to Bathurst, Paris, 17 August 1815 in William Vane (ed.), *Memoirs*, X, p. 483.
[464] Daniel Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs. The End of a Legend, 1800-1820* (Boston, 2005), pp. 85, 88
[465] Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, p. 273.
[466] Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, pp. 520-521.
[467] Webster, *Foreign Policy,* p. 91.

prediction made by Meyer seven years before the Congress of Vienna: using Corfu as a base between 1799 and 1807, as well as after 1809, British military officials and consuls surveyed the islands as well as the mainland, collecting valuable military and political information. In the next two remaining sections of this chapter, the negotiations about the islands in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars are examined, and Castlereagh's sources of information on the spot are discussed.

Perhaps due to the complexity of the issue, the cession of the islands to Britain was one of the last issues to be resolved in the diplomatic negotiations that followed Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo. Following the Congress of Vienna, it would take another year until the cession was signed on the 5th of November 1815 by Capodistrias, Castlereagh, Wellington and Rasoumouffsky.[468] Indeed, debates about the islands could form a history of their own and negotiations over the islands have already been analysed in detail.[469] We only need to pinpoint two major points which British negotiations were aiming at in regards to the islands: to keep Russia out of the Mediterranean, and to ensure Britain's maritime rights in the region.

Various European rulers lay claim to the islands, including almost every member of the coalition: Britain, Russia, and Austria, and even smaller sovereignties like the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, whose claim was based on the islands' Venetian past. Such an example of the multiple alternatives for the islands was Castlereagh's proposal for the islands to pass to Austria in March 1815.[470] As Austria had no maritime interests, the move to cede the islands was less realistic and more a way to contain Russian influence in Eastern Europe: as Webster wrote, 'British statesmen … saw her as an obvious ally, and were prepared to try and make her as strong as possible in Europe … they looked to her to keep the centre of the Mediterranean free from both French and Russian influence'.[471] It has been argued that the 'political fate of the

[468] The list of bibliography on the Congress of Vienna is vast, and therefore, selective: Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*; Adam Zamoyski, *Rites of Peace. The Fall of Napoleon & the Congress of Vienna* (London, 2008); Alan Sked (ed.), *Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848* (London, 1979); Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*; Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (New York, 1964); Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in allied unity, 1812-1822* (London, 1970 [1946]); Charles Kingsley Webster, *The Congress of Vienna* (London, 1918).

[469] For the Ionian Islands issue in particular: Kapetanakis, *Shipping and commerce*, chapter 2; Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', chapter 1; Wrigley, *Ionian Neutrality*, pp. 65-71.

[470] TNA FO 139/35, 'Observations on the cession of the Seven Islands to Austria by George Foresti'.

[471] Webster, *Foreign Policy,* p. 101.

islands was determined in the circles of European diplomacy', but it was British troops who had already occupied the islands. Similarly, after Russia's withdrawal from the Mediterranean in 1807 and the victory at Waterloo British diplomats had acquired a much better negotiating position.[472]

The 'balance of power' was a crucial determinant of British foreign policy in the aftermath of war. Among British statesmen, perhaps few have been more closely associated with the idea of the 'balance of power' in Europe as Castlereagh.[473] British maritime rights and home defence were linked to continental politics and Britain's foreign policy was generally aimed at ensuring the 'balance of powers' in Europe, the same as Britain's maritime rights. In an interesting parallel with the Ionian Islands for example, Bayly mentioned that Castlereagh negotiated fiercely 'to hold onto the Cape colony, St. Helena, and Mauritius not 'for their commercial value' but 'because they affect essentially the engagement and security of [British] dominion'.[474] As has been mentioned before in Ionian historiography, the British government was divided over which policy to pursue on the Ionian Islands: for Bathurst, Bunbury and Campbell, the islands 'ought to be annexed to the British Empire', while for Richard Church, a British officer with experience of Mediterranean service and a good local knowledge of the region, the Ionian Islands should form a 'shadowy' Republic under British protection.[475] With historians debating the exact definition of the 'balance of power', Anglo-Russian relations have been described more accurately as intertwined in a 'great-power rivalry' and cooperation at the same time, as 'rivals and joint hegemons'.[476] This ambivalence would affect greatly the existence of the protectorate as a half-colony.

Permanent peace was far from settled, however. The Vienna settlement had indeed established an unusual 'balance of power' in Europe, a system 'rested not on balance of power but on hegemony'. And the relations between two major European powers Britain and Russia

[472] Wrigley, *Ionian Neutrality,* p. 65.
[473] C. K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822. Britain and the European Alliance* (London, 1925), esp. pp. 63-74.
[474] C.A. Bayly, 'The first age of global imperialism, c. 1760-1830', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 26:2 (1998), p. 35.
[475] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 80.
[476] Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics*, p. 572.

were nevertheless characterized by insecurity.[477] Castlereagh, as other British officials at the time, was nevertheless concerned over what was perceived as the growth of Russian influence in the region, and particularly over Russia's long-lasting influence over the Greeks, including of course the flourishing Greek shipping in wartime and Black Sea trade. During the diplomatic negotiations over the islands, there was much opposition by Emperor Alexander, 'pleading the engagements he had formerly entered into for their independence', meaning the years of the Septinsular government under Russia's protection.[478] Moreover, describing the situation in the Balkans, Vick wrote 'low- level conflict remained ever- present and ready to ignite'.[479]

For Castlereagh, who wrote to the British prime minister, the Earl of Liverpool, at the time, two primary objectives should be Britain's policy aims on the Ionian Islands, even in the case that Britain did not occupy the islands:

> The one to provide adequately for the protection of the people who have so long confided themselves to our care; the other, not to suffer Russia to acquire any establishment in those islands, to the hazard of the internal tranquility both of Greece and Hungary, which latter kingdom is full of Greeks. With respect to the first of these objects, it might be secured by some arrangement like that lately framed for Genoa; but, in order to steer clear of the old republican form of government [the Septinsular Republic], which might afford a pretext for the renewal of Russian protection, it appears to me desirable to give a direct sovereignty over these islands, *under whatever conditions may be thought right*, to some acknowledged European Power, and if this power cannot be Great Britain, in order to exclude Russia, we may insist that the sovereign authority shall belong to a local power, that is, to the King of Sicily, or to the Emperor of Austria.[480]

According to the foreign secretary, Britain should at least ensure the neutralization of the islands, by demolishing the fortifications at Corfu and by rendering the islands' ports free, with a 'system guaranteed by all great powers'.[481] These observations were, of course, written

[477] Paul W. Schroeder, 'Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?', *The American Historical Review*, 97:3 (June 1992), pp. 687, 701.
[478] TNA CO 136/300, Bathurst to Maitland, 2 December 1815.
[479] Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*, p. 194.
[480] My emphasis, Castlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, 24 December 1814 in *Memoirs*, X, p. 225.
[481] Castlereagh to Liverpool, Vienna, 24 December 1814 in *Memoirs*, X, p. 225.

at an earlier stage of negotiations, but Castlereagh's concern over Russia was evident from the beginning. While the Ionian Islands were considered too significant for British policymakers to abolish all control, by allowing the resurrection of Ionian independence under the Septinsular Republic, offering protection to the Ionians did not merely come from humanitarian interest; protecting the Ionians would involve integrating flourishing Ionian shipping and trade into the imperial network of the Mediterranean.

Formally, Castlereagh consulted the opinion of two knowledgeable observers of the Ionian Islands and the Mediterranean in general. The first was Sir Richard Church, who was put in charge of a Greek light infantry unit which was assembled to fight against French troops in the islands.[482] Church was asked specifically by Castlereagh to submit a memorandum to the Congress in Vienna regarding the importance of the islands.[483] Although it was not clear whether the foreign secretary managed to study Church's memorandum in detail due to the extraordinary paperwork during the Congress, Church's ideas were indicative of the importance that British officials who served in the Mediterranean placed on the islands.

Church mentioned the proofs of support for Britain that principal Ionian nobles had given, often 'at the risk of their own lives'. For example, making explicit mention of the family of Martinengo from Zante, individuals who had prepared the inhabitants to actively join British troops, in the hopes of the restoration of the Septinsular Republic.[484] Church made explicit mentions of the potential benefits of a British presence in the region, and particularly mentioned the fleets of the small islands of Hydra, Spetzes and Psara in the Aegean Sea, which possessed fleets of 500 large ships in total and major carriers in the Levant.[485] At the same time, Church emphasized the importance of maintaining nearby areas in the continent, for example the town of Parga, for health policy reasons. These stations would 'ensure the supply of provisions to the islands' by forming 'a barrier to prevent the possibility of the plague being

[482] TNA CO 136/2, Campbell to 'Any officer charged with his Majesty's interests at Naples', Zante, 8 February 1814, p. 19b; On Richard Church, see E. M. Church, *Chapters in an Adventurous Life. Sir Richard Church in Italy and Greece* (Edinburgh and London, 1895); Lane-Poole, Stanley, *Sir Richard Church. Command-in-Chief of the Greeks in the War of Independence* (London, 1890).
[483] BL Richard Church papers, Add MS 36543, 'Report'.
[484] BL Richard Church papers, Add MS 36543, 'Report', f. 143, note 1.
[485] BL Richard Church papers, Add MS 36543, 'Report', f. 146a.

introduced from the neighbouring Turkish governments', Church wrote to Castlereagh.[486] The increasingly interconnected ports of the British Mediterranean played a crucial role in the spread of disease.[487] The other source of information for Castlereagh was Capodistrias' memorandum, and it seems Castlereagh was cooperating because he was hoping for a peaceful resolution with Russia in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.

Indeed, Capodistrias was a Corfiote working for the Russian government, and due to his place of origin, a de facto representative of Ionian affairs in European courts; 'the affair of my heart and of my mind – the affair of the Ionian Isles', as Capodistrias himself confided to his friend and Russian official, Pozzo di Borgo.[488] The Corfiote politician was mostly involved with Ionian affairs in diplomatic negotiations, and later became the main suspect of British officials in potential Russian intrigues and rebellions on the islands. The Ionian cooperated with Castlereagh nevertheless, submitting to him a memorandum on the history, customs and economy of the islands after the islands passed into British protection in November 1815. In this memorandum, it was evident how much weight Capodistrias put on education towards the 'moral improvement' of Ionians. It was also evident that the ideal political system he proposed for the islands was characteristically conservative: 'firstly, the state should be federal or united … secondly, active politics and political rights of individuals should come out from their right to land ownership … thirdly, judicial authorities should be independent and elected by landowners etc'.[489] Hardly a revolutionary, then, Capodistrias actively worked towards Ionian independence in the long term and saw the cession of the islands into British 'protection' as the most viable option, and a better solution compared to the option of ceding to the Austrians.[490]

Despite Castlereagh's personal ideas about the promotion of British interests by ceding the islands to another power, among British officials – particularly on the spot – the general

[486] BL Richard Church papers, Add MS 36543, 'Report', f. 146a.
[487] Robert Sallares, 'Disease' in Peregrine Holden and Sharon Kinoshita (eds.), *A Companion to Mediterranean History* (Chichester, 2014), p. 252.
[488] Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, 'Capodistrias and a 'New Order' for Restoration Europe: The 'Liberal Ideas' of a Russian Foreign Minister, 1814-1822', *The Journal of Modern History,* 40:2 (June 1968), p. 173.
[489] Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State,* p. 40.
[490] Capodistrias to Clancarty, Vienna, 28 March / 9 April 1815 and Capodistrias to Clancarty, Vienna, 18 / 30 May 1815, in *Ioannis Capodistrias Archives*, V (Corfu, 1984), pp. 18-21 and pp. 22, 23 respectively (in French and Greek).

consensus was shifting towards maintaining control of the islands. Bathurst, who also briefly became foreign secretary, replacing Castlereagh who was in Vienna until November 1815, prioritized British involvement in the area rather than the 'balance of power'. Consolidating British presence in the Mediterranean was his main concern, encouraging at the same time a 'friendly connection' with 'all seafaring and commercial people' in the region. Following the instructions he gave to Campbell regarding the Greeks in 1813, Bunbury also emphasized in a private letter to the future High Commissioner of the islands, Thomas Maitland (1760-1824), the importance of establishing 'some degree of influence' over the islands of Hydra and Spetzes in the Aegean Sea.[491] Despite their size, these 'little nations' possessed large fleets and expert sailors, and were quickly becoming 'the general carriers for the Levant'.[492] The fleets of the small islands were disproportionally active during the war with France given the size of their islands of origin. Foresti, for example, had mentioned in 1805 to foreign secretary Mulgrave that about 200 ships from Hydra and Spetzes had broken through the blockade of Toulon in order to contribute supplies for the garrison.[493] Responding to increasing criticism of the British government in Parliament, particularly in the post-Napoleonic era, Bathurst advocated respecting local customs and norms, as long as local populations did not jeopardize British rule.[494] In the same sense, he suggested that Maitland should work with Spiridion Foresti.

Ambivalence about the islands as a British possession was recurring during the period of the protectorate, but Castlereagh's willingness to hand the islands over to Austria met with disagreement from several British officials, particularly the ones serving on the spot who were convinced of the value of the islands for Britain. After all, divided opinion over policy was feeding back into more pervasive debates in Parliament about Britain's 'blue-water' policy: although also an advocate of the 'balance of powers', Bathurst was nevertheless a stronger supporter of relying on the Royal Navy and Britain's maritime rights in the Mediterranean – including of course the integration of Greek mercantile interests – than relying on continental alliances. As has been mentioned before, such debates reflected the political and intellectual

[491] TNA CO 136/300, [Private] Bunbury to Maitland, London, 13 February 1815.
[492] TNA CO 136/300, [Private] Bunbury to Maitland, London, 13 February 1815.
[493] TNA FO 42/7, Foresti to Mulgrave, Corfu, 28 May 1805, pp. 111-112.
[494] Neville Thompson, *Earl Bathurst and the British Empire 1762-1834* (Barnsley, 1999), pp. 115-116.

climate in Britain. Bathurst's view seemed strikingly similar to the view expressed in Leckie's *Historical Survey* (1808). Leckie, probably exaggerating, mentioned that 50,000 seamen could be employed in various parts of Greece.[495]

Ambivalence over the islands resurfaced in different forms in the later years of the Protectorate. But, above all, the newly acquired island outposts were seen as having the *potential* for future utility and profit, as a model-colony. Unlike other British insular possessions which had already acquired a great importance in war and commerce – such as Malta or Gibraltar – the Ionian Islands, 'if properly governed' could 'produce riches and strength to England'.[496] Sir Charles James Napier, whose statue is in Trafalgar Square today and who later came to be a local governor in Cephalonia (1822-1830), was certainly echoing the concerns of many British officials and particularly of the Treasury: the unstable social situation in the islands concerned many officials, as it meant that the government had to maintain a large, and thus expensive, military force on the islands.[497]

Meyer and Campbell's reports from the islands

By the time the wars with France were coming to an end, the islands had already become part of an imperial network in the Mediterranean, which was rapidly integrating maritime communications via the postal service and regional economies. Military and consular officials who served in the Mediterranean, before or during the recent wars, were putting pressure on the British government to maintain control and formally cede the islands in the negotiations following the end of the war.[498] This seems to be the point when rumours of the suggested proposal to cede the islands to Austria reached the islands. Campbell then tried to press the British government to maintain control over the islands in the post-Napoleonic era.

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[495] Leckie, *A Historical Survey*, p. 121.
[496] Sir Charles James Napier, *The Colonies: treating of their value generally-of the Ionian Islands in particular* (London, 1833), p. 1.
[497] This was a recurring issue throughout the Protectorate, but see Napier, *The Colonies*, pp. 24-37.
[498] Wrigley, *Ionian Neutrality*, pp. 67, 68; Tumelty, 'The Ionian Islands', p. 24.

Referring to the prospect of the surrender of Corfu, for example, Campbell wrote to Bathurst in 1814:

> But your Lordship is already aware of how small the means are at my disposal for cooperating in that enterprise, which on the other hand daily experience convinces me is the only one by which the British interests *can be permanently secured and established throughout the Mediterranean*. The Greeks are a people rapidly rising into power and consequence. And the commanding influence and rich resources which we cannot fail to derive from the continuance of our immediate connection so happily commenced with them, will be lost, perhaps irrevocably by suffering Corfu alone in the present state of Europe to remain in the possession of any foreign power.[499]

Campbell also considered the wider implications of British involvement in the region, and a small British detachment stationing in the town of Parga in the mainland (western Greece), particularly in British relations with Greeks. He acknowledged that the presence of a British detachment in Parga would not excite any particular interest. However, British troops stationing there would save the 'small Greek community' from the 'impending ferocity of its powerful and relentless neighbour', Ali Pasha. The inhabitants of the small town had escaped Ali's wrath long enough, but should he manage to occupy the town he would exterminate the inhabitants 'regardless of age or sex'.

The civil commissioner argued that Britain should maintain control over this town in the mainland. By maintaining troops, Campbell thought, Britain would strengthen the 'weak and fluctuating' Anglo-Hellenic connection, which was constantly disrupted by the 'intrigues' of parties affiliated to France or Russia in Greece: 'a foundation has now been laid for a far more intimate political connection and union with the Greek nation by our occupation of Parga'.[500] Campbell's comments on British presence in the region also show how blurred the borders between the islands and the mainland were.

But Campbell was also reflecting the views of William Meyer, who had acquired during his years in the islands a good local knowledge of local customs and politics. Since the Treaty of

[499] TNA CO 136/2, no. 34, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 11 February 1814, p. 17.
[500] TNA CO 136/2, no. 38, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 30 March 1814, pp. 46b, 47a.

Tilsit in 1807 and Meyer's comments about the 'irretrievable step' at the time, the official had shown a broader interest in geopolitical complications apart from the war with France. Meyer, who was also expressing his shared ideas with Spiridion Foresti, did want not explain the inherent importance of the islands but to answer the 'sophisms and projects' which were 'advanced by the ruling powers of the continent, 'to induce the British cabinet to act upon that principle, and to urge her to relinquish under plausible and illusory arrangements' the Ionian Islands:

> My present object is not to enter into any detailed exposition of the intrinsic value or internal resources of this highly gifted island, but briefly to trace the outline of its vast relative political importance under the present aspect and tendency of affair in Europe. … the necessity of the case, however, and not a spirit of aggrandizement or ambition led to the conquest of the greater part of them by the British arms. The Cession of such islands as these, which are the military and commercial keys of the Levant, ought not to be regulated by the same principles as the cession of colonies in general.[501]

Above all, Meyer was concerned about the expansion of Russia's influence in the Mediterranean. According to the consul, Russia sought to secure an outlet for her trade, to strengthen her bonds with the Greeks – particularly through common religion – as well as to ensure demand for her exports in the Levant, in order to realize 'her original commercial schemes in the Mediterranean' as he outlined it. Meyer was convinced that 'on the first renewal of war with Turkey, Russia will devise stratagems for hoisting her flag in the Mediterranean'.[502] Perhaps it is worth mentioning Meyer's broader strategic and geographic considerations that the islands belonged to:

> The channel of the Bosphorus may be forced. Turkey from her necessities, may be constrained to accord Russia the free passage of those straights. But should these events even not occur, and Corfu be relinquished by Britain I … … that no other power can prevent the Greek partisans of Russia (in a state of war with Turkey) from fettering out squadrons and to … up stations in the archipelago. And the talents and resources of her partisans are unquestionable. Such an event alone, while the name and influence of England is … and …, by the

[501] TNA CO 136/2, Meyer to Campbell, Corfu, 1 August 1814, pp. 147a-b.
[502] TNA CO 136/2, Meyer to Campbell, Corfu, 1 August 1814, p. 150a.

> dissolution of her connections with the Greek people by the abandonment of the Ionian Islands; such an event would be of itself sufficient to excite the greatest reaction (thereof) at the Levant. Piracies, rebellions and war in its worst forms would spread instantaneously over these regions; and the British interests would, on every account, be exposed to ruinous counteractions and mischances. Such is the buoyancy of Russian influence, from the … policy of Russia towards Turkey.[503]

His observations were not without foundation: Russia certainly had interests in the eastern Mediterranean, including common religious ties with the Greeks and political views shared by many in the islands, particularly amongst the Corfiote aristocracy. Time and again, such anxieties over perceived Russian influence, even though greatly exaggerated, would nevertheless greatly affect how British officials saw Ionian connections with Russia in the post-Napoleonic era. The threat of Russian intervention affected imperial thinking on the islands, but more crucially was used as a justification for the British governor to maintain political control.

As mentioned above, when the Vienna delegates commenced discussions again in Paris, the Ionian Islands became a British Protectorate, with the agreement of all European powers, under the Treaty of Paris in November 1815. Among the islanders, the decision on the islands passing into British protection was known by early December 1815.[504] The nature of the protectorate as half-colony (or semi-colony), but nominally an independent state, has been discussed recently in Ionian historiography, but with an overwhelming focus on Maitland and Bathurst's schemes, and with much less reference to Britain's diplomatic obligations; not so much to the islanders but regarding her standing in international relations. Britain's negotiating position had indeed improved much since Waterloo, and Russia was satisfied after British concessions on the Polish question. But as Bathurst wrote to Maitland shortly after the cession was signed, 'it was at the same time intimated that we were not free from all engagements to the Ionian Islands … and the declarations we published on taking possession of some of them certainly on reference to them placed us under some obligations'.[505] Therefore, the constitutional and political liberties of the Septinsular Republic were in theory maintained, but

[503] TNA CO 136/2, Meyer to Campbell, Corfu, 1 August 1814, p. 150a-b.
[504] BL Ferrara-Foresti papers, Add MS 88900/1/28, Foresti to North, Corfu, 4 January 1816.
[505] TNA CO 136/300, Bathurst to Maitland, 2 December 1815.

at the same time created a constant source of tension with the possibility of Russian interference, should the protectorate's international status be perceived to be abused by Russian officials.[506] This tension surrounding Russian agents operating in the islands worsened when the possibility of Russian interference in Ionian affairs became more real after 1819, threatening the existence of the protectorate.

During, and in the aftermath of the Vienna settlement, the British sought to ensure maritime rights, and to secure the hegemony of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean. The case of Lord Exmouth's expedition against the Barbary Regencies in 1816 is a case in point, seeking as it did to garner pan-European support to enforce the abolition of the slave trade in the Mediterranean. Exmouth's expedition entered into a long period between accommodation and contestation with the Barbary States by attacking Algiers, and by freeing from captivity Europeans who were slaves in Maghreb. The Royal Navy effectively established naval dominion in the region, consolidating British power on the European coasts of the Mediterranean.[507] Recent literature has questioned the eradication of piracy and has challenged previous notions about the devastating impact of European military interventions on the Barbary States.[508] The role of Britain in the area was nevertheless promoted as that of protector of stability and guarantor of the security of the seas, especially for the benefit of small states, including the Italian states, Malta and the Ionian Islands.[509] What Exmouth's expedition had shown in regards to the islands, is that British protection was not only about acquiring political power but also involved certain 'obligations', as Bathurst mentioned after the cession of the islands in 1815, extending diplomatic agreements. Part of Britain's maritime 'obligations' was protection against piratical attacks. After the cession of the islands was secured, the Ionians – now British subjects – were included in the treaties with the Barbary regencies. Similarly, Ionians who lived under Ottoman dominions were considered British subjects, 'exactly on the same scale and footing'

[506] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 30.
[507] Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, pp. 273-274.
[508] See for example, Caitlin M. Gale, 'Barbary's slow death: European attempts to eradicate North African piracy in the early nineteenth century', *Journal of Maritime Research,* 18:2 (2016).
[509] Gale, 'Barbary's slow death', pp. 139-140.

that the Maltese were, as Maitland wrote to Bartholomew Frere, the British minister plenipotentiary in Constantinople in 1816.[510]

Conclusion

Ionian historiography treats the period of the provisional government (1809-1815) as a political and constitutional 'limbo', where no major changes took place due to the temporary character of government and the legal ambiguity of the protectorate before its formal cession was decided under the Treaty of Paris. Yet despite its temporary character, it was during this period when the British presence became cemented, mainly for three reasons: first, the British found a stable ally in the mainland, Ali Pasha, whose role was crucial in terms of information and supplies. Second, the Ionian Islands had the chance to become a cultural magnet to the mainland as well as the Adriatic shores, attracting knowledgeable individuals across the Greek-speaking world, although still relying to a great extent on the hands-off approach of the British administration. Third, the islands were integrated into an imperial network in the Mediterranean which took shape in wartime.

Moreover, under the Vienna settlement and the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, British maritime rights were secured, creating at the same time new challenges for the British government. As for the negotiations in the aftermath of war, many British officials – particularly the ones serving in the Mediterranean – considered the occupation of the islands as a product of British conquest, a 'solid and legitimate ground of war'. Despite objections stated by Russian officials, especially in the earlier diplomatic discussions in 1815, the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 and the presence of British troops on the islands already gave Castlereagh an important advantage. However, British officials became convinced in the period after 1815 of the 'reappearance' of Russia in the Mediterranean, and the possibility of Russian interference in the islands on diplomatic grounds. To an extent, this anxiety shaped the ways that British officials perceived politics in the islands.

[510] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Frere, Corfu, May 1816.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what this chapter wants to show, is that the diplomatic settlement on the islands did not come solely after Castlereagh's negotiations. We saw how Castlereagh was more concerned with other issues, like ensuring that there would be no renewal of war with France, or giving concessions to Russia on Poland for instance. In the Ionian Islands, the British had penetrated through local networks and already cemented their imperial presence in various ways. These economic, cultural and political connections had already taken shape by 1814: the powerful Ali Pasha was a stable ally with Britain since 1811 – having secured naval stores for the Royal Navy – Foresti's connections had already opened avenues for the islands to become a cultural magnet in the region. At the same time, the islands were integrated into an imperial network of maritime protection.

Figure II: View of the harbour in Corfu

Work titled 'Shipping lying at Anchor in the Harbour off the old Town of Corfu', Hugh 'Grecian' Williams (1773-1829).[511]

[511] https://www.christies.com/lotfinder/Lot/hugh-william-williams-1773-1829-edinburgh-shipping-lying-5835117-details.aspx (accessed online: 25/04/2018).

Chapter 4: Medical knowledge, statistics and plague control in the Ionian Islands, 1815-1819

Science, imperial expansion, and whether they were related have been key topics for historians in recent decades.[512] Medical knowledge and what is defined as 'colonial medicine' have also been recurring subjects in historical writing, where the overwhelming focus has been on South Asia and Africa.[513] British medical officials who served on the islands based on their experience and local knowledge provided by Ionian physicians, used the accumulated information on plagues to compile statistical tables. This chapter contributes to the broader discussion on statistical information, disease-control and medical knowledge through the case of the plague that broke out in Corfu (1815). Furthermore, by looking at the particular plague outbreak, this chapter examines how the collection of statistical information, disease-control and medical knowledge were connected to imperial governance, and how knowledge was configured more broadly in both metropolitan and colonial contexts. Methodologically, studying both official correspondence and medical accounts illuminates a different picture of British governance on the islands than what is often assumed by Ionian historiography, in which Foucauldian approaches to 'governmentality' have perhaps misleadingly been applied to early nineteenth-century colonial governance.[514]

[512] John McAleer, ''A young slip of botany': botanical networks, the South Atlantic, and Britain's maritime worlds, c. 1790-1810', *Journal of Global History*, 11:1 (March 2016), pp. 24-43; Sujit Sivasundaram, 'Sciences and the Global: On Methods, Questions, and Theory', *Isis,* 101:1 (March 2010), pp. 146-158; Mark Harrison, 'Science and the British Empire', *Isis,* 96:1 (March 2005), pp. 56-63, and 'Differences of degree: Representations of India in British medical topography, 1820–c. 1870', in Nicolaas A. Rupke (ed.), *Medical Geography in Historical Perspective (Medical History Supplement)* (London, 2000), pp. 51-69; Paolo Palladino and Michael Worboys, 'Science and Imperialism', *Isis,* 84:1 (Mar. 1993), pp. 91-102.

[513] The list is indicative. On South Asia, Waltraud Ernst, 'Beyond East and West. From the History of Colonial Medicine to a Social History of Medicine(s) in South Asia', *Social History of Medicine,* 20:3,1 (December 2007), pp. 505-524; Sunil S. Amrith, *Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-1965* (Basingstoke, 2006); Mark Harrison, *Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian Preventive Medicine, 1859-1914* (Cambridge, 1994); David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-century India* (Berkeley, 1993). On Africa, Maryinez Lyons, *The colonial disease. A social history of sleeping sickness in northern Zaire, 1900-1940* (Cambridge, 1992). Also, Frank Huisman and John Harley Warner (eds.), *Locating Medical History. The Stories and Their Meanings* (Baltimore, 2004).

[514] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 101-105.

Institutions, medical knowledge, and the background of plague control on the islands

The present chapter is written based on two premises: first, disease-control during the period under study was based on Venetian institutions and practices. Despite British officials' critique of the corruptive influence of Venice on the Ionians, the British essentially saw their presence in the islands as an improvement to the islanders' prosperity and welfare, rather than a radical transformation of Ionian society. Second, collection of information – though utilizing local networks and institutions – was based on personal observation and 'affective' knowledge, an aspect which was even more evident in regards to metropolitan debates on scientific knowledge, and the need to acquire experience in the field.

This section examines the institutions and background of disease-control before British occupation. It shows the extent of the relationship between medical knowledge, administration and statistics on the islands during foreign occupations, and especially during the centuries of Venetian rule. Venice also had one of the earlier systems of hospitals and medical institutions in Europe. Quarantine islands and stations called *Lazaretto* existed years before the British arrived, in order to isolate those suspected of infection in times of plague. While quarantine, for example, was new in England in the seventeenth century, authorities in many Italian cities (including Venice) were using quarantine policies as early as 1348.[515] Collecting information in times of sickness through local authorities and households was also a common governing strategy. During plague outbreaks in Venice, for instance, heads of households were instructed to report to the parish priest, who was in turn expected to send daily collated reports to the government regarding the numbers of sick and houses which were shut up, also noting the

[515] Kira L.S. Newman, 'Shutt Up: Bubonic Plague and Quarantine in Early Modern England', *Journal of Social History,* 45:3 (Spring, 2012), p. 809; Also, for a comparison with plague control in England later, see Paul Slack, *The Impact of Plague in Tudor and Stuart England* (London, 1985).

gender of those affected.[516] Not unlike England and France at the time, it was individuals that did the counting more than institutions of government.[517]

Central administration relied on the skills and reliability of these information-gatherers. The role of priests as information-gatherers and intermediaries between local communities and central administration was also crucial on the Ionian Islands, especially during plague outbreaks where significant concerns about public health were raised. When British troops landed on the islands, they found a system of infrastructures similar to the lazaretti.[518] These buildings are even visible today if one travels to the Ionian Islands, Crete or any other place that was under Venetian rule in Greece: for example, a lazaretto was kept a stone's throw away from Corfu town, in the small island of Vidos.[519] This section briefly examines not only the institutions on the islands meant to combat plagues, but also how the accumulated medical data was considered usable by British officials. As we will see later, a recurring characteristic of many medical and military officials who collected data on the islands was to refer to the 'corrupting influence' of Venice, and especially to the quarantine system; this was most evident in times of disease.

In terms of institutional plague control, a system of hospitals and charitable institutions was established on the islands during the seventeenth century.[520] Policies of isolation were pursued by the Venetian authorities in the Ionian Islands during times of plague. Quarantine stations were supervised by a chief medical official (*Proto medico)*, who had multiple supervisory duties. Hennen wrote that there were three or four such officers in the countryside, paid 25 dollars per month by the government.[521] A structured system of public health

[516] Jane L. Stevens Crawshaw, *Plague Hospitals. Public Health for the City in Early Modern Venice* (Surrey, 2012), p. 81.
[517] On eighteenth century England and France, Andrea A. Rusnock, *Vital Accounts. Quantifying Health and Population in Eighteenth-Century England and France* (Cambridge, 2002).
[518] H. Lountzis, *Peri tis Politikis Katastasis tis Eptanisou epi Eneton* (Athens, 1856) *[On the political situation of the Seven Islands during the Venetians],* pp. 31-32.
[519] Frédéric Guillaume de Vaudoncourt, *Memoirs on the Ionian Islands considered in a Commercial, Political and Military point of view* (London, 1816), p. 386. Also, see Map II where Vidos is visible next to Corfu town.
[520] On health policy and disease-control in Venice, see Crawshaw, *Plague Hospitals.*
[521] Hennen, *Sketches,* p. 204.

institutions and sanitary officers was also established, with a strict chain of command.[522] Physicians under the Venetian administration did not know the scientific basis of the plague, although authorities recognized infection and often took effective measures of prevention. Despite plague outbreaks waning during the 18th century in the islands, epidemics occurred due to 'incorrect diagnoses or delayed notification of the authorities'.[523] Also, in terms of the geographical position of the Ionian Islands, and especially Corfu, previous works have referred to the importance of island outposts to Venetian policies in forming an 'invisible barrier' against the spread of disease.[524]

Throughout years of dealing with plague outbreaks, Ionian physicians had acquired significant medical knowledge and practical experience. British officials who served in the Mediterranean, like the Irish military surgeon John Hennen for example, mentioned local remedies – for example a vermifuge called Corallina – that were recommended by native physicians and were used by many military surgeons to 'good effect'.[525] But a significant medical literature also existed on the islands, which was mentioned by Hennen. The medical topographer published his *Sketches of the Medical Topography of the Mediterranean* in 1830. He described these works as 'connected with the medical topography of Corfu', and mentioned local authors such as Carlo Botta's, *Storia Naturale e Medico dell' Isola di Corfu,* which described diseases which occurred in Corfu in 1797; *Nozioni Miscellane intorno a Corcira* by Lazzaro Mordo (1808), or Baron Theotoky's *Des Illes Ioniennes* (1815), as well as a number of translations.[526]

In many ways, Venetian and British health institutions are worthy of comparison, and hopefully further study will illuminate aspects of Venetian and British administrations in the islands in this respect. The present study builds upon relevant works that emphasize the need for further comparison between British and Venetian administrations, especially regarding

[522] Josette Duncan, 'Health, Dominion and the Mediterranean: Colonial Medicine in Nineteenth –Century Malta, Cyprus and the Ionian Islands' (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 2014), p. 28.
[523] Katerina Konstantinidou, Elpis Mantadakis et al., 'Venetian Rule and Control of Plague Epidemics on the Ionian Islands during the 17th and 18th Centuries', *Emerging Infectious Diseases,* 15:1 (January, 2009), p. 41.
[524] Konstantinidou et al., 'Venetian Rule and Control of Plague Epidemics', p. 41.
[525] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 542.
[526] Hennen, *Sketches*, pp. 205, 206.

information systems or health policies.[527] Here, the interplay between the Ionians and the British in the formation of knowledge, institutions and power in the Ionian Islands was particularly important, as elsewhere in the empire.[528] A good point of comparison between Venetian and British health policies, for example, would be to study the role of geography in dealing with disease. We saw for example that Corfu was important in forming an 'invisible barrier' against contagion, while officers serving in the Mediterranean, like Richard Church, saw towns on the mainland such as Parga as barriers against contagious diseases.

In terms of the effectiveness of Venetian measures against plagues, researchers have suggested comparisons 'with those in the neighbouring coastal region of the Greek peninsula' under Ottoman rule.[529] Comparisons between territories under Venetian and Ottoman rule, however, are difficult to make, mostly because of the lack of Ottoman measures in enumerating the mortality and morbidity of plagues in continental Greece. Estimates were highly speculative and depended on personal observation. For example, Spiridion Foresti wrote to Bentinck from Zante in 1812, about a plague outbreak that hit Constantinople – only three years before the Corfu plague – and that he was informed by consul-general Morier that 'the plague was very severe and that the daily deaths were then reckoned at about 1,500'.[530]

This section demonstrates that there was an institutional background and local knowledge in terms of disease-control, when the British landed on the islands. At the same time, the British faced similar problems to the Venetians: when sickness struck, for example, delays in disseminating news from local networks to the central government caused sickness to spread faster. But dealing with sickness also required the close monitoring of sanitary measures from administrators and medical officials. At the same time, medical interest in plagues and disease in general was parallel to a new scientific reasoning, and the increasing use of medical statistics and colonial experience in scientific debates. The rest of this chapter examines how

[527] Fusaro, 'Representation in Practice', *passim.*
[528] On this, there is a growing literature on India: Harrison, 'Differences of Degree', p. 52; C. A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (Cambridge, 1988); E Irschick, *Dialogue and History: Constructing South Asia, 1795-1895* (Berkeley, 1994).
[529] Konstantinidou et al., 'Venetian Rule and Control of Plague Epidemics', p. 42; For comparison with Ottoman territories, Birsen Bulmuş, *Plague, Quarantines and Geopolitics in the Ottoman Empire* (Edinburgh, 2012).
[530] NA Pw Jd 2401, Sp. Foresti to Bentinck, Zante, 24 September 1812.

British and Ionian officials dealt with the plague that broke out in Corfu between 1815 and 1816, and then discusses the implications on scientific debates in Britain and the use of statistics.

Imperial careers and experience in disease-control

Plague had a devastating impact in the nineteenth century, wrecking lives and economies, in circumstances unthinkable today, with 3,248 reported cases and 584 deaths between 2010 and 2015 worldwide.[531] Particularly high troop mortality in British expeditions, such as in the West Indies in 1793-1798, sparked medical debates on the impact and particularly the environmental causes of disease.[532] Considering the devastating impact of plague on economies and societies, one might have expected that medical theories on the nature of plagues would have caused intense political controversies in the British press and Parliament, specifically in regards to Britain's imperial presence overseas. An eye-witness to an epidemic in Malta in 1813 described it as 'the most afflicting of all human calamities; striking at the very root of our best affections, and severing the dearest and most sacred of our social ties; paralyzing every public measure, impeding every branch of commerce, and at once wounding, in the most deadly manner, our best, our dearest interests'.[533] The consequences for trade and communications were also catastrophic. For example, individuals who were suspected or confirmed of being infected could be quarantined for up to 40 days. If these were crews of incoming ships, they were confined until the vessel received a clean 'bill of health'.

Aside from genuine concerns and humanitarian interest, disease was also a way for career advancement for both military and medical officials. Disease-control also gave ample opportunities for profit and reputation for many involved. In the early nineteenth century, professional and personal experience was crucial, especially when dealing with infectious

[531] http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs267/en/
[532] Geggus, *Slavery, War and Revolution, passim.*
[533] J. D. Tully, *The History of Plague as it has lately appeared in the islands of Malta, Gozo, Corfu, Cephalonia etc.* (London, 1821), p. 56.

disease. There has been some debate in imperial historiography about whether colonial governors enjoyed free rein from London at the time; studying careers of colonial governors like Campbell or Maitland can be illuminating on this matter, and especially their connections in London and the army. Most commonly, it was in cases like plague outbreaks where the careers of governors – and of other officials – really took off, or ended abruptly. At the same time, the collection of medical data was severely limited by knowledge gaps between local communities and central administration, which manifested in different ways.

Campbell's appointment was one such example of disease affecting imperial careers: his conduct had been questionable since 1814, when he was accused repeatedly of 'adopted measures … which tend to alienate the inhabitants from the British government'. Rumours circulated in the Congress of Vienna about harsh measures that his administration took in erecting gallows on the public walk in Corfu, and that British administration was treating the Ionians like 'Indians', as Capodistrias wrote to Castlereagh.[534] Practices like capital punishment were unknown amongst the Ionians, and according to these reports, the British administration had established a 'system of terror', alienating a large part of Ionian society from the British. Campbell rejected the rumours outright, claiming that these were 'misstatements and misrepresentations', characteristic of these islands, coming from 'a particular faction'.[535]

Such accusations of deliberate misrepresentations of the Ionian situation were to be repeated often by British officials in the future. In the context of the ongoing negotiations in Vienna, allegations of abuse of power could provoke reactions from the Russians and potentially threaten the diplomatic position of the British in the islands. Despite the real possibility that Capodistrias could indeed be involved, Campbell was released from service when orders were sent to him on 23 December 1815 – less than ten days after news of a 'malignant fever' reached Corfu – wherein he was instructed to 'make over to Sir Th. Maitland … the whole of the command both civil and military, throughout the Ionian Islands', furnishing

[534] TNA FO 42/17, E. Cooke to Campbell, Vienna, 9 December 1814, p. 217.
[535] TNA FO 42/17, Campbell to E. Cooke, Corfu, 29 December 1814, p. 218.

him also 'with every information' on the islands.[536] Campbell nevertheless kept his place as a governor until February 1816, when he was formally replaced by Maitland.

The plague in Corfu, 1815-1816

Disease struck in Corfu in 1815, because, as was later discovered, of smuggled goods that were brought from the continent. It was a box containing contaminated objects which threatened devastation across the island, in a similar way that disease struck elsewhere, i.e. in Malta two years before. The exact circumstances of Campbell's release from service are not examined in historiography, but this chapter will show that the plague played a major role. His own words in his letter to Bathurst defending his conduct are, perhaps, illuminating: Campbell referred to 'groundless but alarming reports, industriously circulated abroad … calculated beyond any other [reason] to rouse the greatest alarm and inquietude, and to give rise to the most exaggerated misstatements, these being in this instance unhappily a real foundation for spreading such alarming intelligence: I allude to the breaking out of a malignant fever in the southern district of this island, called Lefchimo'.[537]

Indeed, the disease that broke out in Corfu would soon prove to be one of the earliest and most significant challenges for the British protectorate, threatening men and women and causing moral panic. So far, the importance of the plague in consolidating British rule – and particularly Maitland's administration – has seen very little mention in Ionian historiography.[538] Doctors and physicians who were eyewitnesses, and who worked with colonial administrators like Campbell or Maitland, would later publish their memoirs. One of the surgeons who became the head of the committee to contain the spread of the plague in the islands, J.D. Tully, had already served for several years in the Mediterranean, and had helped deal with a plague outbreak in Malta under Maitland's administration in 1813. Campbell appointed Tully as deputy

[536] TNA CO 136/300, Bathurst to Campbell, War Department, London, 23 December 1815.
[537] TNA CO 136/3, no. 70, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 31 December 1815, p. 143a.
[538] But Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 41-46; John Booker, *Maritime Quarantine: The British Experience, c.1650–1900,* (New York, 2007), *passim*; Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State*, pp. 49-51.

inspector of hospitals to 'investigate and report upon the nature of the disease'.[539] Tully gave a detailed, and depressing, account of the disease in his book *The History of Plague as it has lately appeared in the islands of Malta, Gozo, Corfu, Cephalonia* (1821), not 'with the ordinary feelings of a medical writer, who merely examines … but he speaks from his own actual and positive experience'.[540] The disease broke out 'on the evening of the 18th December 1815' in the small village of Marathia, in the district of Lefthimo (*Lefkimmi* in Greek) in southern Corfu; a district of 7,000 inhabitants according to Campbell's estimates.[541] Accompanied by two principal physicians of the island, the surgeon reached the small village where disease first struck, and after 'an anxious investigation' discovered that fever had broken out one month before: 13 out of a population of 50 had already died.[542] The surgeon realized that the disease 'was then raging with considerable virulence'.[543]

Campbell emphasized to Bathurst the importance of environmental conditions for the causes and spread of the plague. Despite the 'misstatements' which circulated in London, the governor dutifully treated the malady 'with precisely the same precautions and measures as are adopted in cases of confirmed plague'.[544] On the surrender of Corfu to the British, Campbell was informed by Donzelot, the commander of the French garrison on the island, about casualties the latter had suffered during military works on the islands due to 'noxious exhalations' on some parts of the island where 'an unhealthy atmosphere prevailed at certain periods of the year'. According to Donzelot's information, the 'waste uncultivated state of the soil' was to blame for the exhalations, precisely where the area of Lefkimmi was.[545] 'The movements of this garrison, and the measures of the civil government', Campbell defended his administration by saying, 'since I had the honour of being invested with the command, have been altogether of a nature to preclude any exposure to such risks'.[546] In any case, Campbell ordered the establishment of cordons with sentries across the southern part of the island and

[539] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 87.
[540] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 86.
[541] TNA CO 136/3, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 31 December 1815, p. 143. See Map II.
[542] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 88.
[543] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 87.
[544] TNA CO 136/3, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 31 December 1815, p. 144.
[545] TNA CO 136/3, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 31 December 1815, p. 143b.
[546] TNA CO 136/3, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 31 December 1815, p. 143b.

the village where the fever started was burnt after the removal of its inhabitants to a lazaretto, following Venetian procedures. Tully collected enough information to draw a map of the region where the plague started with the cordon lines, the exact names of the villages and the villages that were destroyed.[547] He circulated, through the *Gazette,* instructions to the public to prevent social interactions, as these would spread the disease. Breaches of the quarantine often occurred; frequently when Ionian men and women escaped the confines of the quarantine to travel to the mainland. These individuals were condemned to death according to Venetian and French legislation on the breach of quarantine.

Bridging the knowledge gaps between central administration and local communities often caused anxieties and provoked local resistance. Above all, panic such as that caused by infectious diseases called for 'tested' and local strategies which had endured for centuries: Ionians from the infected areas turned first to religion and to local priests, to the detriment of information reaching the central administration in Corfu town on time. The priests withheld the information for a month when sickness hit the village of Marathia, and delayed asking for help from the central government. Withholding information of the disease occurred perhaps because Ionians were afraid of being seized and segregated by quarantine. It was 'the great ignorance and superstition of the peasantry of Lefchimo, having led them in the first instance to consult … the village priests', Campbell explained to Bathurst, whose treatment 'has proved in this case most fatal … and that the fever quickly assumed a very suspicious appearance … of an highly contagious nature'.[548] Tully's writings a couple of years after the plague repeated the concerns he shared with Campbell back then. Close investigation did not bear much fruit for Tully, who interviewed men and women on the spot, as 'ignorance and superstition seemed to reign with unbounded sway': the villagers attributed the disease to the 'agency of a spirit', someone who has murdered in the village a couple of months before. The villagers sought to placate the 'spirit', Tully added, by referring to the priests, by church offerings, processions and prayers.[549]

[547] See Map II.
[548] TNA CO 136/3, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 31 December 1815, p. 144a.
[549] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 88.

In practice, medical officials like Tully and Ionian physicians penetrated local information and religious networks. Tully, who worked along priests during the plague, often used them as a means to collect essential information on symptoms or methods of transmission of the plague, by threatening men and women who withheld information, 'so anxiously required', with excommunication.[550] Medical officials, again like Tully, who inquired of locals in order to identify and isolate the sources of disease, met with significant resistance. The reactions of British medical officials to local superstitions and cultural differences varied.

Tully did not conceal his contempt for individuals who hid information on the plague 'under the shadow of religion' and the devastating impact that this had on the spread of disease.[551] But his contempt was for religion in general, not Greeks at large. We should mention here that the term 'Greek' was generally applied by the British in order to describe the Greek Orthodox religion or the mainland, but more rarely to describe Greeks in both islands and the mainland as members of the same national group. For Tully, very pragmatic in his search for the source of disease, the concealment of information and superstition were not attributed to any inherent ethnic characteristics. Hennen, on the other hand, when describing the morals and the 'national character' of Ionians, found it 'the very lowest in Europe'. He saw amongst the Ionians a propensity to 'revenge, litigation and political intrigue'. Hennen was even more critical with the clergy, whom he considered as 'tyrannical', 'ignorant' and 'superstitious'; 'taken from the very scum of the population'.[552] He claimed that the 'Greek character' was 'debased by their long endurance of Turkish tyranny and Venetian prostitution, as exerted on the Continent and in the Islands' and 'one of the principal causes is to be found in the depravity and ignorance of their clergy'. Hennen continued, 'many of these persons can barely read their breviary: few, if any acts of private atrocity, or rebellion, have occurred in the Islands, which have not been planned and in part executed by the priests'.[553] But, in both cases, Tully and Hennen, the insecurity to delve more into local communities whose 'key' seemed to hold priests and local

[550] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 123.
[551] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 127.
[552] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 184.
[553] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 184.

'superstitions' was evident. These insecurities were prominent among medical topographers and British officials across the empire, particularly during crises like plague outbreaks.[554]

Tully studied any potential environmental circumstance for the spread of infection, mentioning the 'natural unhealthiness of the whole district during the autumn'.[555] Acknowledging at the same time, however, that medical officials were 'unschooled … in the management of this disease', and 'we had yet to learn those grand principles which were to place us upon a firm and solid footing, and give security to all'.[556] But delays in notifying the authorities of the disease was owed to the 'clergy, primates, and some gentlemen of the island' who consistently denied the existence of sickness by sending daily official reports about 'the most perfect health' throughout the southern part of the island.[557] In fact, the 'existence of disease', Tully wrote in his book, 'was discovered in a manner purely accidental'.[558] After establishing hospitals and camps in three places across the southern part of the island, every effort was directed to maintain isolation of individuals and communities, and to impose the rules of the quarantine, but with little effect.

Writing to Bathurst in January, Campbell informed him that the measures he took had produced 'already the most successful results'. The practices of 'separation, segregation, and expurgation … affords an infallible remedy against its baneful operations'.[559] Tully, along with other officials surveyed various villages approximately every two days, and gathered statistics on the number of patients and the dead. Their numbers were announced in 'bulletins of the sick' that circulated the islands. Although from the sample that is kept today in the archives there seems to be slight progress, the sample is nevertheless small and covers a small period of time.[560] There was even a warrant offering 1,000 dollars for anyone who could deliver any information about the causes of the plague.[561] By February 1816, Campbell wrote to Bathurst

[554] Harrison, 'Representations', p. 68.
[555] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 90.
[556] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 98.
[557] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 101.
[558] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 101.
[559] TNA CO 136/4, no. 74, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 20 January 1816.
[560] TNA CO 136/4, no. 1 enclosure, 'Bulletin of the sick in the District of Lefthimo', Corfu, 8 January 1816.
[561] TNA CO 136/4, no. 8 enclosure, Proclamation, 17 January 1816.

that 'the disease has been retained where it originally was discovered, but not before some examples of capital punishment were inflicted for notorious breaches of discipline and the sacred laws of quarantine'.[562] The governor performed his duties, but in reality, disease spread. His emphasis was on setting sentries across the cordons, using local authorities and in investigating the nature of the plague.

Medical officials, like Tully, who served under Campbell's administration were essential in accumulating vital statistics by close observation, gathering information about the geography of the islands or the potential environmental origins for the development of plague. Moreover, as we will see later, medical accounts sought to contribute to metropolitan debates on medical knowledge, using cases of practical experience abroad, like the plague in Corfu. Maitland, however, who became High Commissioner of the islands in 1816, had acquired substantial 'practical' experience in disease-control, and his views on the nature of the plague were different. The next section examines first his experience in plague outbreaks, and how his imperial career was shaped by previous commands and colonial administrations, notably in Saint Domingue and Malta. Then, his stance during the plague of Corfu will be studied.

Maitland's career and plague outbreaks

Maitland's life and career have been the subject matter of two biographies and countless mentions in works on the Ionian Islands or Malta. One of his biographers described him in a typically hagiographic and didactic manner, according to the Victorian historiography of 'great men', as 'a great human force controlled and driven by a will of iron'.[563] Much less romanticized, he was described by one of his contemporaries, James Charles Napier, as 'insufferably rude' and 'particularly dirty in his person', the commissioner used to indulge in bouts of excessive drinking and used to disappear for several days in a row. Maitland often used official channels of communication with London to send bottles of Maraschino to his

[562] TNA CO 136/4, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 12 February 1816.
[563] Quote in Lord, *Sir Thomas Maitland*, p. xiv.

colleagues. All accounts, however, point to him being a competent and effective colonial governor; perhaps the most characteristic type of 'proconsular despot' that Bayly sought to describe[564] Maitland then, was the 'human force' that replaced Campbell. For many British officials, Britain's Mediterranean possessions were acquired during the Napoleonic wars 'by the right of conquest'. However, governing the British possessions in the Mediterranean was not 'a very easy job' for a governor, and required someone with equal military and civil capabilities.[565] Coming from the old Scottish nobility, Maitland was born in Ratho, Edinburghshire (today's Midlothian), at the seat of Lauderdales. After taking up a commission at the age of 18, he served as a young officer in India (1778-1790) and later in Saint-Domingue (1795-1798). A much different man than the later imperialist 'King Tom', Maitland was from the beginning among the very few who were critical of the occupation of Saint-Domingue.

It was in the West Indies and the harsh conditions of the evacuation of Saint-Domingue where Maitland acquired his first experience dealing with plagues: after the 'tactical abdication' of the senior officer, Major-General John Whyte, Maitland – then appointed brigadier-general in the West Indies (1 January 1798) – succeeded him, and entered into negotiations with the later famous rebel leader, Toussaint L'Ouverture. These negotiations led to the evacuation of Saint Domingue.[566] Considering the British losses in this expedition, this was a rather successful outcome.[567] On his return to Britain, Maitland had a short political career after being elected Member of Parliament on three occasions, supporting the Whig Charles Grey.[568] Having spent a life in soldiery in India, the West Indies and Europe (i.e. Minorca, even Britain), he was also

[564] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, pp. 194-200.
[565] BL Heytesbury Papers, Maitland to A'Court, Malta, 4 October 1815, f. 5a.
[566] H. M. Chichester rev. Roger T. Stearn, 'Maitland, Sir Thomas (1760–1824)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17835?docPos=4 (March, 2015).
[567] On the British expedition in Saint Domingue, see D. P. Geggus, *Slavery, War and Revolution. The British Occupation of Saint Domingue 1793-1798* (Oxford, 1982).
[568] From 1790 to 1796, from March 1802 to February 1805, and from October 1812 to July 1813 (Chichester, 'Maitland, Sir Thomas (1760-1824)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17835?docPos=4 (March, 2015).

considered a capable governor, and was appointed to Ceylon (1805-1811). His experience in the West Indies, however, has not generally been neglected in relevant works about him.[569]

Disease became a major challenge for the British in the West Indies, and particularly during the evacuation of Saint Domingue. Suffering from a yellow fever epidemic, as well as other diseases, British casualties in the island reached a death toll of 5,730 by 1796, estimated by Maitland himself under very harsh conditions. Counting was based on two sets of calculations, with Maitland making his own from personal observation which confirmed the dead. More recent historical research on the topic has nevertheless questioned the accuracy of such numbers, but has acknowledged Maitland's relatively accurate estimates.[570] His observations on Saint-Domingue stood out for their 'originality and boldness'. In any case, after investigating the causes of mortality, these proved to be much more due to disease than fighting. In fact, up to November 1795, Maitland calculated that out of the total amount, only 100 British soldiers died in battle.[571] Disease and the failure of the expedition stirred much debate and resulted in the publication of many treatises on the causes of mortality, such as Hector McLean's *Enquiry into the Nature, and Causes of the Great Mortality among the Troops at St. Domingo* (1797).[572]

Plagues in the Mediterranean and military measures

Maitland was later appointed governor of Malta, where he managed a plague outbreak successfully in 1813. The plague in Malta is well known in historiography, but is perhaps worth a brief mention here as well.[573] Following the instructions of his predecessor, Sir Hildebrand Oakes, Maitland established cordons and divided the cities into districts. Goods that were

[569] But David Patrick Geggus, 'The British Occupation of Saint Domingue, 1793-98' (unpublished PhD thesis, York University, 1978), *passim.*
[570] Geggus, 'The British Occupation', p. 334.
[571] Geggus, *Slavery, War and Revolution'* pp. 359, 364.
[572] Geggus, *Slavery, War and Revolution*, p. 348; Hector McLean, *An enquiry into the Nature, and Causes of the Great Mortality among the Troops at St. Domingo: with Practical Remarks on the Fever of that Island; and Directions for the Conduct of Europeans on their First Arrival in Warm Climates* (London, 1797).
[573] Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations*, pp. 131-134; Lord, *Sir Thomas Maitland*, pp. 142-147.

suspected of infection were destroyed, while patients who were suspected were segregated.[574] 'Segregation and a change of air were the cure', according to Maitland.[575] Cutting all communication and shutting up individuals and families in their homes, in order to avoid social interactions and the spread of disease, was the essence of government instruction to the public.

Even before Maitland landed on the islands, he suggested to Bathurst that he exchange troops between Malta and the Ionian Islands:

> it is my intention forthwith to move the whole of the troops at present in the Ionian Islands to this place, and to replace them by pretty nearby a similar number (probably a few more) from this island – and my reason for this measure is, that no man can be aware of the mischief that at times is done in small possessions, by that constant little … communication that results alike from the limited state of the society and in islands, from the limited nature of their communications by sea – except a person who has lived in them and felt it.[576]

Maitland continued his interesting suggestions on how to contain the plague. Some of the garrison on the islands had been there since the occupation in 1809, and had formed 'local connections with women', 'local habits' and 'local opinions about political questions'. 'It is my wish', Maitland continued, 'that we should at least start clear upon all these points, and that whatever is British there should take their feelings from the state in which things actually now stand – and not from what was formerly speculated upon – and I, therefore, think this measure one, if not of primary necessity, at least of fitness and expediency under the circumstances'.[577]

Referring to the plague in Corfu, Bunbury wrote to Maitland that 'no one knows so well how to meet and arrest this formidable evil', informing him that Bathurst gave him 'every power to act as the King's' commissioner'.[578] It was clear from before the commissioner arrived on the Ionian Islands that he would bring a great change of scenery. On his arrival to Corfu, he

[574] Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations*, p. 132.
[575] Quote in Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations*, p. 132.
[576] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Malta, 6 January 1816.
[577] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Malta, 6 January 1816.
[578] TNA CO 136/5, Bunbury to Maitland, Downing Street, 4 March 1816.

rushed to rearrange the cordons and control of disease. While rearranging the cordons he quickly became disillusioned with Campbell's supposed 'successful results'. Almost as soon as he arrived in Corfu, Maitland wrote to Bunbury:

> I arrived here two days ago – having visited on my way Zante, Cefalonia, and Santa Maura, - of these places I can only at present say, that I could form no other opinion than what arose from a cursory view of the principal inhabitants and members of government - and the short conversation I had at each with the commandant and principal officers … I found that the plague unfortunately prevailed, and has not in the smallest degree been got under, in about a third of the island – the rest of the island is stated to be uncontaminated and I hope it may prove so – tho' at present I can give no further opinion than simply to state this facts. I found Campbell perfectly well disposed, but certainly sore in an idea that the intrigue of the people of this island had had an effect to hurt his character in the opinion with those with whom he wished to stand best. And from this feeling he was extreme anxious to get away immediately.[579]

Maitland's 'decided opinion' on the plague was completely different to Campbell's a couple of months before. According to the former, the precautions that were taken were 'loose', and some considerations needed to be taken into account: eradicating the plague, high expenditures of the measures which were 'beyond the limited means of the revenues of the islands' and to prevent a further increase of the disease.[580] For Maitland, the nature of the plague ought not to be investigated, as it was not a medical but a military and political issue. Furthermore, it was proof according to him that Ionians could not deal with the plague effectively. 'At the very outset', Maitland wrote, 'we have the strongest practical instance of the inability of the Ionian Republic to carry on itself – and if the plague increases, I can have no doubt not only that they will apply to us, but that in fact aid must be given to them'.[581]

Maitland's dispatches to London regarding the plague and the conduct of other British officials were far from medical theories or consistent, empire-wide strategies in dealing with disease, but were about the implementation of military measures. His observations were based on the practical experience he acquired during his service as a commander and governor

[579] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Corfu, 18 February 1816, p. 13.
[580] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 27 February 1816, p. 20.
[581] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 27 February 1816.

overseas, in Saint-Domingue and Malta two years before. It was on this basis that medical and military officials collaborated when dealing with plagues on the islands. Somewhat disheartened over the conduct of the military and medical establishment on the islands, Maitland wrote to Bunbury:

> the truth is Campbell [confided] as he must do having no experience of it himself to a young man of the name of Tully here – a doctor – completely uninformed of the common practical rules upon the occasion – active enough but sanguine and ignorant to a degree – in truth in the way he was going on he never could have got rid of it – nor will that be an easy job now.[582]

Maitland's measures produced good results and managed to effectively contain the plague until its eradication in March 1816. Unlike Campbell, Maitland's policy was to involve the British garrisons in order to impose the quarantine to greater effect, and to trust local authorities even less. In March of the same year, control of the medical establishment in Corfu passed from Tully to Staff Surgeon Andrew White. As the 'uninformed' Tully said in his account to the formidable governor:

> The experience of these plagues also shewed that the faithful execution of the duties of the subordinate classes employed, under the critical circumstances of plague, was rarely, indeed never, to be relied upon; and that nothing short of the jealous eye of authority, and the overawing presence of a military force, thrown up to every door in an infected town, could ever ensure safety, or guarantee the due fulfilment of those measures, which were necessarily resorted to for the extinction of the contagion of plague; principles, I confess, that at the first view of the subject, appeared to me to be fraught with the utmost danger, but which, upon trial, fortunately proved otherwise.[583]

Tully, who devoted his account of the plague (1821) to Maitland, conceded to the governor's 'axiom' by giving more emphasis to practical experience than medical principles. By the end of the plague outbreak in March 1816, according to Tully's calculations, 375 people had died in approximately four months in the area of Lefkimmi alone.[584] Furthermore, it needs to be stated here that the plague in Corfu gave ample opportunities for promotion to medical

[582] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Corfu, 27 February 1816.
[583] Tully, *The History of Plague*, pp. 108, 109.
[584] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 115.

officials. For example, Dr. Joseph Thomas, a surgeon who was educated in Ireland (Galway), had served in Malta and the Ionian Islands during the plagues of 1813 and 1815, respectively. Thomas had been repeatedly superseded by junior officers, so he asked Maitland to recommend him to London for promotion. Despite his initial reluctance, Maitland nevertheless admitted to Bunbury that Thomas had 'very strong claims', and asked for 'a personal favour' if 'Lord Bathurst would be good enough to interfere so far as to get him that step to which he is entitled by his length of standing'.[585] The surgeon was finally appointed as head of the quarantine in Zante.

Maitland's measures in controlling the disease were effective. The plague in Corfu received publicity in Britain and proved to be a political triumph for Maitland, ensuring his commanding presence in Ionian politics and administration in the early years of the protectorate. It would be wrong, however, to equate all the efforts of medical and military officials as aspects of the same policy, aiming to impose control over the Ionian society. Simply put, plague outbreaks across the early-nineteenth century empire were nodal points where medical and imperial interests converged. Such cases did not simply aim to promote Britain's presence in scientific knowledge, but also gave opportunities for career advancement or the testing of medical theories in Britain. Maitland's practical experience and the knowledge he acquired abroad were endorsed by medical officials like Tully, also for their medical value and Maitland's efficiency when dealing with disease:

> I am clearly of the opinion that, in the general treatment of plague, these two branches become totally inseparable from each other, as we assure ourselves that, by the proper application of both one and the other, we can reduce the whole matter to the certainty of a mathematical calculation, thus rescuing from inevitable misery, whole communities of human beings.[586]

Medical professionals like Tully and Hennen were also operating within the broader medical community, at a time when a strong belief in scientific reasoning and 'objective'

[585] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Zante, 15 April 1816.
[586] Tully, *The History of Plague,* p. 116.

knowledge was rapidly gaining ground among the public in Western Europe.[587] Statistical information and practical experience in the colonies, which were important attributes in this process, were consistently utilized in these scientific debates. It was due to this belief in science that medical officials devalued local superstitions and questioned the reliability of intermediaries like village priests. In the remaining sections of the chapter we turn to Britain, where we can study these debates more closely.

Medical topographies and colonial experience

Taking the Corfu plague as a case study, this study tries to show how medical officials interacted with the colonial administration in their attempts to control the disease. Collection of information on the numbers of dead and infected, as well as on geography and climate, was undertaken with the aim of preventing the plague from spreading to British troops as well as within Ionian society. The aims of medical officials were not necessarily imperial in the same sense as political administrators, and they often sought to contribute to recurring medical debates in Britain by contributing their own practical experience. In plague outbreaks, nevertheless, their interests converged. Physicians or surgeons – often from similar social and intellectual backgrounds, and often from the 'Celtic' periphery in the British Isles – travelled with the British army abroad, gathered the results of their observations and published these as memoirs. These 'medical topographies', as they were called, evaluated soils, vegetation and climate in terms of the health of British troops and European populations in the tropics or newly colonized regions'.[588] Medical topographies gave rich information about populations and customs, geography and climate – everything that could explain causes of disease – and were often published in journals or individual studies, thus becoming available to the British public.[589] As we saw before, medical officials had also travelled and published memoirs on the

[587] Innes, *Inferior Politics,* pp. 109-111; On the culture of 'fact', see Mary Poovey, *A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society* (Chicago, 1998).
[588] Wendy Jepson, 'Of Soil, Situation, and Salubrity: Medical Topography and Medical Officers in Early Nineteenth-Century British India', *Historical Geography*, 32 (2004), p. 137.
[589] The list is huge. Jepson, 'Of Soil, Situation and Salubrity', p. 152; John Lind, *Essay on the Diseases Incidental to Europeans in Hot Climates* (London, 1768); James Johnson, *The Influence of Tropical Climates, More Especially of the*

Mediterranean and the Ionian Islands.[590] Sparking genuine scientific interest over the nature of the plague (causes/methods of transmission), these topographies produced proof at the same time, and were vital in creating 'imperial geographies' and providing indispensable information, like geography or vital statistics, to colonial governance overseas.[591]

Medical officers in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century came from distinct social and economic backgrounds. They often sought opportunities for career advancement and to improve their social status through medical service 'on the spot'.[592] They 'worked within a colonial society that was not only fragmented along the axis of "colonizer/colonized," but also among the British colonizers themselves, according to social, professional, and educational hierarchies. Despite working alongside the troops, military officials were often suspicious of the effectiveness of medical personnel. Differences between military and medical officials and suspicion towards medical theories are evident in official correspondence on the islands too, especially in Maitland's dispatches. As we saw in the case of the plague in Corfu, collecting information on disease through personal observation was a way to bridge such differences, and for medical officials to integrate into colonial governance. Historians have shown, for example, how the medical profession had a 'long, hard struggle to demonstrate to the military authorities its competence as a therapeutic and prophylactic agency'.[593] Similar suspicions were shared by British officials who served in the Mediterranean. Often hailing from a lower social class and the 'Celtic' periphery in the British Isles, medical officers saw the collection of information and the assimilation of statistics in times of plague as a way to advance their careers, or even more for 'claims of authority within the army and the colonial state

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Climate of India, on European Constitutions and The Principal Effects and Disease Thereby Induced, Their Prevention and Removal, and The Means of Preserving Health in Hot Climates Rendered Obvious to Europeans of Every Capacity, 2nd edition (London, 1815).

[590] Hennen, *Sketches*; William Goodison, *A Historical and Topographical Essay upon the Islands of Corfu, Leucadia, Cephalonia, Ithaca and Zante: With Remarks upon the Character, Manners, and Customs of the Ionian Greeks* (London, 1822); Tully, *The History of Plague*; Davy, *Notes and Observations.*

[591] Duncan, 'Health, Dominion and the Mediterranean', p. 182; Jepson, 'Of Soil, Situation, and Salubrity', pp. 137-155.

[592] For the relation between social status and medical knowledge in the eighteenth century, N.D. Jewson, 'Medical Knowledge and the Patronage System in 18th Century England', *Sociology*, 8:3 (Sept. 1974), p. 370

[593] Arnold, *Colonizing the Body*, p. 63.

apparatus'.[594] Moreover, colonial service and experience with disease were not only used for career advancement, as the cases of Thomas and Tully have shown. Medical accounts published later also aimed at contributing to the development of medical knowledge in Britain.

What, then, constituted medical knowledge on plagues? In regards to the aetiology of the disease, medical opinion was divided into two main 'camps', with other variations in between: on one side of the medical spectrum were the 'contagionists', who believed that plagues and infectious diseases in general were the result of contagion. On the other side of the spectrum were the 'anti-contagionists', or proponents of the 'miasmatic theory', who blamed the soil, air, and the environmental conditions overall.[595] It was a common characteristic of works on 'medical topographies', including works on the Mediterranean, for authors to situate themselves somewhere among these, or to adhere to different variations of these theories. As Jepson explains, 'metropolitan medical professionals developed a new "contagionist" theory, which was based on the person-to-person spread of disease'. Medical officers who had held a colonial post, however, 'ascribed to the more conservative paradigm of miasmatic etiology, the spread of disease by air and vegetation'.[596] Emphasizing contagious or environmental causes explains a recurring tendency of medical topographies, for example Davy's *Notes and Observations* (1842), to examine climate or the change of seasons.[597]

Medical debates are not the main subject of this study, but rather how they contributed to information-collection abroad for administrating the Ionian Islands.[598] Nevertheless, it is important to point out two characteristics in information-gathering here: the social context in which the gathering of medical data occurred, and the growing significance in metropolitan debates of locally-obtained medical experience in treating plagues. Methodologically, distinguishing between genuine scientific interest and political incentives for medical

[594] Jepson, 'Of Soil, Situation and Salubrity', p. 145.
[595] Duncan, 'Health, Dominion and the Mediterranean', p. 185.
[596] Jepson, 'Of Soil, Situation and Salubrity', p. 145.
[597] Davy, *Notes and Observations,* pp. 280-323; also, Tully, *The History of Plague*, *passim.*
[598] On medical opinions, see Catherine Kelly, "Not From the College, but Through the Public and the Legislature": Charles Maclean and the Relocation of Medical Debate in the Early Nineteenth Century', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 82: 3 (Fall, 2008), pp. 545-569; Christopher Hamlin, 'Predisposing Causes and Public Health in Early Nineteenth-Century Medical Thought', *The Society for the Social History of Medicine,* 5:1 (April, 1992), pp. 43-70.

knowledge is essential, and this is why medical topographies need to be contrasted, or read in parallel with official correspondence.[599]

Where it is obvious that medical topographies converged with imperial interests is in their ideas regarding Britain's role in disease-control, particularly in contrast to the inefficiencies of previous administrations, i.e. Venice. As mentioned previously, British officials went to great effort to differentiate the protectorate – and therefore to justify their own presence in the islands – from all previous administrations, most often Venice and her 'corruptive influence'. In fact, 'liberating' the islanders from Venetian corruption and 'protecting' them from external threats was the *raison d'être* of the British presence as it was presented to the Ionian public. Health policy in Venetian times was a great point of difference: Hennen mentioned the quarantine establishment where, 'previous to the islands coming under British government, reformation was most loudly called for in this department'.[600] 'The most absurd and nugatory regulations', the surgeon continued, 'were formerly in force, while the corruption of those who regulated, and the poverty of those who carried their orders into execution, were much more calculated to spread than to check the progress of contagious disease'.[601] He proceed to give an example:

> Under the former regime, persons who had to perform different periods of quarantine were mixed indiscriminately in the same place, so that it often happened that in the same apartments were individuals who had finished their quarantine, and were on the point of being restored to free communication with the community, and others who had just arrived from suspected ports, and had to undergo the whole period of foul quarantine ; an arrangement contradictory to the rules not only of quarantine, but of common sense. The poverty of the guardians was so great as to expose them to every temptation, and, instead of being selected from respectable persons, they were generally picked from among the vilest characters in the community.[602]

Medical topographies provided some credible raw data to colonial governance on populations, geography, climate, customs etc. Depending on the experience or the theoretical

[599] Also Duncan, 'Health, Dominion and the Mediterranean', pp. 149-151.
[600] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 201.
[601] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 201.
[602] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 201.

dispositions of the author, there was a significant emphasis on the local environment or only the plague. Clearly, more research is needed in this direction in tandem with official correspondence. In terms of historical analysis, the present study argues that medical topographies as a literature, genre, and primary source, provide more accurate evidence on the development of medical knowledge on disease and scientific reasoning at large, than on colonial governance.

The aftermath of the plague and Maitland's observations

Maitland was adamant that the plague was not a medical but a military problem, using effectively the old methods of segregation and isolation. In this sense, the combined use of institutions, like quarantine stations and the troops, would prove effective. Even though quarantine was an ancient system 'with a degree of cruelty and tyranny, unparalleled in the annals of the world', Maitland wrote to Bathurst, it was nevertheless a necessary one in isolating the infected from the healthy, and stopping the spread of disease.[603] After the plague in Corfu, the commissioner implemented measures to reform the quarantine system, mainly to fix 'a sink of corruption, dangerous to the health of the community', as Hennen saw it[604]: Maitland divided the lazarettos into separate apartments, and raised the pay of the guardians so that they would be less inclined to accept bribes. Finally, as the guardians of the lazaretto were poor and 'from among the vilest characters in the community', their 'characters' were 'most rigidly investigated before they [were] appointed to act'.[605] Owing to Maitland's efforts, Hennen wrote in his book, 'the quarantine establishment' was 'placed upon a respectable and efficient footing', yielding 'a considerable revenue' from a percentage on expurgated goods or tax on the individuals who stayed at the lazaretto. The establishment was, according to the medical official, 'to the highest state of perfection'.[606] When disease struck again in Cephalonia soon after, the Ionian state was better prepared to control the plague.

[603] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 12 April 1819, p. 124b.
[604] Hennen, *Sketches,* p. 202.
[605] Hennen, *Sketches,* pp. 201-202.
[606] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 202.

After the plague outbreak in Cephalonia, a select committee was appointed in the British parliament in order 'to consider the validity of the doctrine of contagion in the plague'.[607] The question was brought before Parliament by Frederick Robinson, President of the Board of Trade since early 1818, and was widely publicized in newspapers. Much evidence was brought from the plague in Malta in 1813, such as Maitland's writings to Bathurst on the matter in April of the same year, with specific mentions of the plague outbreaks in Malta, Corfu and Cephalonia. His observations were a testimony to the close connection between scientific debates and the practical experience acquired in the colonies. Above all, with the frequent use of statistical evidence, such debates had shown how more 'objective' forms of knowledge could be shared across the medical and military establishments.

As was often the case in debates about the causes of the plague between supporters of one theory or the other, much controversy was sparked: a doctor called Augustus Bozzi Granville, for example, published an open letter to Robinson a couple of months later, 'championing' the case for contagion. We should add here that experience 'in the field' – whether of medical or military officials – overseas was called upon in medical debates in Britain. Moreover, the participation of locals in dealing with plagues was routinely neglected. Granville's account, for example, although drawing data from British officials like Maitland's dispatches or Meyer's information, had consistently ignored the participation of Ionian doctors when dealing with the plague of 1815-1816, despite the fact that their practical experience was acknowledged by medical officials like Tully who served on the spot: it was to Campbell and Maitland's measures, Granville wrote, that 'the islanders owed their salvation'.[608]

Data that was collected from plague outbreaks across Malta, Corfu or Cephalonia was most frequently mentioned to support medical opinion. Maitland's conduct in controlling the plague was praised by many. Referring to the plague in Cephalonia, for example, Granville

[607] 'Report from the Select Committee. Appointed to consider the validity of the doctrine of Contagion in the Plague' (London, 1819).

[608] Augustus Bozzi Granville, *A letter to the right honorable F. Robinson, M.P. on the plague and contagion with reference to the quarantine laws: including the history of plague conveyed direct from the Levant to five European ports of the Mediterranean, within the last six years: and also a detailed account of the experiments made on the subject of contagion in plague …* (London, 1819), p. 50.

wrote in his open letter to Robinson: 'This is the third plague which Lieut.-general Sir Thomas Maitland has succeeded in completely stopping and in preventing its propagation, while commanding in the Mediterranean; and no measures have ever been enacted better calculated for that double purpose'.[609]

However, for Maitland the quarantine system was ineffective and the problems caused by quarantine laws ought to have been the main concern, not the causes of disease. Explaining the need to significantly reform the quarantine laws, but also the necessity of isolation in stopping the spread of disease, Maitland wrote to Bathurst:

> The quarantine law too in the instance of plague, actually existing, is not only most arbitrary in itself, but to the full as indefinite as it is arbitrary, and the whole of the circumstances attached to it, are so revolting to the feelings of every man looked at in any way, that I apprehend this is one of the principal reasons why, in almost every instance that can be mentioned, this fatal malady is allowed at a great height before it is even declared to be plague, and in the two great instances of the plague at Messina and at Marseilles, we accordingly find that no reliance was placed on it being the plague, till it got to that dreadful head that occasions those miserable scenes which afterwards ensued … the same was considerably the case at Malta.[610]

Precautionary measures, according to Maitland, were the 'cure'. 'The whole' of Mr. Robinson's statement in the parliament', Maitland wrote, 'solves itself into the one examining whether 'the plague be acquired by infection or contagion'. In many publications, he continued, infection or contagion were not defined at all, questioning the validity of medical authorship altogether: 'in some they are most strangely jumbled together, and in not a few, they are altered exactly as suited the argument of the individual at the moment.'[611] Maitland's intention, was not to enter into any 'theoretical or medical discussion … but to limit myself simply to facts – which facts I think (and I am ready to prove them) must lead every … person to concur with one in opinion, that the plague is only acquired by <u>contact</u> and that therefore the treatment which has hitherto been followed, is the only mode of arresting so dreadful a

[609] Granville, 'A letter', pp. 102-103.
[610] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 12 April 1819, p. 125a-b.
[611] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 12 April 1819, p. 126b.

calamity'.[612] His opinion on medical professionals and metropolitan debates is most illuminating:

> I carry my opinion and on this lead so far, that I have always held and now hold, that medical advice with regard to the preventive treatment of plague is not only of no use, but is almost invariably attended with evil consequence, because I have rarely met with any medical practitioner who had not some favourite theory to which he … always endeavoured to reduce the plague under this theory, and who never contemplated it in the only view in which I consider it, as the direst visitation of God: - with the original cause of which we are hitherto ignorant; but the progress of which is may arrest by measures recognized by experience, acted upon for centuries, - and of the effect of which, I think I can bring forward the strongest and most incontrovertible proofs.[613]

As for relevant publications, Maitland referred to Doctor Maclean's work where 'there is not a single instance quote in it, which come to my knowledge that is not most strongly presented and most unfairly stated'.[614] Charles Maclean (1788-1824) was a famous 'anti-contagionist' and enemy of quarantine laws.[615] Maclean attended to a plague outbreak in Constantinople in the service of the Levant Company. However, despite Maitland's pronounced differences with medical professionals in general, Maclean played an important role in relocating medical debates of contagion from medical practitioners to the public sphere, thus challenging the exclusivity of medical knowledge.[616] The commissioner criticized McLean's work for the lack of persuasive evidence on Turkey and lack of practical experience:

> We have none of those data to go on so essentially necessary for the fair understanding of the question. It leaves the whole thing so loose, that every individual who writes upon it will find cases sufficiently strong to support his immediate view of the subject, but we cannot come to a knowledge from the returns of the government or the police of the country how far such cases, are exceptions to a general rule, or partake of the general rule itself. In the instances, however, I am about to quote to your Lordship, we are considerably

[612] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 12 April 1819, pp. 127b-128a.
[613] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 12 April 1819, pp. 127b.
[614] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 12 April 1819, pp. 127b-128a.
[615] Kelly, "Not From the College', pp. 545-569; Charles F. Mullett, 'Economics and Medicine: Charles Maclean and Anticontagion in England', *Osiris,* 10 (1952), pp. 224-251.
[616] Kelly, 'Charles Maclean and the Relocation of Medical Debate', *passim.*

> relieved from this difficulty, for though I am far from saying that the returns I have had in the various plagues I have seen, are accurate, or that such returns ever can be accurate; yet I think I am perfectly borne out, when I say, - they are more accurate than any others that ever have or could have been exhibited.[617]

Concluding his letter, Maitland admitted 'we are just as much in the dark in respect to any cure of this terrible disease, as we were at the moment it broke out at Malta'.[618] His observations seem to be in line with Tully's conclusions after dealing with the plagues in the Mediterranean:

> Our views of the system requisite for the eradication of plague, unschooled as we were, in the management of this disease, were directed by the principles generally laid down in all cases of absolute contagion; both hospitals and camps were established for the comfort of the sick and security of the suspected; and, although every effort had been directed to that great end, seclusion and separation, we had yet to learn those grand principles which were to place us upon a firm and solid footing, and give security to all.[619]

From medical topographers, Hennen's work was perhaps mostly followed by later writers. For example, Robert Montgomery Martin, a civil servant and a founding member of the Statistical Society of London (1834), followed the data collected by Hennen, which was transmitted to the Army Medical Board. But, as Montgomery wrote of Hennen's statistics, these 'refer to the military sick which, however, in some measure, is not a fair criterion of the healthiness of an island, or station, as soldiers are exposed to fatigues and to nightly dews, which civilians frequently avoid'.[620] Aside from disease control, it was this consistent use of statistics and mentioning practical experience that was acquired in the colonies that fostered debates on disease in tandem with discussions over the perceived successes of British administrators when dealing with plagues.

[617] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu 12 April 1819, p. 128b-129a.
[618] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu 12 April 1819, p. 149b.
[619] Tully, *The History of Plague*, p. 98.
[620] Robert Montgomery Martin, *History of the British colonies. Volume V. Possessions in Europe* (London, 1835), p. 336.

Conclusion

Aside from the humanitarian crisis, plague outbreaks and, subsequently, the quarantine laws significantly disrupted economic life, including communications and trade. This chapter argued, mainly, two points: first, despite delays or disruptions of trade and communications, the 'ancient' quarantine system was the first line of defence. In the first stage of the plague in Corfu under Campbell's administration, British officials relied on the quarantine system and on the combined efforts of medical and military officials. In the second phase, under Maitland's administration a significant weight was put on the military; and efforts were aimed at segregation and tight surveillance of the cordons. Maitland found the quarantine laws inherited by the Venetians an arbitrary system, and he took efforts to reform them. For the commissioner, controlling the disease was mainly about segregation and implementing military measures.

Secondly, the chapter explained how statistical information, which was collected by medical topographers, was more a tool for containing the disease at the time, or for scientific debates in Britain, than elements of a well-thought out strategy from the metropole. Overall, the relationship between gathering information and state measures was more related to disease control in the islands, or to medical debates in Britain, and more loosely related to the growth of the Anglo-Ionian state and institutions in the islands. In this way, the chapter finds more common ground with relevant studies in eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Britain, than with works on the mid and late-nineteenth century empire.[621]

[621] For example, Innes, *Inferior Politics.*

Map II

Map of the southern Corfu. Lefchimo is the infested part - TNA CO 136/3 (unpublished), no page numbers



Map III

Cordons of British troops (red lines) and quarantine areas, southern part of Corfu, January 1816 - TNA CO 136/3 (unpublished), no page numbers



Chapter 5: Penetrating the 'impenetrable scene of intrigue'? Organization of information and security imperatives, 1816-1819

By 1816, Maitland's authority in the Mediterranean islands was well-established. Despite the end of the war and the Vienna settlement between the coalition powers, which ensured peace in Europe, uncertainties still remained. These uncertainties were economic and related to the costs that came out of the Napoleonic Wars, or were ideological and connected to threats posed by revolutionary movements, they were therefore widespread across the empire. On the Ionian Islands, British officials were caught between two equally undesirable outcomes, which were related to the unchecked power of the elites as well as what the British perceived as the threat of foreign intervention, which would result in intervention from Russia based on a perceived breach of the international settlement on the islands. The latter threat was minimal in 1816 but, as we will see in the next chapter, became greater from 1819 onwards. On the one hand, this chapter looks at how dependent the political and constitutional character of the protectorate was on the character and ideology of the new High Commissioner. On the other hand, it examines in more detail these uncertainties, which were related to the extraordinary expenditures that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars across the empire, and particular security concerns of British officials regarding internal and external threats.

Representations of Ionian character and rule in early nineteenth century colonial governance: some methodological problems

The correlation between stereotypes, institutions and colonial rule is frequent in imperial historiography.[622] Historical writing on the islands has discussed at some length how cultural difference and rule were related, especially in regards to the constitutional aspect of British rule on the islands, and the Ionians' supposed inability to rule. As elsewhere in the history of the empire, identity-formation and representations of 'Otherness' in Ionians have been perceived as important tools in governing the islanders. Paschalidi's main thesis, for example, explores how representations of the Ionians influenced various forms of rule during the protectorate (1815-1864), based on the conviction – by the British and several Ionians alike – that the Ionian character would not allow the people to rule themselves by 'good government'.[623] Similarly, Gallant's book explains how the Ionians were perceived as 'Mediterranean Irish', 'European aborigines', 'noble savages', 'Black Irish' etc.[624] However, these works on the islands encountered similar issues to a range of works on colonial knowledge and rule, which is the fact that they have not explained sufficiently how this 'colonial knowledge' was able to shape social realities in the colonies and dependencies.[625] This thesis argues that cultural representations of Ionians were mostly effective as an internal dialogue between British officials, or in a metropolitan context, from Maitland and the Colonial Office responding to parliamentary pressures, than as actual ways to produce dominion on the ground.

There is no doubt that the empire was to a great extent, an empire based on a 'rule of difference', or that overall, stereotypes and racism were no less real than material conditions. However, this study argues that in the case of the early-nineteenth century Ionian Islands, to suggest that stereotypes about the Ionians were the sole organizing principle of British rule, is a

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[622] Catherine Hall (ed.), *Cultures of Empire: A Reader – Colonizers in Britain and the Empire of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Manchester, 2000), p. 7; Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation And Its Fragments. Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (New Jersey, 1993), especially pp. 16-34.
[623] Paschalidi's 'Constructing Ionian Identities', *passim.*
[624] Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion,* pp. 15-55.
[625] Ballantyne, 'Colonial Knowledge', p. 182.

gross exaggeration. To start with, differences between 'lower orders' and 'nobles' played a much greater role in official correspondence than any stereotypes about Ionian society as a whole. Moreover, cultural representations and character were rarely mentioned for their own sake, but were almost always heightened when more pressing issues were at stake, such as threats to the security of the state or lack of information.

Historiography of the British Empire has referred often to the 'unsystematic' and performative character of colonial governance in the early nineteenth century, instead of being 'rigidly institutional'; a crucial difference which is not acknowledged or taken into account in Ionian historiography.[626] Common tendencies in colonial governance were associated with the free rein that colonial governors had across the empire, especially after 1815. In many ways, Maitland's centralizing approach to governance was similar to the new imperial ethos of revivified conservative, militarist and royalist values, what Bayly defined as 'proconsular despotism'.[627] This new ethos was shared by other governors and officials across the empire, such as Lord Charles Somerset (Governor in the Cape between 1814 and 1832). Yet colonial governance was not merely about similarities across the empire or political cultures. Despite the similarities between colonial regimes, governors were never free from local peculiarities, institutions and legal traditions, which inherited, for example, the machineries of Dutch, Russian, or French despotism, or Venetian devolution of power.[628] Emerging politically triumphant from the plague of 1815-1816, and with his authority in the Mediterranean secured, Maitland was able to dictate the political life of the protectorate, writing at the time to Bathurst that the plague had given the British 'the strongest practical instance of the inability of the Ionian Republick to carry on itself'.[629] Here, the commissioner did not attribute 'inability' to the character of the Ionians in general, but in regards to Ionian political bodies.

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[626] Except Gekas who made the distinction – between performative in early 19th c. and institutional in the later period – although he does not explain how this worked in the case in the islands (Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 7). See also Kathleen Wilson, 'Rethinking the Colonial State: Family, Gender, and Governmentality in Eighteenth-Century British Frontiers', *The American Historical Review*, 116: 5 (December 2011), pp. 1294-1322.

[627] David Cannadine, *Aspects of Aristocracy. Grandeur and Decline in Modern Britain* (New Haven and London, 1994), pp. 9-36; Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, pp. 194-195.

[628] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian,* pp. 194, 195, 205. Also, see Gabriel Paquette, (ed.), *Enlightened Reform in Southern Europe and its Atlantic Colonies, c. 1750-1830* (Surrey, 2009).

[629] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 27 February 1816.

'King Tom'

During his administration on the islands, Maitland thoroughly justified his characterization as a 'rough old despot', as Charles James Napier called him, in the eyes of the islanders.[630] We have already seen in the previous chapter that he was a very capable negotiator, colonial governor, and methodical in the keeping of statistical information, which was particularly evident in plague outbreaks. An authoritarian in governance and a disciplinarian in the army, he received the nickname 'King Tom' (or 'Sultan Maitland' from the Greeks after the cession of Parga) from both the people he ruled as well as his troops. Coming from the Celtic fringe in the British Isles, he served under the Scottish Henry Dundas and belonged to his social circle. Maitland was personally acquainted with Adam Smith; in fact, he later admitted to his friend, and British ambassador to Naples, William A' Court (later Lord Heytesbury), that the British constitution and Adam Smith's ideas were 'possibly the two things on earth' that he considered 'proofs of human wisdom and human ingenuity'.[631] His contacts in the army, navy and Parliament secured his appointment and allowed him to circulate local knowledge and share ideas with other officials regarding the region.

By the time Maitland became High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands, he was extremely well paid. His lavish lifestyle, the 'new and useless offices', and the multiple offices Maitland held himself, were criticized mercilessly by his opponents in Parliament in the post-Napoleonic era. He received a salary totalling between £13,000 and £15,000, 'upon the most moderate computation', according to his Radical opponent in Parliament Joseph Hume (also a

[630] Sir Charles James Napier (1782-1853) served as the governor of Cephalonia between 1822 and 1830, and not between 1809 and 1816 as is mentioned before (Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 96). The years he was a governor in the island he later described as 'the happiest in his life'. Born in London, he later established connections with Ireland when his family moved in Celbridge, Co. Kildare, in 1785. Because of Ireland, Napier became aware of bad government and the misery of the colonized. During the Greek revolution of 1821, he became a passionate supporter of Greek independence. After having served in the Peninsular and American wars (1808-1814) and the Ionian Islands, Napier was appointed in Bombay (1841) and then became a Governor of Sind, modern-day Pakistan (Ainslie T. Embree, 'Sir Charles James Napier', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com.bris.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-19748 (December, 2016)).

[631] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41529, Maitland to A' Court, Corfu, 23 November 1818, ff. 192b-193a.

Scot).[632] In fact, this kind of critique of large expenditures by the British government was part of a broader attack by parliamentary critics, and increasingly the wider British public, against 'Old Corruption' in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.[633] Parliamentary critique was relentless, particularly on expenditures on foreign or colonial policy. By 1816, for example this had resulted in considerable retrenchment at the Colonial Office, which was reduced from 25 to 15 clerks, a considerable change for an establishment at the time.[634]

When Maitland was appointed Governor of Malta, he already had impressive credentials in Britain as well as overseas: Madras, Saint-Domingue, Ceylon, in all of which posts he had significant duties. Ionian historiography has shown at length how Maitland's authoritarian ideas were important to the origins of the protectorate and the creation of the colonial state, but less attention has been paid to the imperial networks he was connected to.[635] Politically, Maitland started as a Whig, advocating parliamentary reform in Britain, delivering his first speech in 1791 against the war with Tipu Sahib in India.[636] But over the years he changed from a Whig into an 'imperialist' and an authoritarian, advocating the suppression of sedition in Britain. Surprisingly, it is rarely mentioned in historiography that before Maitland became a governor in Malta and the Ionian Islands, he was the leading officer who suppressed a Luddite rebellion in Yorkshire in 1812-13. When he was appointed High Commissioner in the Ionian Islands in February 1816, Maitland was already the most powerful and well-paid British official in the Mediterranean: holding a post as governor in Malta since 1813, he also became commander-in-chief of British forces in the Mediterranean, and (a position which is often neglected) in charge of all Barbary consulates excluding Morocco.

One of the closer connections was William A' Court, a diplomat with many years of service in different stations in the Mediterranean, from Palermo and Naples (1801-1807) to the

[632] Maitland received annually as a Governor of Malta £5,000, as Commander-In-Chief in the Mediterranean £3,500, as High Commissioner £1,000, as pension from the revenues of Ceylon as having served as a governor previously £1,000, and a variety of allowances (Hansard T. C., *Parliamentary debates*, New Series, **VII**, 14 May 1822, p. 567).
[633] Philip Harling, *The waning of 'Old Corruption': the politics of economical reform in Britain, 1779-1846* (Oxford, 1996), pp. 1-8.
[634] Thompson, *Earl Bathurst*, p. 111.
[635] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 89-95.
[636] W. C. Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations of Sir Thomas Maitland* (New York, 1939), p. 4.

Barbary States (1813).[637] It seems Maitland acquired a great deal of local knowledge from his friendship with the ambassador, including on constitutional matters and the legal history of the Ionians, and the 'Mediterranean people' at large. Through his private correspondence with A' Court we know that the governor was particularly critical of William Bentinck's failure in Sicily.[638] Bentinck was appointed governor of the Two Sicilies during the Napoleonic Wars, and tried to gain the support of the Sicilian elites by giving them a constitution in 1806. This experiment quickly failed, and Bentinck was recalled in disgrace to Britain prompting criticism from many of his colleagues. Complaining to Lord Liverpool about Bentinck's conduct for example, Castlereagh mentioned 'how intolerably prone he is to Whig revolutions everywhere'.[639]

By the time Maitland went to the islands, he was a renowned 56-year old war veteran with plenty of administrative and military experience. His post and his connections with high-ranking veterans of the Napoleonic Wars in London allowed him significant free rein as governor. It would be hardly surprising, then, to say that his experience was crucial to the consolidation of British power in the political and constitutional character of the protectorate. In the eastern Mediterranean, Maitland considered British possessions (Malta and the Ionian Islands) as a unified geostrategic space. Emphasizing contingency and the militarist culture of 'reinvented conservatism', instead of consistent efforts to create abstract categories of rule, this chapter explains first the broader British policy in the eastern Mediterranean and security considerations that followed the Napoleonic Wars. These concerns, more present than ever in the period immediately after 1815, played an important role in how British officials conceived of their presence in the Ionian Islands. Then, this chapter explains how closely related these considerations were in the British administration in the islands.

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[637] Muriel E. Chamberlain, 'A' Court, William, first Baron Heytesbury (1779-1860)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com.bris.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-70?rskey=khJBix&result=1 (December 2017).

[638] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 100-101; BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41529, Maitland to A' Court, Malta, 16 October 1815, f. 9a.

[639] Quote in Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 103.

Napoleonic concerns? Security and retrenchment

Along with the militarist ethos and reinvented conservatism of 'proconsular despotism', there were security concerns in the Mediterranean originating from the wars. As the case of Exmouth's expedition had shown, these concerns were related to British naval presence in the Mediterranean 'policing the seas', particularly since the abolition of slave trade in 1807. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, security imperatives related to the defence of British possessions in the Mediterranean, for example, involved maintaining garrisons in both Malta and the Ionian Islands. Strategically, as we saw in the first chapter, the Ionian Islands (along with Malta) were part of a unified geopolitical space of island outposts, forming Britain's defence in the Mediterranean. As Castlereagh said in 1816, 'our policy had been to secure the empire against future attack. In order to do this, we had acquired what in former days would have been thought romance-the keys of every great military position'.[640] Maitland's appointment as a governor of both places is a case in point. Broadly stated, he was not overly concerned about a sudden renewal of war in Europe, although he would not exclude the possibility.[641]

Surprisingly, until recently the aspect of security – especially after a 25-year period of war – has been altogether neglected in Ionian historiography.[642] Yet, as this thesis argues, security concerns were paramount in the earlier period of the protectorate. In regards to the need to maintain a garrison in the Ionian Islands, Maitland wrote to Bathurst:

> In respect to the necessity of having troops here on a peace establishment, I can only say that the internal state of these islands is not at this present moment in a situation – even supposing that we had got rid of the plague – and had got rid of their present military establishment (which is neither more or less than an efficient military force acting indirect opposition to our views) I do not think we could with safety to ourselves – or with security the well-disposed, diminish the garrison a man under 3,500 – which allowing the whole to be 6,000, would only leave a residence of 2,500 men for Malta.[643]

[640] Peter Burroughs, 'Defence and Imperial Disunity' in Porter, *OHBE,* III, p. 323.
[641] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 7 May 1816.
[642] Except Gekas, *Xenocracy,* pp. 174-183.
[643] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 7 May 1816.

Although perceived as potential threats by the British, such concerns over an 'efficient military force' in the islands threatening the British presence and islanders supposedly being under 'a permanent martial law' would be exaggerated from time to time by Maitland and his supporters in Parliament to defend military expenditures and martial law. In fact, 'between 1815 and 1848', Gekas wrote, 'the Ionian State [protectorate] spent £456,311 on artillery and defence; of these Britain paid only £148,684 and the Ionian State the remaining £307,627'.[644] It was in these parliamentary proceedings on retrenchment and Maitland's conduct, rather than in the actual British administration of the islands, that characterizations of Ionians as 'violent' and 'unable to rule themselves' would be most effective against Maitland's opponents in Parliament.

Threats to 'public tranquility' would resurface often on the islands, especially after 1819. But there were perhaps other, more immediate and local concerns regarding the maintenance of troops at the expense of the British government. Surprisingly, although Ionian historiography has discussed at length the issue of extraordinary military expenditures in the islands, it has not offered any explanation or speculation as to why this was the case.[645] While a sudden renewal of a major war was to a large extent excluded, the possibility was always considered, particularly in the case of a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which would bring the former to the Mediterranean:

> In regard to the military establishment now at Malta and the islands, I must consider them in two points of view – in relation to their military establishment if should war break out suddenly as things now stand in Europe and secondly, with regard to their state even supposing no such unfortunate event to take place. I shall not take into the scale at all their military situation with the present force supposing war actually to exist – the necessity of having large military establishments at either in that event will rest totally at the supremacy of our navy, but it is fair to say that even making every due consideration for that supremacy, I hold 7,000 men to be too little under any circumstances in time of war. [646]

[644] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 177.
[645] Except Gekas, *Xenocracy,* pp. 177-182.
[646] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 7 May 1816.

Certainly, security incentives regarding potential internal threats played a role in Maitland's consideration of a garrison of 7,000 men on the Mediterranean islands, which would be shared between the strategically important Malta and Corfu. But, despite what Maitland's supporters were alleging in the British parliament about the 'violent' character of Ionians, experienced British military officials like Maitland were well aware of a potentially rebellious garrison. Premeditated movement of troops was suggested in times of crisis, or when troops remained for too long in one place. Such was the example of troop replacement between Malta and the Ionian Islands during the plague, which we mentioned in the previous chapter. One example of dire consequences was the so called 'white mutiny' in 1809, when rebellion threatened the Company's possessions in India: the insurrection spread across southern India and was quelled by troops coming from the Cape.[647]

Coincidentally, when the 'white mutiny' was active in southern India, Maitland was a governor in Ceylon. On the opposite shore at the time of the rebellion, he was writing to Castlereagh from Point de Galle in February 1810: 'All cordiality and unanimity are totally extinguished, and the degree of jealousy, discord and dissatisfaction on all sides in the army has got to such an extent as must lead to the most serious consequences, if not put an end to by the government in England'. Maitland was 'astonished' that the government in Madras was referring to 'a state of perfect calmness and quiet', at a time when governance was subject to the 'extraordinary lengths in which insubordination is manifested every day'.[648]

But of course, not all British incentives were about security in the islands. After showing the pressing concerns of British officials in the islands, we now move to the political status of the islands and the extent to which the collection and organization of information was unsystematic. We only need to mention here that Maitland's concern over potential disturbances was always present.

[647] McAleer, 'The Key to India', p. 310.
[648] BL Liverpool papers, Add MS 38410, Maitland to Castlereagh, Point de Galle, 20 February 1810, p. 25a-b.

'To make a mountain out of a mole hill': Ionian elites, wartime origins and the establishment of Maitland's system

In many ways, Maitland was an ideal example of the phenomenon that Bayly described as 'proconsular despotism'. By centralizing power in his own hands, in the places he governed he implemented similar changes in economy and law, but in societies radically different from one another: Ceylon, Malta, and the Ionian Islands. Recent work on the islands has explained these similarities in policy as signs of colonial modernity.[649] Yet, as the next two sections show, there was little novelty in Maitland's approach to keeping track of political developments and organizing information on the islands. As we will see, the collection and organization of political information did not involve abstract categorization of Ionian society, but on the contrary involved dynamic processes and close observation, aiming specifically at Ionian nobility. At the same time, due to the peculiar settlement of the islands in the Treaty of Paris, British officials were not only concerned with controlling the elites but also with identifying how they were connected with Russia. This thesis argues that such anxieties about external influence in the political and constitutional development of the protectorate, whether perceived or real, preoccupied British officials to an extent, and should not be neglected in Ionian historiography. Moreover, as Bayly explains, proconsular despotism was also a reinvention of a militarist ethos and a particular political culture, the military was not so distinct from the civil establishment.

British attempts to give constitutional charters in various cases across the Mediterranean – be it in Sicily, Malta or the Ionian Islands – took place in strategically important island outposts. Consolidation of British rule meant establishing garrisons which would, according to the Treaty of Paris, be paid out of the Ionian state's revenues.[650] Initially, the civil and military affairs of the islands and Malta were to be kept distinct, where Campbell was to be appointed Lieutenant Governor in Malta so that he would relieve Maitland from the 'pressure of military business'.[651] It is important to mention that Maitland became a governor in Malta (1813) and the Ionian Islands (1816), as well as Commander-In-Chief of British land forces

[649] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* pp. 101-103.
[650] Article VI of the *Treaty between the Allied Powers respecting the Ionian Islands, 1815* Appendix F, in Jervis, *History of the Island of Corfu,* p. 294.
[651] TNA CO 136/300, [Separate and Private] Bunbury to Maitland, London, 16 August 1815.

in the Mediterranean. Forming a common geostrategic space, issues of military expenditure or manpower were usually discussed along similar lines in official correspondence between Maitland and the Colonial Office. Stemming from the Napoleonic Wars and the Vienna settlement, it was also with a concern over internal security and 'public tranquility', and anxieties about the nature of connections between Ionians and Russia that shaped imperial thinking on the islands. Recurring problems that British officials encountered in the islands, like the lack of information, or challenges – real or perceived – threatening 'public tranquility' heightened stereotypical notions about the Ionian character.

Maitland did not trust the 'Mediterranean people', particularly the elites. Although he found his predecessor Campbell 'well disposed' in conducting his duty, he did not approve his stance towards the nobles: 'I have already seen enough of the Mediterranean islands and people to say, that in his situation it was hardly possible to steer clear [for the Ionians] of an opportunity to traduce him', Maitland wrote to Bunbury. 'There was', Maitland continued, 'quite industry enough and a spirit of low intrigue so sufficient to have made not only a mountain out of molehill, but a serious charge'.[652] Upon his arrival, Maitland surveyed the islands in order to interview the wealthier and most influential of the Ionian elite. The information he collected was not the result of abstract theorizing in a manner of 'governmentality', but a product of close involvement. Looking for potential collaborators among the islanders, he turned first to the island of Zante, where commercial connections had existed with England since the sixteenth century, as we already saw. Describing 'a very different class from those of Corfu', Maitland referred to existing aristocratic factions in Zante, naming for example the powerful Comuto or Martinengo family: 'Comuto is decidedly with us, but I expect nothing from him he is so excitingly feeble. Martinengo professes much – and they all generally hold the same language – but I cannot see a great deal further below I can give a decided opinion with regard to it.[653]

[652] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Corfu, 18 February 1816.
[653] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Zante, 4 April 1816.

Frustrated, Maitland wrote to Bunbury that 'the whole' was 'such an impenetrable scene of intrigue'.[654] Such representations of Ionians as 'intriguers', 'unreliable' or liars, have been associated by previous work on the islands as being used by the British to support their claims about the supposed unsuitability of the Ionians to self-governance.[655] In the period under study, however, these stereotypes hardly formed a more pervasive model for ruling the islanders. Stereotypes were often deployed by frustrated officials, exasperated by knowledge gaps and potentially significant threats to imperial authority. Historians of the empire have warned us of how we should interpret the use of stereotypes by colonial officials elsewhere. For example, in India of the nineteenth century, 'orientalist stereotypes … were not tools of epistemological conquest, so much as conceptual fig-leaves to conceal desperate ignorance'.[656] A similar picture comes to mind when considering Maitland and his relation with Ionian nobles, despite Maitland's absolute domination of Ionian politics.

Furthermore, frustration came from previous experiences: Maitland's time in Ceylon, for example. It was there that Maitland noticed the 'corrosive effects' on British authority that local elites had through the legal system.[657] Maitland hoped to alter the situation by implementing deep changes in the legislature, and by employing men loyal to the empire. We have already seen how tightly connected the Ionian elites were to the legal system.

In any case, Maitland's writings to London marked a significant departure from Britain's relationship with local information brokers in wartime; Foresti's case, which has been analysed before as an instance of the shift in Britain's policy towards Ionian sources of information in wartime. Foresti was surely not the only one, as other Ionians were excluded from high offices, much like colonized peoples were excluded from colonial administration elsewhere in the empire. In a characteristic early-nineteenth century type of colonial governance – and in a typical Maitland fashion – the High Commissioner had a free rein in deciding who stayed in

[654] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Zante, 4 April 1816.
[655] I.e. Maria Pashalidi's thesis, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', *passim.*
[656] Bayly, *Empire and Information,* p. 52.
[657] Benton, *Rage for Order,* p. 8.

office and who did not, despite Bathurst's calls to collaborate with locals who played a role in the occupation of the islands in 1809. Wherever he went, Maitland saw scenes of intrigue:

> Because I wish to annihilate … that animosity and rancour which have prevailed here, and do not throw myself … into the hands of those who now hold the different offices – that therefore I am going to throw myself into what they call the opposite party – to their … and destruction. But the truth is … that if I am right in my conjecture, there is such a radical difference between me and those who have hitherto governed in the places upon the … of government itself – that it is impossible we could ever agree – their mode of getting a party in favour of the British interests was bottomed certainly in a most desirable view of the subject – that of raising the lower orders of the people and diminishing the power of the nobles – which power … principally in their corrupt influence in the courts of law – and so far I perfectly concur with those – but the manner of doing this is where I differ with them.[658]

To a large degree, partly due to a lack of reliable sources of information and partly due to prejudice, Maitland was concerned throughout his administration that he would be 'thrown' into party politics in the islands just as his predecessor had been. He often implied that Campbell was well-intentioned but naive. The High Commissioner wrote to Bunbury about a system of governance where state officials would check the power of the nobles, the standards of living in the rural areas would be improved, and at the same time, it would abstain from any local power dynamics like for example the English political party in the islands. At the centre of all these, would be the governor, the central authority of the protectorate:

> The only mode in which I am aware we can make a decent government here, is in the first place to allay all the spirit of party that has existed – whether arising from speculative feelings with regard to other powers, or from hostility to our … rule – that we may at length lend them to come into our views with regard to a constitution – and that we must manage so as to get all the parties to agree to enact a constitution.[659]

And of course, Capodistrias was perceived to be the 'archenemy' of Maitland's administration. For Maitland, Russian intervention was not something London ought to be worried about in 1816. On the other hand, the commissioner kept Capodistrias at arm's length

[658] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Zante, 4 April 1816.
[659] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Zante, 4 April 1816.

throughout his administration. This would change in 1819 and after that, when the possibility of Russian interference became more real than ever.

Maitland took it upon himself to get to know more about the Ionian elites as well as the Ionians in general. Libraries in the islands contained valuable knowledge on the customs, geography, the climate and politics of the islands; there had been many works published in Corfu or by publishing houses in Europe. According to a traveller, no public library existed for the natives in Corfu, but a collection of books founded at Messina in 1810 was transferred to Corfu. The library contained 2,500 volumes and 20 atlases, and British military and naval officers, officers of the civil departments or respectable inhabitants had easy access to this collection and could become members 'at a moderate entrance' fee and a small annual or monthly subscription.[660] Even Maitland begun studying 'most attentively' the 'disposition and character' of the Ionian nobility since the period of the Septinsular Republic.[661] Maitland himself seemed to possess a great deal of private and public papers, including information on dealing with plagues, having provided free access to medical officials, like the medical topographer John Hennen, who were interested in the matter.[662] Other libraries existed on the islands, formed by noblemen or wealthy individuals. Dissemination of information was also centralized in the hands of Maitland and the Ionian Senate. The only printing press was in Corfu, under censorship and was employed in publishing the *Ionian Gazette*, official documents and acts of Parliament.[663]

Knowledge gaps between the central administration and local communities were fraught with danger for British officials, enhanced by problems in transportation, due to the weather and the problematic communications between the islands. Geographical distances in insular communities, like the Ionian Islands and Malta, created real problems and frequently appear in official correspondence. Often, officials mention delays of letters, or bad weather. Concluding the previous sections, stereotypes and colonial rule were undoubtedly connected.

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[660] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 209.
[661] H.W. Williams, *Travels in Italy, Greece, and the Ionian Islands, in a Series of Letters descriptive of Manners, Scenery, and the Fine Arts in Two Volumes, volume II* (Edinburgh, 1820), p. 155.
[662] Hennen, *Sketches*, p. 426.
[663] Davy, *Notes and Observations*, p. 36.

But these were hardly the sole organizing principle of colonial governance. As we will see next, state surveillance was based more on close surveillance of 'figureheads' or individual acts of insubordination, than with institutionally-based categories of rule, whether based on stereotypes or otherwise, hence why it makes notions of nineteenth century rationalities of governance – or as it is called, 'governmentality' – difficult to apply to the islands between 1815 and 1824. Throughout the period under study, British officials were constantly translating wider geopolitical concerns and anxieties into usable knowledge that could assist with aspects of colonial governance.

The Constitution of 1817, Ionian politics and state surveillance

Maitland's system was based on close monitoring of the Ionian elites. When considering state surveillance, intelligence services and state storage of information more broadly, there is a wide assumption — extending beyond imperial historiography — that the modern state was more centralized and perhaps more effective in surveillance.[664] This study finds this assumption erroneous in many ways, building upon previous work on cases in early-modern India or, indeed, Venice.[665] The Ionian Islands, which were under Venetian control for centuries, can contribute to such discussions in both imperial and Venetian historiography. Generally, the thesis has tried to show how elements of Venetian surveillance strategies survived on the islands. This section examines how British officials devised strategies for the surveillance of Ionian political bodies, and particularly how central the role of the High Commissioner was in this. Despite the attention paid by historians to the constitutional workings of the protectorate, relevant works have shown much less interest in Maitland's earlier experiences in ruling, or the broader context of early nineteenth century colonial governance.[666]

[664] Iordanou, 'What News on the Rialto?', p. 326; Higgs, 'The Rise of the Information State', pp. 175-197.
[665] For early modern Venice, De Vivo, *Information and Communication*. For India, see Bayly, *Empire and Information.*
[666] Except the works of Gekas, *Xenocracy, passim;* Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 89-95.

In the context of international relations, the state on the islands was built under the principles of the Treaty of Paris, creating an enduring legal ambivalence regarding the protectorate which continued until the cession of the islands to Greece in 1864. For Maitland, however, there was no such paradox. Before he landed on the islands, he knew about 'an intrigue going on to make them into a Republic under our protection', referring to Capodistrias and Russian pressures in Vienna to increase Russian influence in the islands. Writing to A' Court from Malta when the cession of the islands to Britain was not certain in late 1815, he was convinced that 'if they [the Russians] don't give them in sovereignty, we are certainly better without them all'. Maitland had Bentinck's failure in Sicily in mind.[667]

Peter Burroughs on imperial institutions writes that 'Britain's governance of Empire involved dynamic processes, not static structures and inert constitutional frameworks, as some earlier imperial historians imagined'.[668] The constitutional status of the islands, and particularly the Constitution of 1817, have been amply analysed.[669] Although it will examine the political and constitutional nature of the protectorate, this chapter is essentially covers the extent to which imperial authority was consolidated through the British governor. Although Maitland considered the British constitution as 'proof of human wisdom and ingenuity' the kind of society he hoped to create, through the constitution, on the islands seems less certain in retrospect.

Constitutional power did not operate in a vacuum. This chapter argues that, contrary to the assumptions that shape several works in Ionian historiography, it was not the Constitution of 1817 that the political power of the commissioner emanated from.[670] Rather the other way around: the ambiguities of the Constitution of 1817 allowed Maitland to take control and pursue his own personal strategies. Character played a role, as we saw before, and Maitland in theory shared other officials' notions of the superiority of the 'rule of law' over other legal

[667] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41529, Maitland to A' Court, Malta, 16th October 1815, ff. 8, 9.
[668] Peter Burroughs, 'Imperial Institutions' in *OHBE,* III, p. 170.
[669] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities'; Eleni Leontsini, 'I ithiki ke politiki diastasi tou Syntagmatos ton Eptanison tou etous 1817' ['The moral and political dimension of the Constitution of the Ionian Islands in the year 1817'] *6th Panionio Synedrio, Zante 23-27 September 1997*; Calligas, Maitland's Constitution'.
[670] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 107-109; Calligas, 'Maitland's constitution', pp. 118-120 and 'The Rizospastai', p. 2.

cultures: his contemporary, William Horton, considered the 'Dutch laws of the Cape or the Spanish laws of Trinidad', 'scandalous' and contrary to his 'feelings and prejudices'.[671]

According to the commissioner, 'extrajudicial interference … in criminal or civil cases' was a necessary measure for Ionians.[672] After all, he was in absolute agreement with Bathurst, who advised Maitland to 'get them [Ionians] to slide into a constitution'.[673] Essentially, the principles as set out by the Colonial Office were the same since the first troops landed on the islands: the islands were considered too strategically important to be left to any system of local representation, or to share power with local representative bodies. Constitution-making on the islands has been rightly identified by historians with Maitland's despotic ideas and administration. The Constitution of 1817 was theoretically based on its predecessors, for example the Constitution of 1803: the main difference was the extensive power of the governor and the ability of one individual to dominate all political bodies, including the legislative and executive.[674] There was an Ionian Senate of six members (divided into three departments, the Political, the General and the Financial) – with an Englishman appointed as the Senate's Secretary – and a Legislative Assembly of 40; the Ionian Senate being, theoretically, the executive part of government.[675] The High Commissioner had the power of veto in all decisions taken by the Senate as well as in legal proceedings; his signature was final, with no right for appeal afterwards. In short, Maitland's rule reigned supreme; the Ionian State was, in theory, considered a protectorate, but in reality was governed as a colony.

Theoretically, the protectorate was organized as a federal state, but Maitland and Bathurst were well aware that the federal character of the state was merely a façade, masking British power. Based on the ambiguities of the Treaty of Paris, governance seemed to be organized based on a parallel dual-system: one which consisted of the local governing bodies of

[671] Burroughs, 'Imperial Institutions', p. 175.
[672] TNA CO 136/5, Maitland to Bunbury, Corfu, 18 February 1816.
[673] The emphasis is on the original. Quote in Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 96.
[674] Calligas,'Maitland's Constitution'; Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations*, p. 186.
[675] The Senate approved the civil lists, nominated local officials and controlled the expenditure of the Ionian State (Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 57, 58); Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 106; The Senate (Chapter II) and the Legislative Assembly (Chapter III, Section I) in the *Constitutional Chart of the United States of the Ionian Islands* (Jervis, *History of the Island of Corfu*, Appendix G, p. 297 and p. 300, respectively).

each island and another one which consisted of British military officers: at the head of the local government on each of the islands was the Regent. Under the Regents were a secretary, an advocate-fiscal, an archivist and a treasurer, along with a British military official called the Resident, whose exact responsibilities were not clearly defined in the constitution.[676] Needless to say, the official local government – both municipal administration and Regencies – were politically decorative. Even for Maitland, 'the whole of these articles relative to the municipal body are more for show than substance'.[677] 'It is quite possible', Dixon mentioned, 'to read the writings of the Residents without discovering that a local municipality existed'.[678] Despite the decorative nature of the municipal councils and Regencies, they were in direct and frequent communication with the Commissioner, providing essential information on each island.

Maitland's reaction to 'low intrigues' and party politics was to bring political bodies like the Ionian Senate under his tight control, and to monitor closely the Ionian elites' conduct. In 1816, for example, he dismissed four members of the Senate – practically dissolving it – because they were causing 'dissensions in the government'. Writing to Bunbury in the same year, he explained that the dismissed senators were 'a set of corrupt and insufferable intriguers' and 'creatures of Capodistria'. Dixon mentioned the fact that on top of corruption, Maitland implied that the senators were also involved in communications with Russia and copies of their treasonous correspondence were sent to Bathurst.[679] The senators were replaced by people who conformed more to Maitland's wishes, a person he trusted was appointed to the head of the Senate.

How, then, did Maitland seek to make this 'impenetrable scene of intrigue' more 'penetrable'? How did he seek to create reliable collaborators? One way to achieve his aims was to closely monitor the activities of Ionian political bodies. In this peculiar, 'dual' system of government, the role of the commissioner in state surveillance and the monitoring of Ionian political bodies like the Senate was more nuanced than it is often assumed to be. Despite

[676] Articles 1st and 2nd, Section I, Chapter IV (Local Government) of the Constitutional Chart, in Jervis, *History of the Island of Corfu*, p. 307.
[677] TNA CO 136/7, Maitland's comments on the constitution, no page numbers.
[678] Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations*, p. 191.
[679] Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations*, p. 183.

considering many of the Ionian elite intriguers, Maitland was nevertheless personally involved in information-gathering, and thus kept in close contact with many of the local elites. His relationship with them is rather comically depicted in an episode that took place in Corfu during the early years of the protectorate: his bedroom was next to the chamber where the Ionian Senate used to gather for their assemblies. One morning, he was awoken by the Senators as they gathered to convoke a meeting. After a night of heavy drinking – one of many – Maitland appeared in the doorway in his night attire telling Hankey, his officer: 'Damn them, Secretary. Tell them to go to Hell'.[680] We can easily imagine how surprised the senators would be – schooled in the ways and delicate manners of Venetian aristocracy – by this authoritarian, 'frequently drunk' and 'dirty' governor. But at the same time, Maitland's hard-working administration was also acknowledged by Napier and others.[681] Indeed, the authoritarian governor had appointed Frederick Hankey, a person of trust and his right hand in the islands, as a Secretary of the Senate.

The commissioner knew that by appointing Hankey he would ensure a physical presence in all the Senate's proceedings.[682] Hankey had to ensure that 'nothing can be done from day to day without it being reported to the Lord High Commissioner'.[683] Similarly, the High Commissioner surrounded himself with close associates, veterans of the Napoleonic Wars. Frederick Adam for example, also a Scot and Maitland's successor as a High Commissioner in the islands, served with Maitland, and was, typically, appointed commander of the forces in the Ionian Islands in 1817, and second in command to the High Commissioner.[684]

Creating connections with members of the Ionian elite was also crucial. In March 1816, Maitland appointed Baron Theotoky as a president of the Senate. Baron Emmanouel Theotoky (1777-1837) came from a powerful noble family in Corfu and was an active supporter of Greek

[680] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 39.
[681] Roger T. Stearn, 'Sir Thomas Maitland', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17835 (March, 2015).
[682] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 106.
[683] Quote in Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 106.
[684] Alfred Von Reumont, *Memoir of Sir Frederick Adam. A Sketch of Modern Times* (London, 1858), p. 22. However, Adam's biography is full of mistakes and inaccuracies: for example, the Corinthian gulf in Greece is mentioned as Colocynthian gulf, or the cession of Parga was mentioned as taking place in 1817 instead of 1819 (*Memoir,* pp. 31).

education. Theotoky was able to provide Maitland with up-to-date information on Ionian politics within official political bodies, as well as among the Ionian aristocracy and the subsequent access they had to rural communities. Also, the Senator had compiled valuable quantitative and qualitative data on population, land and economy, in his book *Details Sur Corfou.* In his opening speech in the Senate, Theotoky himself praised Maitland's conduct and proclaimed the new era:

> The time of troubles is over, and we should not reminisce about them. We are happy that our interests happened to be under the protection and the guarantee of the Prince Regent of Great Britain, and of the honourable Thomas Maitland as guarantor of our good fortune. The testimonies of [Maitland's] qualities are his predictions over the plague, the protection and establishment of our Church as a dominating religion of the state, the security of our property, and ensuring us our essential needs.[685]

Along with the Residents, Maitland worked closely with the Ionian police. Policing on the islands was organized at a local level and according to the principles of the constitution of 1817. A bill for the organization of police was brought by Maitland to the Legislative Assembly in March 1818, and was a rather indicative example of the continuous interventions of the High Commissioner in the Ionian legislature, as well as the silent compliance of Ionian legislators. The police department was organized into two branches, the Executive and Judicial police: the latter was appointed by the Regents who 'were able to sentence without appeal in cases involving not more than thirty dollars at Corfu, Cephalonia and Zante, and correspondingly lower in the other islands'. The executive police 'fulfilled the duties of police constables'.[686] At the same time, they were crucial in the registration of occupational titles and individuals in Corfu, such as shopkeepers, merchants, brokers or manufacturers.[687] Constables were called for, in cases ranging from neighbourhood differences to plots and rebellions threatening public order. In all cases, the Commissioner was to be informed, even in trivial alterations of the system.[688] Overall, Maitland's personal strategies and surveillance of individual Ionian politicians were

[685] Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State*, pp. 55-56.
[686] Dixon, The *Colonial Administrations*, pp. 207, 208.
[687] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, p. 105.
[688] TNA CO 136/213, 'Journal of Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly', Corfu, 12 March 1818.

tactics employed to control the local political scene as a whole, along with censorship of the press, and effectively stifling anything resembling public opinion.

In many ways, Maitland put effort into upholding the traditions of the local aristocracy, and exchanged lengthy correspondence with A' Court because of the latter's knowledge of customs and political traditions in the Mediterranean. The commissioner decided to respond to the requests of Ionian nobles who were 'plaguing' him 'with all kinds of offers, quite ridiculous of themselves', 'from all these [gifts and offers]', Maitland wrote to A' Court, 'I have shrunk and hold back as much as I possibly could; - but the impression on my mind has always been that it would be unwise policy to place ourselves so much beyond them, as to state at once that I would receive nothing of any kind at their hands'.[689] Despite having 'an aversion on foreign titles', Maitland gave his consent to establishing, in 1818, the English peerage under the Order of St. Michael and St. George and by consenting to spend £10,000 for expenses.[690]

Relevant works in Ionian historiography are at pains to understand the social and cultural mechanisms of information-gathering, either in the form of examining rumours or British officials exchanging information with Ionians informally. Some tendencies of linking a 'reinvented' nobility to colonial administration can be traced across the British Empire – to possessions like Ireland, South Africa and Malta – or even to European colonial rule elsewhere. Similarly, as elsewhere in the empire, efforts were taken by both British and loyal Ionians to associate the imperial enterprise with Ionian society through military parades, public ceremonies and 'viceregal display'.[691] The most obvious architectural display of British rule is the neoclassical palace of St Michael and St. George, the High Commissioner's residence and home of the Ionian Senate, which today overlooks the Spianada, the main square of Corfu town.

In any case, Maitland established a network to monitor the Ionian elites in circumstances of great distrust and suspicion. The anxieties over Russian agents and suspicious

[689] BL Heytesbury Papers Add MS 41529, Maitland to A' Court, Corfu, 2 November 1818.
[690] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41529, Maitland to A' Court, Corfu, 2 November 1818, f. 175.
[691] Burroughs, 'Imperial Institutions', p. 183.

figureheads are indicative, most notably in the case of the Corfiote noble, Capodistrias. Another example of Maitland's surveillance strategies being used control the central political scene in the islands, was the Lepegnotti affair in 1816-1817.[692] Lepignotti, who was Frederick Hankey's secretary, spread false information that a plot had been devised by a group of nobles to poison Maitland. British and Ionian constables were ordered to arrest the suspected individuals, all of which were Theotoky's political opponents.[693] The plot seemed to be finally exposed, and after consideration, Maitland made amends by releasing the nobles and 'professions of goodwill on both sides ended the affair'.[694] However, as Maitland's opponents testified a couple of years later in the British parliament, the plot was fabricated in order to destroy Theotoky's political opponents. Despite Lepegnotti's personal motives for profit, he was turned into a convenient political scapegoat. But generally, few Ionian nobles had caused Maitland as much concern as Count Capodistria, who was also the head of the Russian party in the islands. Maitland wrote to Bathurst and Castlereagh at length on the measures that he adopted in order 'to defeat [Capodistria's] cabals'.[695] Considering this climate of 'intrigues' and the ambiguities of the international settlement, then, it is hardly surprising that the constitutional background would be even less representative.

Along with surveillance strategies, British officials came to rely on the collaboration of local politics and institutions. As we already saw, before the British had established their provisional government in the islands, Ionians had been commissioned to conduct statistical accounts during the French administration. Similarly, infrastructure works like roads and administrative buildings were part of a project that Ionians also promoted. Surveys of the land, such as the marshes in southern Corfu which were seen as a factor to plague outbreaks, were conducted by French engineers with local help and funds from the Ionian government.[696] Later forms of information collection in the empire, like the Blue Books of Statistics, 'collected by the British authorities for colonial administration purposes, documents of the Ionian State

[692] Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State*, pp. 86-90.
[693] Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State*, p. 88.
[694] Dixon, *The Colonial Administrations*, p. 184.
[695] TNA FO 42/17, Maitland to Castlereagh, Corfu, 24 February 1817, pp. 71-74.
[696] TNA CO 136/3, Campbell to Bathurst, Corfu, 31 December 1815, p. 143b.

bureaucracy and accounts of Ionians and British contemporaries reveal a colonial modernity that found fertile ground among the educated Ionians who followed the logic of accountability, transparency and found innovative expressions of interests in the public sphere, but also through collective petitions'.[697]

Collection of information: counting the Ionian population or treating opinions?

Many of the practices in information collection mentioned above were also adopted during Venetian administration, including the accumulation of quantitative information and surveys. Therefore, more contextualized research needs to be done before we can safely say that the Venetians had not achieved a 'sophisticated level of nineteenth-century colonial governance', or that they had not used 'population as a resource for economic development at an empire-wide level'.[698]

Apart from Maitland's experience on measurements and statistics in general, since the expedition in Saint-Domingue, we saw how the compilation of statistical tables was the act of pioneering individuals: British medical topographers like Hennen, or Greek officials like Plato Petrides. Following tendencies of official information gathering in Britain, these individuals 'had the potential to 'illuminate aspects of society that government was not well equipped to survey directly'.[699] Such enquiries provided 'the most direct precedent for the activities of early Victorian statistical societies'.[700]

But gathering information had its limitations. We saw, in the previous chapter, Tully's efforts to gather information from priests on the plague, and his subsequent frustration when villagers in rural areas concealed this information. This frustration was understandable from Tully's perspective. As we saw before, priests in the islands – like in Venice – were 'depositories' of knowledge about the community, and state officials in the islands – both British and Ionians

[697] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 101.
[698] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 102.
[699] Innes, *Inferior Politics,* p. 112.
[700] Innes, *Inferior Politics,* p. 113.

from Corfu – were dependent on them. State officials did not manage to free themselves entirely from these kinds of local sources of information in the period under study, and any surveys conducted by state officials involved local actors. In any case, as we saw in the introduction of the thesis, accounts from even the mid-nineteenth century had not reached consensus over the actual measurement of the population. Limitations in counting the population were even greater in terms of population movement.

Demographic change and the recording of the population are often associated with state mechanisms of surveillance, as well as the rise of the modern state. In the case of highly mobile societies like the Ionian Islands, this could cause a constant headache to state officials should they decide to count the population, and especially if they keep track of incoming foreigners.[701] The second French administration maintained the policy of passport controls as the previous one of 1797-198.[702] Recording the presence of foreigners on the islands was systematized in the course of the nineteenth century, although these procedures were prone to circumstance and political change: during the Septinsular Republic in 1805, for instance, the police commission announced that 'within five days all foreigners would be traced and recorded, with the assistance of hotel and other property owners in and around the city and its suburbs'. In the context of a climate of political instability in the islands, 'this practice of surveillance', Gekas noted, 'was introduced for the first time and it was considered so indispensable that it lasted until the end of British rule'.[703] Certainly, British officials took 'precautionary measures' to regulate population movement in the port-towns and coasts of the islands, but usually on a small scale and for specific purposes, for example in order to contain the transmission of plague to the island of Cephalonia from the mainland.[704] Similarly, maintaining an old practice, men and women who were crossing the borders between the islands and the mainland had been a source of tension between the British and the local pasha

[701] As Gekas noted, Ionian authorities considered foreigners (*forestiero*) not only incoming migrants from say Malta or mainland Greece, but also between the Ionian Islands, for instance Corfu and Cephalonia. As one can imagine, this adds more to the difficulties of studying the history of Ionian administrations (Gekas, *Xenocracy*, p. 117)
[702] Figure III, Sample of passport.
[703] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 117.
[704] TNA CO 136/411, Travers to Hankey, Argostoli, 8 November 1819.

since British troops landed on the islands in wartime, especially in the case of individuals fleeing Ottoman authorities.

In most cases, counting the population did not necessarily involve control, but followed previous standard policies of Ionian administrations when naturalizing foreigners, or, to put it differently, 'making new subjects'.[705] Few demographic changes were greater during *Anglokratia* than the arrival of 3,000 refugees from the small town of Parga, who were forced to migrate and to settle on the islands of Corfu and Paxoi in a matter of weeks. This particular case shows how information collection processes followed previous patterns of integrating foreigners, but were nevertheless shaped by new geopolitical imperatives, notably the links with Ali Pasha.

The cession of Parga in 1819

In a way, in 1819 the British were still involved in the wartime connections they had established with Ali Pasha in the mainland. As we will see, the scandalous case of Parga is illuminating in many ways, not only in terms of the wartime connections the British fostered between the mainland and the islands, but also in regard to the British presence in the Mediterranean at large.

Geographically, the small coastal town of Parga is in northwestern Greece, opposite the small island group of Paxoi in the Ionian Sea, consisting at the time of 4,000 to 5,000 people. As was described by an author at the time, 'without being so useful to the provisioning of Corfu … was nevertheless of infinite importance, owing to the connections its inhabitants then did and still continue to keep up with … independent clans of the Cassiopian mountains [in the mainland, opposite of Corfu]. This was one of the principal seats of the insurrectional movements which agitated the Epirus, and a secure asylum for the enemies of Ali Pacha'.[706] The cession of Parga, as the 'incident' was rightly named by contemporaries, bought

[705] John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 10-13.
[706] Frédéric Guillaume De Vaudoncourt, *Memoirs on the Ionian Islands considered in a Commercial, Political and Military point of view* (London, 1816), p. 82.

embarrassment to British foreign policy. It created one of the greatest humanitarian crises in the British Mediterranean at the time. Initially, the British government tried to withhold information from the British public in regard to the case, but news leaked due to the efforts of a particular officer in the British army, Charles De Bosset, who published, almost immediately after the cession of the islands, his *Proceedings in Parga and the Ionian Islands* (1819).[707] News also travelled through Greek networks between the islands and London.

Historically, Parga along with other coastal towns in the region, which are divided between modern-day Greece and Albania (Butrint, Preveza, Vonitsa), were heavily-fortified Venetian enclaves on the continent. During the brief occupation of the islands by French (1798-1799 and 1807-1809/1815) and Russian (1799-1807) troops, these same troops also occupied Parga, along with the Ionian Islands. British troops also occupied the town at the time of the French retreat in 1814, and informal promises of protection were given to the worried Parguionotes by Campbell, who mentioned that 'this small Greek community has been rescued from the impending ferocity of its powerful and relentless neighbour, the Vezir Ali Pacha … [who] would undoubtedly have exterminated the inhabitants, regardless of age or sex'.[708] Campbell was not merely concerned with protecting the inhabitants of Parga, however genuine his comments may have been, but also an expedition in the mainland would, according to him, consolidate a 'weak and fluctuating' British presence in the islands, in the face of Russian and French intrigues throughout Greece.[709]

After the occupation of the islands by British troops between 1809 and 1815, however, both Ottoman and Russian claims over western Greece were officially renounced.[710] British officials like Campbell mentioned the strategic influence of the town to London, considering it

[707] Charles Philippe De Bosset, *Proceedings in Parga and the Ionian Islands, with a series of Correspondence, and other justificatory Documents* (London, 1819). This thesis used the publication of 1821.
[708] TNA CO 136/2, no. 38, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 30 March 1814, p. 46a. Campbell's concerns about the extermination of the inhabitants of Parga were well-founded, as Ali Pasha had already massacred of approximately 16,000 men and women in nearby Preveza (1798).
[709] TNA CO 136/2, no. 38, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 30 March 1814, p. 46b.
[710] TNA FO 42/17, 'Precis of the conduct of the Vizir Aly Pacha towards the Ex-Venetian Continental provinces of the Levant, at that time previous and subsequent to the treaty of the 21st March 1800 between Russia and the Porte', Meyer to [Foresti?], 1817.

'an outwork of the garrison of Corfu'.[711] Or, as already mentioned in this study, such towns in the mainland could contain plague outbreaks from reaching the Ionian Islands.[712] European troops were welcomed warmly by the inhabitants of Parga, who looked on them as offering protection against the nearby Ali Pasha's expansionist vision of filling the power 'vacuum' – and conquering territories – as he saw fit, after the collapse of the Venetian Republic in 1797. Despite Campbell's assurances to the Parguionotes, the town was ceded to the Ottoman government in 1817 under a secret agreement between John Cartwright – consular official in the Morea at the time and later a political reformer – and Ahmed Bay, on behalf of the British and the Ottoman governments respectively.[713] Parga was finally delivered to Ali Pasha in 1819 for £142,425. Having waited in a state of anxiety for news of the town's fate, the nerves of 3,000 inhabitants broke in May 1819, and they fled the town to look for refuge in the nearby Ionian Islands.

News of the cession of Parga caused public outrage in Britain as well as the rest of Europe. De Bosset, who sympathized with the people's plight and protested to Maitland, was swiftly recalled.[714] Fierce clashes took place in the pages of the *Quarterly Review* and *Edinburgh Review, The Times*, and in Parliament in May 1819. Most characteristically, one of Maitland's critics, Joseph Hume, called Maitland 'a disgrace to England', when the incident was discussed in Parliament two years later.[715] Across Europe, poems were written and paintings were produced depicting the plight of the people of Parga, such as the *Parguinote*, drawn by John Cartwright (1822) which is kept today in the British Museum. The *Scots Magazine* lamented:

> The facts speak for themselves. Great Britain has condescended to an act which Venice, Russia, and France, shrunk from with horror. We have abandoned a free people, whom we had solemnly and unequivocally pledged ourselves to protect. We have actually sold their homes and their altars, and have surrendered to a ferocious barbarian the last inlet through which the arts, the

[711] TNA CO 136/2, no. 38, Campbell to Bathurst, Zante, 30 March 1814.
[712] BL MS 35143, Richard Church Papers, 'Report', f. 146a.
[713] Charles Philippe De Bosset, *Parga and the Ionian Islands; comprehending a Refutation of the mis-statements of the Quarterly Review and of Lieut.-Gen. Sir Thomas Maitland on the Subject* (London, 1821), p. 263.
[714] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 34.
[715] Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, p. 35.

> religion, and the commerce of civilized Europe could make their way into Greece.[716]

The case of Parga is still debated in historiography, but it is certain that geopolitical imperatives, maintaining good relations with the pasha, and the agreement on timber since wartime played crucial roles; the town was not even included in the Treaty of Paris that gave the islands to Britain.[717] After agreeing to cede Parga for 'a quantity of timber' from Ali Pasha, and to maintain good relations with the Porte, the town was finally delivered to the pasha in July 1819.[718] Above all, for British officials the town of Parga had no strategic use.

Maitland shared his thoughts on Parga in a lengthy report he sent to Bathurst in November 1819. For the commissioner, Parga was 'a barren rock' of no strategic use, 'possessed … of no means of resistance, of no funds to create such means – with no possibility of being of the smallest utility to us, and with the certainty of generating a spirit of hostility and disgust on the part of our ally the Porte'.[719] Keeping Parga, Maitland wrote to Bathurst, would involve establishing garrisons in the town, and covering an 'enormous expense of new [military] works' that would cost the British government more than £50,000. Maintaining a garrison in the mainland would produce a sense of tension and a 'series of complaints and quarrels between the British and Ottoman authorities … shaking that connection that I am sure I need not state to your Lordship'.[720] Maitland continued:

> I contend that a mere garrison would have been inadequate to the protection of its territory – that we could not have prevented them from being placed, as it were, in a state of *constant siege*, cut off from all communications with the interior, and as completely isolated, if it had been a rock in the ocean. … with the certainty (which has been sufficiently proved My Lord in the course of this proceeding) of indisposing the Ottoman Porte towards us, with the certainty of violating the system of general policy, which formed the bases of all our

[716] *The Edinburgh Magazine and Literary Miscellany; A New Series of the Scots Magazine*, V (July-December, 1819), p. 248.
[717] Starting from De Bosset, *Parga and the Ionian Islands*; Christophoros Perevos, *Istoria tou Soulliou kai tis Pargas* (Athens, 1857) *[History of Souli and Parga]*.
[718] TNA CO 136/12, Adam to Goulburn, Corfu, 19 July 1819.
[719] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, f. 49a.
[720] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, f. 49b.

> engagements a the reestablishment of the general peace, - with the certainty of entailing upon ourselves a very heavy annual expenditure.[721]

Strategically, Maitland, particularly because of his tenure in Ceylon, was well-aware of what it meant to govern in the frontiers. From the perspective of Britain's 'blue-water' strategy, his observations were reasonable. The anxiety of putting the garrison in Parga in a situation of 'constant siege', and the fear that a British military presence would 'violate the system of general policy' and become a cause for war was characteristic of the state that British officials were in on the islands. The commissioner also mocked the ignorance of his critics in England:

> [who] had never had any knowledge of Mohomeddan power, or of Mohameddan authority, except from two or three months residence in the place of Parga, stating broad doctrines with regard to the policy Great Britain ought to entertain relative to countries of which they pretend to have gathered sufficient knowledge from the slight and casual opportunities of such momentary residence. The others in England are pleased to maintain the usual political notion, to this miserable place, and its more despicable inhabitants.[722]

Finally, on Parga: there is another important conclusion that can be drawn from the cession, directly related to the place of the islands as an 'observatory to the whole of Turkey'. First, Maitland's concerns about the inability of the Parguinotes to defend themselves in case of invasion, and the fact that it would need more than 'a mere garrison' to protect the town[723], show the ambivalence in the relationship between British authorities on the islands and the powerful Ali Pasha up until 1819, a point which is downplayed in relevant historiography.[724] Maintaining at least an entrepôt like the Ionian Islands, and a naval force to secure them, would give to the British an important advantage, allowing them to collect intelligence and to communicate between both the pasha and the Porte.

Alternatively, should the British have maintained a garrison in the mainland they would have met with unprecedented difficulties. As Maitland wrote to Bathurst, 'either a very short space of time must have undergone the disgrace of ceding it, or embarked ourselves in a

[721] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, f. 50b.
[722] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, p. 51a.
[723] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, p. 49b.
[724] For example, Fleming, *The Muslim Bonaparte, passim.*

system of what I may truly call, Asiatic Polities; similar to what which has so long prevailed in our possessions in the East'.[725] Maitland's concerns on the strategic place of Parga have stemmed from his colonial service as a governor in Ceylon or Madras, and the 'corrosive effects' that local elites had on British authority.[726]

Lastly, the cession of Parga created problems in housing, provisions and, of course, personal distress to the refugees.[727] The issue raised a significant problem in the form of the integration of the refugees into Ionian society. Recordings of Parguinotes, and naturalizations that the Ionian State offered to them, followed previous practices of information collection, as mentioned above. By 1827, for example, Parguinotes made up 22% of the population of Corfu not originating from the island.[728] Grants of land were offered to them, and the British government intended to grant them 'a large additional sum beyond there which they have received for their property in Parga'.[729] According to Maitland, the refugees had become 'very fat, well fed, and rich – they have made an advantageous sale of their property, and the ready money they have got, in a country where it is very scarce, enables them to domineer and command in these islands to a great degree, where they have taken out of the hands of the Corfiotes, a great deal of the little trade they had and these latter are …, and the Parganots laugh at every body, particularly at their zealous British advocates'.[730] These reports were of course exaggerated, and much less convincing to justify the cession of Parga, other than Maitland's conduct. His comments on the 'fat and rich' Parguinotes seemed to be supported by another author who wrote on the islands, Tertius Kendrick: 'the Parguenotes are brigands both by inclination and trade; and, whenever an opportunity offers, directly avail themselves of it; seemingly disdainful of improving the natural advantages accorded to their territory by the bounteous hand of Nature. … Why Parga came to be a nest of banditti and villains, can be accounted for by the open manner in which all who fled from Ali Pacha were received by the

[725] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, p. 52a.
[726] Benton, *Rage for Order,* p. 8.
[727] TNA CO 136/14, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 24 January 1820, p. 17b.
[728] Kosmatou, 'Population and geographical mobility', p. 361.
[729] TNA CO 136/12, to Maitland, Palace of Corfu, 2 October 1819, pp. 231a-b.
[730] TNA CO 136/14, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 24 January, 1820, p. 17a.

natives'.[731] Nevertheless, the majority of these 'very great rogues' and 'very fat' Parguinotes were filing complaints about living in absolute poverty in 1837, and many of them had become beggars to survive. The refugees faced problems in receiving their compensation as late as the 1850s.[732]

[731] Kendrick, *The Ionian Islands*, pp. 44-45.
[732] Gekas, *Xenocracy*, pp. 120-121.

Conclusion

Clearly, as previous historical works on the islands have suggested, the Constitution of 1817 provided a basis for the future political and constitutional development of the Ionian Islands as a British protectorate. But as this chapter argued, Maitland's system was created before the constitution, and under the formidable governor's authority: the press was censored and the commissioner dissolved the Senate, reconvening it with persons more friendly to him, while keeping the Senators under close surveillance and Ionian political bodies under tight control. Maitland, who had already acquired significant experience from the colonies, was already familiar with local 'intrigues' and Mediterranean politics. But at the same time, he was too confident in his ability to transform Ionian society in his image, by 'ameliorating the lower orders' and by establishing a loyal aristocracy through the Order of St. Michael and St. George. The consequences of this were the exclusion of a significant portion of the nobility from power, the disruption of Britain's steady sources of information from wartime due to the marginalization of the English party, and the stifling of public opinion as a result. Ironically, Maitland's interventions in Ionian political life did not allow for the very thing he claimed he aimed to build: a society liberated from Venetian corruption, intrigues and local 'vices'.

Finally, this chapter took issue with approaches emphasizing 'colonial governmentality', and a particular logic in governance that would differentiate between Maitland's personal involvement in governance and any independent state mechanism: regardless of political economy, or the ideology of separating Ionian society into economic divisions that British officials brought to the islands. In the period under study they were not willing to, or the circumstances did not allow them to, create a civil society free of patronage, corruption or the interventions of the governor.



GOUVERNEMENT
DES
ILES IONIENNES.

Passe-Port.

N.
229.

SIGNALEMENT.

âgée de 30. ans
taille de 1.50. centimètres;
cheveux blonds
front ordinaire
sourcils blonds
yeux bleus
nez moyen
bouche moyenne
barbe —
menton rond
visage rond
signes particuliers

Signature du Porteur:
Andrianna Zona
Stavrachi

EMPIRE FRANÇAIS.

AU NOM

DE S. M. L'EMPEREUR DES FRANÇAIS, ROI D'ITALIE,
PROTECTEUR DE LA CONFÉDÉRATION DU RHIN,
MÉDIATEUR DE LA CONFÉDÉRATION SUISSE &c. &c.

DONZELOT, Général de Division, Gouverneur-Général des Iles Ioniennes.

A tous Officiers civils et militaires chargés de maintenir l'ordre dans les différens Départemens de la France, et de faire respecter le nom Français chez l'Etranger,

Laissez passer librement Mme Andriana C. Zona née Stavrachi

native de Zante
demeurant à Corfou
allant à Zante
et donnez lui aide et protection en cas de besoin.

Le présent Passeport valable pour ce voyage

Au Quartier-Général à Corfou le vingt cinq May mil huit cens treize

Le Gouverneur-Général.
Donzelot

Scellé et contresigné;
Le Secrétaire
Dillon

Figure III: Ionian passport during second French administration, 1807-1809/1815 – TNA CO 136/1

Chapter 6: The end of illusion? The Santa Maura rebellion and the beginning of the Greek revolution, 1819-1822

After 1819, one rebellion followed another in the Ionian Islands and British officials dealt with a prolonged political crisis, whose peak was the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in the mainland in 1821, where this thesis ends. During this crisis British authorities became increasingly alienated from many Ionians across the social strata, with the cession of Parga being considered one reason, as many Greeks accused Maitland for giving up the town. British officials in the islands decided to deal with the revolutionaries in the mainland by proclaiming martial law. In the end, British officials managed to enforce 'public tranquility' but as this chapter argues, the circumstances that made the islands a protectorate had changed irrevocably.

Official anxieties, rumours and the rebellion in Santa Maura, 1819

As is mentioned in recent work on the islands, British officials indeed sought to influence Ionian society through a particular set of changes to the economy and politics, which bore similarities to projects elsewhere in the empire as well as in Britain. Besides an increase in the use of statistics and censuses, which were the recent legacy of the Napoleonic period, colonial officials sought to transform colonized societies and dependencies by implementing changes in local legal cultures and economies, encouraging a new legal order and political economy to emerge. In the islands, these tendencies were compatible with a process of systematizing the collection of information that had started at the turn of the nineteenth century, and which created a fertile ground for 'the construction of colonial modernity'.[733] But this project to construct colonial modernity was rarely homogenous. Aspects of British rule in the islands were indeed new, yet British officials dealt with contemporary problems in a characteristically 'traditional' way. Repressed social problems, generated by war and political transition in the

[733] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 35.

islands, re-emerged in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, when peace and relative stability was restored. Such were the origins of the crisis that began in 1819, starting with a peasant rebellion in Santa Maura.

Rural protest has been the subject of many interesting works in imperial historiography and anthropology, usually as a contest between colonized and colonizers.[734] Influenced by relevant debates in history and anthropology, works on the Ionian Islands have examined similar issues in symbolic forms of resistance and the 'war of words', such as the peasant rebellion that took place on the island of Santa Maura in 1819.[735] To some extent, the rebellion of 1819 has also concerned Greek historical literature.[736] Examining the period of *Anglokratia* as a whole, previous works have emphasized the anti-colonial context of the rebellion, but have neglected aspects of popular protest that were addressing older problems and class antagonisms which were apparent before British rule: for example, chronic indebtedness and the firm grip of moneylenders and landlords on the peasants. This thesis addresses these problems, and also examines significant continuities in peasant resistance since the Venetian era, considering similar debates in imperial historiography.[737] In this way, it examines peasant resistance not only as a challenge to colonial rule, but also as a (failed) attempt to establish lines of dialogue between distant rural areas and the central government. This chapter analyses the multiple levels on which this dialogue operated, and the ways in which British officials collected and processed information about the events that followed. The rebellion is worth describing here, as it illuminates crucial aspects of Ionian society which have not been examined yet in this thesis.

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[734] Richard Gott, *Britain's Empire. Resistance, Repression and Revolt* (London, 2011); James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak. Everyday Forms of Resistance* (New Haven and London, 1985).

[735] Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion*, pp. 102-105 or its older version: Gallant, 'Peasant Ideology and Excommunication for Crime in a Colonial Context: The Ionian Islands (Greece), 1817-1864', *Journal of Social History,* 23:3 (Spring, 1990), pp. 485-512; Calligas, 'The Rizospastai', pp. 40-43.

[736] Triantafilos Sklavenitis, 'H eksegersi ton chorikon tis Lefkadas to 1819' ['The rebellion of peasants of Lefkada in 1819'], *Lefkadotropio,* vol. 8, 2007, pp. 17-26; Mahairas, Konstantinos, *Lefkas ke Lefkadioi epi Agglikis Prostasias (1810-1864)* (Corfu, 1940) *[Lefkas and Lefkadians during British Protection (1810-1864)],* pp. 50-61.

[737] Jon E. Williams, '"A Thousand Countries to Go to": Peasants and Rulers in Late Eighteenth-Century Bengal', *Past & Present*, 189 (Nov. 2005), pp. 81-109; Eric Stokes, *The Peasant and the Raj. Studies in agrarian society and peasant rebellion in colonial India* (Cambridge, 2007 [1978]). I would like to thank Simon J. Potter for recommending me these works.

In 1819, the Anglo-Ionian state dealt with a direct challenge to its authority. As we saw before, Maitland's despotism may have imposed firm control over Ionian political bodies, but many villagers on the islands were still far out of reach of British troops and tax-collectors. Rural areas were also culturally distant from the seat of the state in Corfu, as the majority of the countryside consisted of a Greek-speaking population. This was especially true of mountainous islands like Lefkada. Moreover, with a great portion of the population being mobile seasonal workers, it was impossible to exert control without the aid of local collaboration.

As the expenses of the civil establishment of the Ionian State had to be paid out of the state's revenues, according to the Constitution of 1817, local constabularies were also assigned to collect revenues in Santa Maura, under instruction from the general government in Corfu. The Senate had approved a tax on the numerous flocks and herds of the island, in order to fund the dredging of a canal through the salt-flats of the northern part of the island.[738] The canal tax, as it was called, was intended to benefit local commerce and transportation, and answered local demands that had existed since the Septinsular government in 1806. However, when local constabularies came to the small village of Sfachiotes, in Lefkada, to collect the tax in September 1819, they found villagers taxed to the point of starvation following a bad harvest, and exasperated by rumours that they would be sent as militia to the West Indies.[739] Soon, the state officials sent to collect the tax were chased, and fled to a local monastery, where they were saved by the local priest.[740] Shortly afterwards, a British detachment under Colonel Frederick Stovin arrived at the village in order to prevent the situation escalating further. Stovin, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812, was the Resident in Santa Maura at the time.[741] The protesting peasants claimed that they had no quarrel with the British, but were in dispute with the local landlords who 'wanted to starve and make them poor'.[742]

[738] TNA CO 136/412, Stovin to Adam, 28 September 1819.
[739] TNA CO 136/412, Stovin to Adam, 28 September 1819.
[740] TNA CO 136/12, Adam to Maitland, 20 October 1819.
[741] Frederick Stovin (1783-1865) was an English war veteran. He had served in Ireland, Bremen and was at the famous capture of Copenhagen in 1807 and the Peninsular Campaign in 1808. By the time he became a Resident in the Ionian Islands he was commanding the 90th as a Lieutenant-Colonel and a knight in the Order of Bath (E. M. Lloyd, 'Sir Frederick Stovin', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), available online: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/26608 (January, 2015).
[742] Chiotis. *History of the Ionian State*, p. 210.

Stovin asked for the peasants to write down their demands in a petition, assuring them that it would be 'carefully examined' by the Ionian government.[743] The peasants' demands were written down by Count D' Orio and Thomasso Vaffea, two aristocrats who could translate the petition from Greek and who were trusted by the insurgents. Referring to Stovin, the petition started with the peasants acknowledging their respect for the 'august empire which deigns exclusively to protect them, and they protest themselves ready to shed the last drop of their blood to defend the government and their country in this island'.[744] The petitioners asked for a fair price on salt (which was the main export of Lefkadites), fairer rates of tax as the nobles were exploiting them, the replacement of constables from Corfu in Santa Maura with ones originating from the island, and to receive a proper education. Protection of their private property from seizure in the payment of debts, by the elites or moneylenders, was another important point. The local priest who acted as an intermediary between Stovin and the peasants warned the officer that the grievances of the peasants were real, and he should in 'due course of time' redress them, feeling that Stovin did not take the peasants' problems seriously.[745] After that the British force left, asking for reinforcements from Corfu at the same time.

From the beginning, Stovin wrote to Frederick Adam (also a Scot), who was deputy for Maitland in his absence in Malta, about the seriousness of the situation: 'the people [had] some ground [for] complaint, and that their distress arose in some measure to satisfy a lavish expenditure on some very worthless functionaries of the government', meaning the exorbitant expenses for the newly built Palace of St. Michael and St. George in Corfu. The officer noted that 'not one person bearing the reputation … of the gentleman' offered to accompany him from the town with a view to conciliating with the insurgents, which proved 'the little connection or kind feeling … between the People and higher classes.[746] His observations, however, fell on deaf ears. Stovin's conduct in the rebellion was later praised by Maitland, but

[743] TNA CO 136/412, Adam to Maitland, Corfu, 20 November 1819, p. 468.
[744] The petition can be found at Hansard T. C., *Parliamentary debates*, New Series, **V**, 7 June 1821, 'Papers relating to the Ionian Islands viz. Disturbances at Santa Maura; and Correspondence respecting Parganote Emigrants', no. 1, p. 7.
[745] TNA CO 136/412, G. Deposition of the Protopapa, 23 October 1819.
[746] TNA CO 136/412, Stovin to Adam, Santa Maura, 28 September 1819.

his observations were not taken into account. The situation quickly escalated, and the rebellion spread across the island to other villages. A British detachment was forced to retreat by the insurgents, and the armed villagers entered the town of Lefkada.

Causing panic among the middle and upper classes of the town, the peasants burnt down some of the houses of the supporters of the canal tax, and attacked the municipal building where taxes were kept. Soon, however, a larger detachment of 350 soldiers arrived from Corfu, with Frederick Adam at its head, and quelled the rebellion.[747] British officials, and Stovin in particular, received the gratitude of the 'citizens of Lefkada', who sent him a letter offering him a gold medal of honour 'for his bravery by which he drove away the villagers who flooded the city, with the purpose to destroy the citizens'.[748] Ironically, the aristocrats who had been trusted by the armed peasants to write down the initial petition, were also included as signatories of the letter, as concerned citizens of Lefkada. The rebellion in Lefkada was the first direct challenge to British authority in the islands, causing a great number of British casualties.[749] Adam declared martial law for the first time during *Anglokratia*, which came into force on all the Ionian Islands and was prolonged until May 1820.[750] Nine of the insurgents were arrested and four of them were hanged as ringleaders.

How did the rebellion affect British rule on the islands? For an island of 16,000 inhabitants, the impact of the rebellion on Britain was great. *The Times* estimated that 6,000 men were under arms, with women playing a very active role in the rebellion. It is, however, unlikely that almost 40 percent of the island's population was in fact armed![751] But as the perception of Ionians as an armed population was a recurring anxiety among British officials, it is very possible that newspapers like *The Times* were receiving their information from official sources. The majority of the insurgents fled to mainland Greece, and some of them later took part in the Greek Revolution of 1821.[752] From the time that the rebellion was crushed, Maitland

[747] TNA CO 136/12, Adam to Maitland, 21 November 1819, p. 471.
[748] Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State*, p. 220.
[749] The number is estimated at about 200 dead, but is probably exaggerated. The number of dead, however, should be high due to the exposed position of the British troops (Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State,* p. 213).
[750] Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State,* p. 220.
[751] *The Times*, 8 Dec. 1819.
[752] TNA CO 136/1270, Adam to Travers, St Maura, 20 October 1819, p. 217.

wrote to Goulburn regarding his suspicions about the real instigators, mentioning a particular individual and implying that Capodistrias was 'a considerable sharer in the occasion'.[753]

The rebellion alarmed the authorities: martial law was proclaimed, and the size of the permanent garrison was increased from 307 in 1818 to 495 troops in Lefkada in 1819, until authorities considered the crisis over and ended martial law in May 1820.[754] British officials saw the whole 'incident' as instigated by external forces instead of as a result of poverty, lack of education and indebtedness. Hume mentioned in the British parliament later, for example, that there were 45 people who were found incapable of paying their debts.[755] Claims that the insurrection was instigated by an external source were repeated by Maitland to Ionian Senators in one of his speeches to the Ionian Senate.[756] In one of his earlier instructions, after the rebellion, Maitland wrote to Adam that to examine the causes more closely would force the British to endeavour into 'slow and uncertain grounds', meaning that inquiries into the origins of the insurrection would be lengthy, and have a small chance of ever getting to the bottom of things.[757] Adam was convinced of Capodistrias' involvement.

In retrospect, Capodistrias most probably knew about the political turmoil in Lefkada, but there has not been any evidence that he participated in any way. The only evidence is circumstantial: he was present at the time in Corfu for personal reasons, which by itself hardly constitutes evidence of his involvement in the rebellion. This, however, gave sufficient justification to British officials like Adam and Maitland. After interrogating the culprits of the rebellion, Adam wrote to Maitland that Capodistrias' name was 'in everybody's mouth here; and rumours of changes soon to take place more spread', despite him 'marrying his brother to a Santa Mauriote', implying that Capodistrias could easily be the instigator of this change.[758] Believing that these 'uncertain grounds' represented the entanglement of the dense network of connections and misinformation between the elites and the peasants, Maitland was more

[753] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 17 October 1819, p. 208.
[754] Hennen, *Sketches,* p. 398.
[755] Hansard T.C., *Parliamentary debates,* New Series, **V,** 7 June 1821, p. 1135.
[756] Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State*, pp. 15-16.
[757] TNA CO 136/1085, Maitland to Adam, Corfu, 22 October 1819, pp. 229-230.
[758] TNA CO 136/12, Adam to Maitland, Corfu, 20 October 1819, p. 230a.

certain of Capodistrias' involvement 'in direct hostility' to British interests.[759] As for the canal, it took 30 more years for it to be completed.[760]

The aftermath of the rebellion: public inquiries, rumours and official anxieties

Close inspection, led by Adam, followed. Public enquiries were established in order to collect information about the causes of the rebellion, although with very clear instructions not to enter into 'slow and uncertain grounds', from before these interrogations even started. Instead of delving in any way into the actual standards of living in rural areas or the legal context of debt payment, Adam's inquiry was into the connections of the aristocrats involved, all pointing to Capodistrias.

Following the insurgency, a strong sentiment against British rule spread across rural communities on the island, and Santa Mauriotes were the first to fight as volunteers in the Greek Revolution two years later. If sentiments were not clearly anti-British at the outset of the protest, they certainly became so thereafter. Enquiries met with local resistance when many peasants who were interrogated concealed crucial information from the authorities. The inspector of the village, for example, was due to be executed for inciting the people of his village 'to take up arms', but the executioner of the island refused and 'neither threat nor reward could induce him to act'. The British had to bring a hangman from Corfu to execute the inspector.[761] Village priests played a crucial role in the insurrection, as the 'leading priest' was arrested and hanged for giving false testimony.[762] The insurgents who fled the islands for the mainland had their property confiscated.

When interrogated, the villagers repeatedly referenced the long-lasting economic and social issues in the islands, referring to their exclusion and exploitation by the upper classes. They spoke about the daily struggle for survival, problems of scarcity and low incomes, high

[759] TNA CO 136/1085, Maitland to Adam, Corfu, 23 October 1819, p. 234.
[760] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 67.
[761] TNA CO 136/12, Adam to Maitland, 20 October 1819, p. 226.
[762] TNA CO 136/12, Adam to Maitland, 20 October 1819, p. 227.

taxation and their aspirations for themselves and their children. They 'were happy before with taxes and laws … during the rule of Venice, and the French and the Russians,' because their former rulers did not 'annoy' them with unreasonable demands: they knew that they 'could not handle more'. Although they found the construction of the canal 'beneficial', they suggested that there could be fairer ways to pay for it than by levying heavy taxes on them. They also asked why there could not be a 'public school … in a monastery,' so that it could be 'accessible to all inhabitants' of Santa Maura, even the poor.

But Adam would have none of it. In the end, he wrote to Maitland that 'nothing transpired which could at all lead to the conclusion that the new taxes were in any degree unpopular, at least among the peasantry'.[763] Adam was not eager to examine the case more thoroughly. More misinformation followed, when British officials started to speculate about external factors, and perhaps the role of Russia and her agents in the islands. Frederick Adam, in particular, was convinced that the main instigator was Capodistrias, based on the latter's visit to Santa Maura for entirely personal reasons before the insurrection. When the 'business of Santa Maura' came at an end, Maitland wrote to Henry Goulburn – Bathurst's Under Secretary – on the causes of the 'tumult', appraising at the same time Stovin's conduct. Informing Goulburn so that he would contradict any 'idle rumours in London' about the disturbances, Maitland confirmed Bathurst's suspicions that instigators of Ionian origin, working for Russian interests, were to blame, without 'the smallest doubt'.[764] Capodistrias' name was mentioned frequently in Maitland's correspondence to the Colonial Office: 'I have every day an opportunity of knowing there is no engine of any kind that is not now at work to poison the minds of the people here, and to convince them that an immediate change is going to take place in favour of the Russian party; and I have no doubt all this proceeds solely and alone from the intrigues of Capo D' Istria himself'.[765] In the following months, Maitland concluded that all these were attempts to 'awaken the old Russian interest', separate from social or political

[763] TNA CO 136/412, Adam to Maitland, Corfu, 20 November 1819, p. 468.
[764] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 19 October 1819, p. 208a-b.
[765] Quote in TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 25 October 1819, p. 237. Ioannis Capodistrias came from a noble family in Corfu and was at the same time the Russian foreign minister. He was a particularly known figure amongst European courts and diplomatic circles (Vick, *The Congress of Vienna*; C.M. Woodhouse, *Capodistria: The founder of Greek Independence* (London, 1973).

problems.[766] It was a while before the canal tax was withdrawn, or any concerns of the villagers regarding the excesses of the elites were addressed.

Official ignorance or indifference were certainly not unique to the islands. Comparisons with developments in Britain in the post-Napoleonic era can be drawn here: in 1819, the year of the rebellion in Santa Maura, Manchester had also become a scene of social and economic crisis with the Peterloo massacre.[767] As Boyd Hilton wrote, 'for the political nation as a whole fear of the mob outweighed acknowledgment that on this occasion the local authorities had overreacted. Ministers were privately appalled by their 'precipitation', but endorsed their actions publicly'.[768] In the Ionian Islands, however, the authorities were dealt with differently: the Regent who abandoned his post to take refuge in the fortress was removed from office.[769] What was perceived as an attempt to overthrow British administration, allowing Maitland to declare martial law, convinced Bathurst that 'no alternative is left to him but that of either abandoning the protection of the Ionian States, or asserting his determination unalterably to maintain that authority which the Treaty of 1815 and the charter have conferred upon him'. London approved of Maitland's conduct on the islands.[770] In many ways, the problems of peasants in Lefkada constituted a lower priority for British officials compared to Corfu, and British officials would soon enter into a vortex of disinformation across the Adriatic with little legitimacy in the countryside. In a letter sent to Goulburn, the commissioner mentioned that he received information a couple of months earlier from a captain called Smith, who was stationed in the island of Lissa in the Adriatic, that there was 'at Santa Maura an insurrection, or that one would soon take place'. Moreover, the captain informed him that the British consul, Henry Kane, a native of Ancona, 'was at the time absent in some attempt to organize the insurrection'. The commissioner's suspicions of Kane's perceived involvement stemmed from the beginning of his administration, and were aimed particularly at consuls. Maitland concluded in his letter: 'this is all extraordinary and tends to strengthen the idea that the disturbance

[766] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 14 November 1819, p. 239.
[767] I would like to thank Erik de Lange for reminding me of the Peterloo massacre.
[768] Hilton, *A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People*, p. 252.
[769] Regents were municipal authorities, not to be confused with Residents, who were British officials and governors of each island. TNA CO 136/304, Bathurst to Maitland, Downing Street, 4 February 1820.
[770] TNA CO 136/304, Bathurst to Maitland, Downing Street, 3 February 1820.

arose from no tax in respect to the canal, but was owing to the attempts which have been so generally lately made by all the adherents of the Russian government in these islands to stir up the people by every species of misrepresentation and misstatement'.[771]

Parliamentary criticism of Maitland's conduct

During the period that this study examines, Parliamentary criticism began to press the British government to obtain information on the colonial governors' conduct in the colonies. For example, from 1817 onwards, requests were made of the Colonial Office to deliver almanacs and lists of civil and military offices from the colonies, with detailed dates of appointment, methods, and salaries, a process which became formalized after 1822 as the 'Blue Books of Statistics'.[772] Parliamentary criticism, pressing the government to cut costs and to minimize the armed forces, became increasingly effective overall.[773] The same was true of British affairs in the colonies. Unlike economic lobbies, public opinion and parliament were oscillating between pride and embarrassment about Britain's colonies, depending on the political parties in Parliament. At the same time, colonial governors abroad had significant free rein from the Colonial Office in the early-nineteenth century, in the fashion of 'proconsular despotism' as Bayly had shown.[774] On the other hand, even very powerful political figures were not immune from criticism: for instance, Henry Dundas was impeached in the midst of the battle of Trafalgar in 1805, on the charge of misappropriating public funds. In order to respond effectively to parliamentary criticism, and to secure personal networks and patronage, control of information from the colonies was of primary importance to British officials, both in London and the colonies.

In the case of the Ionian Islands, it was also in the period between 1819 and 1824 when Maitland's conduct would be questioned, and the relationship between Britain and the islands

[771] TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 14 November 1819, p. 239b-240a.
[772] Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections*, p. 171.
[773] Thompson, *Earl Bathurst*, p. 109.
[774] Bayly, *Imperial Meridian,* pp. 194, 195.

became clearer. Yet his free rein was constantly negotiated with Britain and his conduct was often in question. Accusations of despotism in the early nineteenth century could endanger colonial appointments. Criticisms of Maitland's despotism often came from inside the colonial establishment. For example, in the islands his authoritarianism made William Henry resign his post as a member of the Supreme Court of Justice on the islands in 1820. He felt that Maitland was 'obsessed with holding authority over the Ionian State and acted as a law unto himself'.[775]

His opponents in Parliament, like Hume and Monck, pressed for a commission of inquiry in the islands in 1821, in order to investigate allegations concerning the commissioner's abuse of authority.[776] Apart from parliamentary criticism, we saw how Capodistrias had become a great adversary of Maitland, especially associated with the rise of Russian influence.[777] Often, there is a tendency in Ionian historiography to treat the clash between the two men as a diplomatic rivalry, the aftermath of the Treaty of Paris and the European 'balance of power'. Yet it was indicative of the way that the British saw the Ionians, and how they sought to control the flow of information from the islands. In this sense, state surveillance, foreign policy and the production of colonial knowledge in regards to the islands were almost indistinguishable. Capodistrias' movements, for example, were monitored as early as 1816, as well as those of his 'creatures' activities in the islands.

After the Constitution of 1817, Capodistrias protested that Maitland's powers over Ionian political bodies were too great, and that the commissioner's frequent interventions constituted abuses of the Treaty of Paris. The Corfiote politician regularly received news from his extensive network of correspondents in the islands and the mainland, including the poet and writer in the *Edinburgh Review,* Ugo Foscolo, as well as the later-famous Greek general, Theodoros Kolokotronis. Compiled after personal observation, and with information he received from his contacts, Capodistrias travelled to London and submitted a memorandum which outlined all his points to Bathurst in August and forwarded a copy in October 1819. In the

[775] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 120.
[776] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 110-144.
[777] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', pp. 123-129.

memorandum, Capodistrias wrote at length to Bathurst about Maitland's abuse of authority.[778] Maitland in turn exchanged lengthy correspondence with Bathurst about Capodistrias' accusations.

The Colonial Office tried to keep discussions with Capodistrias confidential, and Maitland was never really threatened. Bathurst responded to Capodistrias officially in February 1820, after a long delay of many months.[779] The former dismissed the latter's accusations, pointing to the fact that any defects of British 'protection' owed to the character of the people and the recent history of the islands: 'the great evil with which the Ionian States have had to contend has been the rapid succession of different systems of government … hence the unsettled habits of the people, and the perpetual recurrence of cabal and intrigue, which your excellency may remember were not less deplored when under Russian protection …'.[780]

According to Bathurst, any arbitrary measures against the Ionians were justified due to their character and recent history. Capodistrias' charges were dismissed as misinformed. Essentially, for the Colonial Office it was Capodistrias' word against Maitland's. The real issue at stake, however, was not the charges against Maitland's conduct specifically, but the potential charges of a violation of the Treaty of Paris by Emperor Alexander of Russia. Such accusations, ministers in London feared, would bring Russian intervention, with complications which were difficult to predict. Writing to Castlereagh a month after the charges, Bathurst seemed to confirm Maitland's fears about Capodistrias' role in this.[781] Castlereagh and Bathurst tried to keep this confidential. Even Capodistrias was put under close surveillance by British officials, with Frederick North, the previous commander of Ceylon and part of Maitland's circle, reporting on the Corfiote's movements to the commissioner. A copy of Bathurst's reply was forwarded to Maitland by Goulburn, cautioning him 'not to make it known to any person in the

[778] And not in July 1818 as Paschalidi mentions (Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 124). See Chiotis, *History of the Ionian State*, pp. 205-206; TNA CO 136/304, Colonial Department to Capodistrias, London, 19 February 1820.
[779] TNA CO 136/304, Colonial Department to Capodistrias, London, 19 February 1820.
[780] TNA CO 136/304, Colonial Department to Capodistrias, London, 19 February 1820.
[781] Vane, *Memoirs,* XII, Bathurst to Castlereagh, Cirencester, 3 September 1819, p. 145.

islands', to keep this communication 'confidential' overall.[782] But research has shown at length that Capodistrias was no revolutionary.[783] Ideologically, he was a conservative and not a supporter of violent insurrection against Turkey. Reflecting the views of many Greeks at the time, he believed in 'moral improvement' first; that Greeks should improve themselves by education, before any plans for independence were considered.[784] He was even asked to take part in a patriotic secret organization, the Philiki Etairia, between 1816 and 1820, requests which he rejected.[785]

Of course, it would be an exaggeration to view state surveillance, or information collection in the islands more broadly, only through the lens of Maitland's convictions about Capodistrias. Either way, Maitland had established an effective police system, later characterized by his opponents in Parliament as 'a system of revolting espionage', where 'no one durst speak his mind'.[786] But Maitland's anxiety lay in his fears about the 'impenetrable scene of intrigue' consisting of disaffected Ionian nobles and opponents of his administration, a network whose leader was thought to be Capodistrias. Seditious correspondence was easier to control in the Mediterranean islands where Greek, and specifically the Ionian diaspora, constituted a significant percentage. In any case, the anxiousness to trace the source of 'falsifications' that could be used to harm British authority in the islands, or in fact present evidence for Russian intervention, is evident in Maitland's dispatches from 1815 until his death in 1824.

Despite Maitland's suspicions about Capodistrias, less than six months from the end of the rebellion, the commissioner became aware of the wider implications of political turmoil in the region: 'looking at the situation', Maitland wrote to Bathurst, 'Santa Maura was actually in state of rebellion and convulsion'.[787] The centralizing tendencies of the commissioner would

[782] 'Confidential' was emphasized by Goulburn. TNA CO 136/304, Goulburn to Maitland, Downing Street, 21 February 1820.
[783] C.M. Woodhouse, 'Kapodistrias and the Philiki, Etairia 1814-21' in Richard Clogg (ed.), *The Struggle For Greek Independence* (London, 1973), p. 114.
[784] Woodhouse, 'Kapodistrias and the Philiki Etairia', p. 106.
[785] Woodhouse, 'Kapodistrias and the Philiki Etairia', p. 106.
[786] Hansard T.C., *Parliamentary debates,* New Series, **V**, 7 June 1821, p. 1139.
[787] TNA CO 136/14, Maitland to Bathurst, Palace Malta, 2 February 1820, pp. 23a-b.

only alienate the majority of Ionian society further, potentially multiplying the number of disaffected people joining later Greek political nationalism. At the same time, the case of Parga had shown how Maitland enjoyed practical immunity, and protection from the British government.

The cession of Parga and monopoly of information

Parliamentary criticism was, perhaps, more severe in the case of Parga, 'one of the darkest blots upon our national reputation' as Hume called the cession.[788] The previous chapter looked at the cession of the town as a humanitarian and demographic crisis on the islands. It also examined Maitland's considerations of the strategic value of the town in regard to British presence in the region. The case of Parga shows that Maitland's conduct was in line with Bathurst's and Goulburn's opinions: 'I press His Lordship to permit this to be public, *to a certain extent*, for I constantly think the best way to pave the way for the introduction of a complete and useful exposition of the whole affair of Parga'.[789] In fact, parliamentary criticism of his conduct by his opponents, Hume and Charles Monck – and particularly the fact that De Bosset's 'misrepresentations' of Maitland would be published – hardened Maitland's stance even more, heightening his recourse to stereotypical characterisations in official correspondence: responding to claims that 4,000 Parguinotes were starving on an island for example, Maitland wrote to Goulburn about 2,700 'high minded Parganotes, but in truth very great rogues'.[790]

As was already mentioned, news of the cession of Parga was leaked to the British public by a Swiss officer who had served for in the British army for 24 years, Charles De Bosset. This officer is known in Ionian historiography and the Ionian Islands mostly because of his public works during his short tenure as a Resident in Cephalonia, but is less well-known for his role in making the case of Parga public.[791] After the cession of Parga was decided, De Bosset was sent

[788] Hansard T. C., *Parliamentary debates*, New Series, **VII**, 14 May 1822, p. 576.
[789] My italics. TNA CO 136/12, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 14 November 1819, pp. 240a-b.
[790] TNA CO 136/14, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 24 January, 1820, p. 16b.
[791] But Holland, *Blue-Water Empire*, pp. 33, 34.

to the town by Maitland at the head of 300 troops, with the task of informing the inhabitants that they could emigrate to the islands should they chose to do so.[792] His testimony was thus one of personal observation. Nevertheless, he was soon relieved of command of Parga, as he was acting in opposition to British views. In fact, he was replaced by Maitland's own nephew, James Maitland.[793] De Bosset wrote in one of the editions of his *Proceedings in Parga and the Ionian Islands* that 'very extraordinary exertions were made to obstruct its circulation, and prevent the diffusion of truths contained in it. But the impartiality of a British public defeated these interested efforts, in spite of the influence of those with whom they originated … a second edition of this work has indeed been for some time demanded; but, in deference to superior authority, it has been withheld', and De Bosset referred to consistent anonymous attacks in the *Quarterly Review* seeking *'*to traduce his character and destroy that of my work'.[794]

Perhaps the substance of the case De Bosset brought before the British public was encapsulated in his words: 'it should not be forgotten that the issue is between a man holding one of the highest offices under the government, enjoying some of its greatest distinctions, and strongly supported by family and parliamentary influence, and an isolated officer, who, for the strict and conscientious discharge of his duty, has become the object of the most unaccountable and inveterate persecution, instead of receiving, in recompense for his services, civil as well as military, the means of enjoying an honourable retirement'.[795] De Bosset's sympathy for the Parguinotes was genuine; he risked too much by making the case public. What this case of early-nineteenth century colonial governance shows, and what was essential in De Bosset's proceedings, was the key role of the British governor. In the case of Parga for example, Maitland did not act like he was subordinate to Bathurst but rather his acquaintance.

Maitland's anxiety derived also from the fact that news of the case came to Britain via communication channels that he could not control, through 'Milan, Florence, and Naples,

[792] De Bosset, *Parga and the Ionian Islands* (1821), p. x.
[793] De Bosset, *Parga and the Ionian Islands* (1821), p. 296.
[794] De Bosset, *Parga and the Ionian Islands* (1821), *p*. v.
[795] De Boseet, *Parga and the Ionian Islands* (1821), pp. xiii-xiv.

where discontented Italians and renegade Greeks misrepresent and distort everything'.[796] Above all, the whole case of Parga, for the High Commissioner, was a matter of 'misinformation' of the British public: 'There has been no question brought before the public within my memory, which has been more completely misunderstood, or more generally misrepresented than the measures adopted by His Majesty's government in regard to the cession of Parga to the Sublime Porte'.[797] Exaggerations and misrepresentations in regards to the actual 'value, its mean, and its capacities' of Parga had been characteristic in the proceedings of the case for Maitland. The commissioner also referred specifically to De Bosset's accusations regarding Parga. These, he claimed, had been the products of 'a great degree of pernicious industry … employed to mislead the public mind'. On the other hand, 'there has not been even the most trifling attempt to detect the fallacies published and the misstatements which have been sent forth'.[798] Maitland concluded his letter to Bathurst, 'that the Policy which dictated the cession of Parga, was wise in itself, and necessary under the existing circumstances, - that the arrangements for the accomplishment of that object originated in a principle of humanity,- that they were conducted uniformly throughout in a spirit of conciliation and equity'.[799] As Paschalidi mentioned, the British government put 'everyone … confined within a labyrinth set of 'incorrect representations' or 'erroneous and insidious' quotations'' with Britain possessing the monopoly on information, especially in her colonial affairs.[800]

Furthermore, the Parga case shows the importance of newspapers, rising in their significance to scandals and politics. Contrary to information coming from government insiders, colonial governors often rejected newspaper reports as ignorant and prejudiced: as Laidlaw has shown, governors whose reputations were perceived to be under threat, restricted the press during the 1820s in the Cape, New South Wales or Van Diemen's Land.[801] Maitland's censorship of the press in Corfu, and his attempts along with Bathurst to control information about the Parga case, is not much different. Therefore, the case of Parga can also be studied in the

[796] TNA CO 136/14, Maitland to Goulburn, Corfu, 24 January 1820, p. 17a.
[797] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, f. 39a.
[798] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, f. 40a.
[799] BL Heytesbury Papers, Add MS 41530, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 24 November 1819, f. 41.
[800] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 129.
[801] Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections,* p. 118.

broader context of parliamentary pressures taking place during the 1820s between Britain and the colonies.

The islands a hub of intelligence-collection, 1820-1822

By 1820, circumstances had changed dramatically in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans since the British took over the Ionian Islands. The Serbian revolution in 1817 had won against the Ottoman Empire and resulted in the establishment of the Principality of Serbia. In 1820, Ypsilanti, a famous Greek revolutionary and a senior Russian officer, established a press in the city of Kishinev (in today's Moldova), inhabited by numerous members of the Greek diaspora. From there, Greeks maintained correspondence and circulated patriotic proclamations across the Ottoman Empire.[802]

By occupying the islands, the British had acquired a significant advantage in information collection both in the islands as well as the wider region. Maitland was at the hub of information collection in the eastern Mediterranean. As during the Napoleonic Wars, British officials received information which was forwarded to the Colonial Office mainly through two channels: one from the British embassy in Vienna and the other from Ali Pasha's court in Ioannina. This section examines how the circulation of information inflamed official anxieties, causing misinformation and further broadening the gap between the Ionian society and British officials. The communication channel between Vienna and Corfu played a crucial role in the negotiation between the British and the Austrians in terms of surveillance and exchange of information on revolutionary movements.

It is well-known to historians that the period after 1815 marked the 'age of revolutions'. British officials in the islands were no less preoccupied with Russian influence and Ionian plots, even more than state officials across Europe were preoccupied with revolutionary movements, with Austria's Metternich among the first.[803] Plots that were discovered by state officials were

[802] Richard Stites, *The Four Horsemen. Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe* (Oxford, 2014), p. 199.
[803] On Metternich's 'security state', see David Laven, 'Law and Order in Habsburg Venetia 1814-1835', *The Historical Journal*, 39:2 (1996), pp. 383-403; Alan Sked, 'Metternich's enemies of the threat from below' in Al. Sked (ed.),

perceived to be parts of a large 'directory', operating at a universal level. By now, historical research has shown convincingly that while secret organizations and societies existed, and plots did indeed take place, their aims were more conflicting and their organization poor.[804]

In Vienna, Metternich exchanged information with the British ambassador, Charles Vane (Castlereagh's half-brother), who forwarded Maitland information 'relative to the state of affairs in the Ionian Islands'.[805] 'Unfounded rumours' and conflicting reports about Russia's role came to Vienna from regions under Ottoman rule with significant Greek populations, which were confirmed by supposedly more credible information in Corfu.[806] As we saw from the case of the rebellion in Santa Maura, Maitland did not need convincing about the existence of 'a deep laid system which is in agitation and is aided by the Greeks, to place not only all the Greek islands but Moldavia and Wallachia in the hands of the Russians'.[807] 'Amongst other things', Vane continued,

> Prince Metternich mentions a secret interview which … the Turkish charge d' Affaires at Paris (who is a Greek) had with count Capo d' Istria ____, which however he concealed from his government (Prince Metternich … this from a letter which was intercepted in September last). On which occasion advice was given for the Greeks to temporize for the present, that the time was not far distant when they would enjoy all the wished other circumstances in this letter prove an active agency to be on foot, but His Highness did not wish to produce it alone.[808]

In terms of British governance in the islands, Maitland's suspicions about Ionian 'intriguers' and of Capodistrias in the background of all political and social turbulence, were not merely stereotypical characteristics, nor signs of Maitland's personal 'vendetta' with the

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Europe's balance of power 1815-1848 (London, 1979); Donald E. Emerson, *Metternich and the political police. Security and subversion in the Hapsburg Monarchy (1815-1830)* (The Hague, 1968); Arthur G. Haas, *Metternich, reorganization and nationality 1813-1818. A story of foresight and frustration in the rebuilding of the Austrian Empire* (Wiesbaden, 1963).

[804] Sked, 'Metternich's enemies', p. 165.

[805] TNA CO 136/429, Vane to Maitland, Vienna, 19 February 1820.

[806] TNA CO 136/429, Vane to Maitland, Vienna, 19 February 1820.

[807] TNA CO 136/429, Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh dated Vienna, 19 February 1820, p. 97a-b.

[808] TNA CO 136/429, Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Stewart to Viscount Castlereagh dated Vienna, 19 February 1820, p. 98a-b.

Corfiote politician. In any case, it seems that Capodistrias was not exactly the all-time favourite of Europe's leaders: Metternich referred to him as the 'scourge of Europe' and to Castlereagh he was a 'mongrel minister'.[809] Ironically, it appears the Corfiote was the least revolutionary in a country that was in a state of revolutionary fervour. Certainly, the conspiracies were not pure fiction, and they have been a subject of discussion among historians for years. On the Ionian Islands, many connections were established with Italy through Greek connections in the universities. Rumours, exaggerated official anxieties and often highly speculative information created a sense similar to 'information panics', as historians have described. Maitland himself was regularly receiving information, particularly through consular networks in mainland Greece. For example, in May 1821 he learned from Philip Green, the British consul in Patras, that 'there is no doubt of a general insurrection in the Morea'[810].

Corfu was the nodal point of information networks from Vienna, but also from Constantinople and Ali Pasha's court in Ioannina. As is already mentioned, William Meyer was the main link to the mainland, and to Ali Pasha in particular, for both the British on the islands and in London. As was mentioned before, Meyer was a Consul-General at the time, and a resident for many years in the region. He travelled between the islands and the pasha's court in Ioannina, Epirus on a regular basis, so he had first-hand information for the High Commissioner. Being able to speak and read Greek, Meyer had good local knowledge of the area and its people, hence he often corresponded with Maitland, as well as Strangford Canning in Constantinople, on various matters of local interest. Above all, Maitland had a knowledgeable 'interpreter' of the politics of the Porte as well as of Ali Pasha, in close proximity to the islands. For example, collecting information in the pasha's court, he sent information to British officials about the growing opposition and 'disposition to act' among Greek officials employed in the pasha's service, whose sentiments were shared by many in Albania and the Morea.[811]

Occasionally, even experienced British officials with a long service in the region completely misinterpreted the collected intelligence. It was from Meyer that London learned

[809] Stites, *The Four Horsemen*, p. 192.
[810] TNA CO 136/18, Green to Maitland, New Broad Street, 2 May 1821.
[811] TNA FO 78/103, Meyer to Strangford Canning, Zante, 27 December, 1820, p. 42b.

about the existence of *Philiki Etairia* (*Friendly Society* or *Society of Friends*), the secret society bearing resemblance to secret societies in Spain or Italy, and 'whose object is the liberation of Greece from the Turkish yoke'. In the original it is written as *Etareia*, and Meyer mentioned to Castlereagh that it had been in existence for many years, and 'it appears to have been reorganized after the subversion of the late revolutionary government in France in 1814'.[812] In fact, one of the founders of Etairia was initiated as a freemason in the island of Santa Maura. It is most likely that Maitland learnt the information from Meyer. However, it is entirely possible the consul confused the secret organization with a cultural institution devoted to the promotion of classical studies that was established in Athens a year prior with a similar name, *Philomousos Etaireia*. Or with another organization which was entirely different, also with the same name (Rigas Feraios). Ironically, the founder of the educational institution was Capodistrias. This confusion about the Corfiote politician's actual role in Ionian politics has been emphasized in previous historical work.[813]

Ionian neutrality, martial law and Maitland's negotiation with London

In March 1821, a general uprising broke out in the mainland and Frederick Adam declared Ionian neutrality in June of the same year.[814] Many Ionians went to the mainland to fight as volunteers, and even the islands were in a constant state of uprising. After a boat of Muslim refugees tried to land in Zante, the passengers were slaughtered in retaliation for Ottoman atrocities against the Greek population. For Maitland, the episode represented a premeditated attack and not an isolated act of violence. He declared martial law, as he had done after the rebellion in Santa Maura, and circulated a proclamation demanding the disarmament of the islanders. The arms would be returned after register books and licenses were prepared.[815] The names and residences of license holders were to be published in the

[812] TNA FO 78/103, no. 7, Meyer to Castlereagh, Preveza, 15 March 1821, p. 82a.
[813] Wrigley, *Ionian Neutrality, passim.*
[814] Wrigley, *The Ionian neutrality.*
[815] TNA CO 136/1085, Maitland to Bathurst, Corfu, 14 February 1822, p. 48a.

Government Gazette annually.[816] For the commissioner, as well as for Frederick Adam, the islands were in a state of emergency, and British officials in the islands asked for additional troops from London. The commissioner wrote to London claiming that 130,000 Ionians with firearms could overcome the 3,500 British soldiers, and that he had therefore decided to disarm the population, abandoning plans for the creation of an Ionian militia. Disarming the Ionian population according to Maitland 'was no measure adopted in one island, because a necessity had arisen for it another – but that it was one most deeply considered, with a view to the general situation of our affairs in those possessions, antecedent to its execution'.[817] The disarmament of the Ionians precipitated a reaction from Hume in Parliament, who argued that the act disregarded the liberties of Ionians and their 'cultural identity'.[818]

Writing to Bathurst, Maitland continued to emphasise the severity of the situation: 'The truth of the matter is that the principal reason for its adoption was not so much the necessity arising out of any individual act, as one emanating from a grave and serious consideration of the whole state and condition, into which the gov. of the Ionian Islands was placed in consequence of the revolution in Greece, and of the activity of various emissaries employed to revolutionize the islands'.[819] For Maitland, this state of emergency should bring an end, temporarily at least, to the nominally independent British protectorate:

> To me the strict view of the subject (and what appeared to me was my business to consider) was exactly this, - whether with our eyes open we should be carrying on a nominal government, with the certainty of petty rebellions and revolutions occurring in all the greater islands daily, according as events gave the infatuated population reason to believe the Greek Revolution was succeeding; - or whether it was not both a necessary and an expedient measure before it came to a crisis (to which it was hourly approaching) of a much more violent nature – whether it was not to say both expedient – and advisable to place ourselves in a situation so as to prohibit – the possibility of those constant scenes of disturbance and tumult, by showing to all parties that we had the

[816] Gekas, *Xenocracy,* p. 65.
[817] TNA CO 136/1085, [Private] Maitland to Bathurst, Malta, 9 January 1822, p. 14b.
[818] Paschalidi, 'Constructing Ionian Identities', p. 140.
[819] TNA CO 136/1085, [Private] Maitland to Bathurst, Malta, 9 January 1822, p. 14b-15a.

> power (and were determined to exert that power) of protecting the government of the country against revolution and rebellion.[820]

Bathurst was reluctant to proclaim martial law, or put the islands into a state of emergency for a prolonged time, but finally trusted Maitland to keep his word. In retrospect, the period of the Greek revolution brought an end to a historical phase that started in wartime. By 1822, circumstances were dramatically different: Foresti was dead, after being marginalized by Maitland's administration, Antonio Martinengo one of the strongest supporters of British protection in 1809 was imprisoned as an instigator of a rebellion against Maitland in Zante, while the Ionian Senate was dissolved and replaced by Ionian nobles loyal to the High Commissioner. In the mainland, Ali Pasha had died after an unsuccessful rebellion against the Porte, and another pasha replaced him who was loyal to the Ottoman government. Britain's major wartime collaborators and sources of information were gone.

At the same time, in Britain a revolution in administration started to take place.[821] Detailed recording was often more a result of parliamentary criticism than a sign of emerging growth in the use of statistical knowledge in colonial governance.[822] Colonial expenditure in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars was associated with 'Old Corruption', and led to criticism in Parliament. In this sense, the regulation regarding receiving information from the colonies came as a response to such criticisms. For example, referring to Malta, Bathurst wrote to Maitland in 1822 that 'the want of a regular form of transmission to my office of detailed information, respecting the financial resources of the island, and the several branches of its expenditure, is a deficiency which is calculated in some instances, to embarrass the deliberations of His Majesty government'.[823] Therefore, he wrote to Maitland that the latter should transmit to Bathurst, at the close of each succeeding year, 'abstracts of the revenue and expenditure of your government, which shall exhibit, distinctly and separately, the sources from which the receipts have been derived, together with the total amount of expense incurred by

[820] TNA CO 136/1085, [Private] Maitland to Bathurst, Malta, 9 January 1822, 14b-15a.
[821] Laidlaw, *Colonial Connections*; Oliver MacDonagh, 'The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal', *The Historical Journal,* 1:1 (1958), pp. 52-67.
[822] For example parliamentary criticism on Ionian neutrality (Wrigley, *Ionian Neutrality*, pp. 122-123).
[823] TNA CO 136/306, no. 4, Bathurst to Maitland, Downing Street, London 10 February 1822.

each department of the government'. Moreover, Maitland was to include with these abstracts 'such observations … sufficient to explain the causes, and point to the remedy of any deficiency in the revenue, or excess in the expenditure'. Complete returns of civil servants, financial abstracts and schedules of every department of government, as well as of the military defence of the islands in a separate return, were to be recorded at the close of every year, printed and processed to the Colonial Office.[824]

[824] TNA CO 136/306, no. 4, Bathurst to Maitland, Downing Street London, 10 February 1822.

Conclusion

The rebellion that took place in Santa Maura in 1819 was the first in a series of recurring crises that followed. While the peasant rebellion was perceived by the British as 'a single act of insubordination', the turmoil that followed in 1820, and particularly during the revolution on the mainland in 1821, threatened to throw the islands into a full-blown revolution. Maitland treated the issue as he had done in the past: pragmatically, but despotically. The crisis after 1819 that followed, this thesis argues, was the outcome of two processes: first, of Greek political nationalism, whose influence British authorities could not confine to the mainland, especially after 1819. Second, because of Maitland's administration during 1816 and 1821, which effectively stifled all opposition, but which in so doing cut crucial channels of communication with local society. To control the Ionian political scene, the High Commissioner had drawn all his focus on creating a loyal aristocracy and to strengthen the ties between central administration and loyal Corfiote aristocrats like Theotoky. But this stance, which Maitland kept from the beginning of his administration had effectively isolated him from other parts of the Ionian society, and particularly Britain's wartime collaborators, as we saw in previous chapters.

Despite the growth of metropolitan pressures which increased during the revolution in information that started to gain ground in Britain, other factors protected Maitland from parliamentary pressures, like personal networks, the importance of the islands as a strategic outpost, and subsequently Maitland's particular ability as a colonial governor. However, the circumstances that made the islands a protectorate in 1815 had dramatically changed in less than ten years later. This thesis argues that the period 1819-1821 truly marked the end of an illusion that started with British officials serving in the Mediterranean during the Napoleonic wars that the islands would become a productive colony in the east.

Conclusions

Firstly, this thesis has challenged the tendency among historians of *Anglokratia* to view the protectorate as a failed colonial experiment: as Napier's typology would have it (and as discussed in chapter one of this thesis), the importance of the islands to contemporaries lay in their *potential* to become a model colony in an indefinite future. If the British protectorate is viewed solely through its problems and controversies – already evident from the moment of its creation, and particularly after 1819 – the real question would not be why the protectorate failed as a colonial experiment, but rather why the British decided to keep the islands in the first place. Focusing on the early period of British rule, the thesis has pursued two aims: first, aside from strategic considerations to turn our attention to issues of political culture, militarism and the emerging importance of 'objective' knowledge to metropolitan contexts during the early-nineteenth century.

Secondly, this thesis aims to contribute to relevant studies in imperial and Mediterranean history, as well as on colonial knowledge in the early-nineteenth century. The protectorate was created in a period of great transitions, marked by rapid change alongside the persistence of conservative mentalities. British rule in the islands presented many cultural and political characteristics that were common elsewhere in the early-nineteenth century. This was true during the post-Napoleonic period in particular: the growth of the 'fiscal-military' state, a militarist ethos, the despotism in colonial governance and the desire to address security concerns related to the possibility of war (especially between Russia and the Ottoman Empire) or the supposedly violent character of Ionians.

Traditionally, historians of the protectorate start their analysis from the Treaty of Paris in 1815, concluding with the cession of the islands to Greece in 1864. This thesis argues that while the protectorate was formally ceded to the British in 1815 its origins could be traced further back in the past, in the wartime and in the Russia's withdrawal from the Mediterranean. The immense strategic importance of the islands as a centre of communications and information-gathering about enemy movements first became known to Nelson during Napoleon's campaign in Egypt in 1797-1798. From the period of the Septinsular Republic in the

islands (1798-1807) until the Treaty of Tilsit when Emperor Alexander signed an alliance with Napoleon, the islands belonged (according to the European powers) to the Russian sphere of influence. This accepted condition was not challenged by any of the coalition powers. British and Russian officers combined forces in joint operations in the eastern Mediterranean in order to counter the perceived threat of a French invasion of the islands and the mainland between 1803 and 1805. However, under the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia withdrew from the Mediterranean and the Ionian Islands were annexed by France. Even though Anglo-Russian diplomatic relations were restored later on, this move strategically isolated Britain from the mainland and the Porte. Moreover, it threatened the British naval presence in the Mediterranean. Secondly, the Treaty of the Dardanelles two years later solidified the place of Britain as a mediator between the Ottoman Empire and other European powers. After these two treaties, Collingwood's initiative to occupy the islands in 1809, was almost inevitable.

The thesis has also examined how 'go-betweens' like Foresti acted as brokers between British officials and local actors like Ali Pasha, even before British troops landed on the islands. Many of these actors or their families were involved one way or another in promoting the idea of British protection, before the British came: either through old commercial connections with England, or by being members of the English party during wartime. These actors belonged to the information networks that obtained intelligence for the British from the battle of Aboukir onwards and worked closely with the British after they occupied the islands. The interests of these Ionians were to ensure Britain's maritime and political protection of the Ionian Islands and to promote deep reforms in Ionian politics and society, especially in the legislature and in education. They asked for greater intervention by central administration in both fields, in order to curtail the power of the elites, particularly those coming from Corfu. The first British administrations of the provisional government under Oswald, Airey and Campbell worked closely with Foresti for example. However, these Ionians were gradually marginalized during Maitland's administration. Ironically, Maitland focused his efforts to establish a constitutional regime and to create a nobility loyal to British interests. However, Maitland's centralizing tendencies finally stifled public opinion and excluded a class of collaborators and modernizers which British rule could potentially have been based upon.

The thesis has also examined how the British managed their wartime connections with the Greek mainland, a factor which was integral to the creation of the protectorate but which is often downplayed or neglected in Ionian historiography. The boundaries between the islands and the continent were always blurred, as the islanders were dependent on the mainland for foodstuffs and labour for years before *Anglokratia*. But as chapters two and three showed, British diplomacy could not but take into account these local parameters: Castlereagh's negotiations in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars were substantially shaped by the British penetration of local networks, a change that started to take shape particularly after 1803.

British presence in the eastern Mediterranean redefined these local networks with the mainland through agents and consuls like Foresti, by essentially replacing the influence of previous powers in the region, such as Venice, Russia or France. One example was the relation with Ali Pasha: the British provided ammunition and assurances that they would come to the pasha's need in case of French invasion, in exchange for information and naval stores. The relations between the British and the pasha even cumulated to 1811, with the pasha confiding to British agents his willingness to abandon the Porte, in order for his *pashalik* to be guaranteed as an independent state and a permanent ally of the British in the region. And in fact, connections between the British and the pasha continued after the war as the case of Parga had shown, until 1822 and the death of the pasha.

This thesis thus builds on previous historical works to highlight the key role of information networks and the importance of war in the establishment and maintenance of the British position. The thesis also builds on previous historiography to highlight the key role of information networks and war in the establishment and maintenance of the Ionian Protectorate.[825]

Statistical information was utilized and surveys were conducted well before the establishment of French or British rule in the islands. The thesis has examined briefly the role of information-related networks and institutions during Venetian and French rule. However, as *Anglokratia* was the topic of this study, the thesis' main emphasis is on the employment of new

[825] Chessell, 'Nelson's Ionian Agent; 'Britain's Ionian Consul'.

forms of knowledge in administration, including a more specific focus on objective knowledge and 'facts'. Relevant literature on 'colonial governmentality' and the use of statistics in British administration of the Ionian Islands has been less clear over the exact use of accumulated statistics in the empire in the broader context during the period under study. Although medical officials like Tully compiled statistical tables based on the plague of 1815, there is little evidence that this information was used by any Ionian state institution: medical officials like Hennen mentioned that they obtained the information on the plague from Maitland's papers for example, or by other medical officials like Davy.

On the other hand, medical officials like Tully accumulated experience in controlling and understanding the disease. This knowledge included statistical information and careful examination of symptoms of the plague and measures to contain it. It was the information that these officials had collected on the spot, alongside Ionian medical officials, which was used for scientific debates in Britain to support different medical opinions like the supporters of the 'contagionist' or 'anti-contagionist' theories we saw in the debate of 1819. These debates cemented the connections between empire, science and 'objective' knowledge.

Security concerns were paramount in disease-control. For Maitland, based on his own experience dealing with plagues like St. Domingue or Malta, disease-control was not a medical but a security matter. According to him, and other medical officials they served under him like Tully, the role of the military was paramount, in order to enforce quarantine laws and cordons. The commissioner implemented various measures according to these priorities, such as putting the cordons under tight surveillance and suggesting the replacement of troops in the Ionian Islands with troops from Malta, as the former were in the islands since their occupation by British troops and had become compromised by their forming of 'local connections with women'. Furthermore, these measures were not merely for protecting the Ionian society and the troops from the plague, but also to reinforce discipline and control within the garrison: as Maitland mentioned to Bathurst when he suggested the movement of troops during the plague, the soldiers had also formed 'local opinions about political questions'.

Chapter five examined the dissolution of the Ionian Senate by Maitland, and how information-collection about Ionian politics was characterized by 'affective' knowledge and tight surveillance of the commissioner's political opponents. Maitland's centralizing tendencies in governance were characteristically conservative. At the same time, Maitland tried to create a class of loyal aristocracy through the Order of St. Michael and St. George. As previous work on the islands has shown, the Constitution of 1817 was a façade covering British power, rather than the mark of an independent state. Accusations of intrigue and connections with Russia allowed Maitland effectively to neutralize Ionian political bodies and to impose his control in government.

After 1819, the enduring social problems of the islands came to the surface. British officials put the islands into a prolonged state of emergency, after a series of rebellions took place in the islands, starting from Santa Maura and lasting until the Greek Revolution. Martial law was declared on different occasions and the authorities in the islands became anxious that political turbulence would spread. Ionians with connections with Russia, such as Capodistrias, were suspected of acting as instigators of rebellions and of being Russian spies.

In this climate of instability, personal antipathies and security concerns dominated information-collection. We saw for example how, in the aftermath of the rebellion in Santa Maura, Maitland and Adam were discussing Capodistrias as an instigator of most political turbulence in the islands. It was also in the context of Ionian disturbances that the Concert of Europe was put into effect in the islands, and Austrian and British authorities actively collaborated to prevent the appearance of further revolutionary movements. In this sense, as we mentioned before, the British Protectorate was indeed an observatory over the mainland and the traffic in the Adriatic, giving the British a significant advantage in information-collection in the wider region, particularly when the Greek Revolution of 1821 broke out.

Meanwhile in Britain, the critique of 'Old Corruption' was gaining ground. Parliamentary pressures on public spending were particularly persistent in the cased of Britain's colonial policy, to some extent forcing Bathurst to focus his efforts on minimizing expenses. Radicals like Joseph Hume accused Maitland's administration of despotism and extraordinary expense.

Nevertheless, despite the accusations and the calls for sending a committee of inquiry to investigate his conduct in the islands, Maitland was well-connected and was not placed under scrutiny.

The thesis also argues that a phase that started in wartime and in 1815 with the creation of the protectorate ended in 1822 with the Greek Revolution, when political turmoil and security concerns reached their peak in the islands. British officials who took over the islands of course could not predict that a Greek state would be created later on; a factor that British foreign policy could not ignore. In all cases of political turbulence and crisis, British officials were ambivalent about the protectorate. Maitland was very reluctant to accept his appointment as a High Commissioner in the first place, unless the British had absolute control over Ionian politics. Political independence of the islands and Ionian representation was also discouraged, with an independent Ionian State being considered by the British as the worst outcome, allowing Russia to re-enter the Mediterranean.

We mentioned before how an overwhelming emphasis on cultural representations and stereotypes, and their connection to structures of British rule, has been central in much historical-writing about the islands. Undoubtedly, for Maitland and Bathurst authoritarian rule was certain justified in part by the character of the Ionians: official correspondence is full of such characterizations. But as the thesis has shown, British officials hardly thought that such cultural depictions justified British rule in and of themselves. The supposed inability of Ionians to rule themselves – and their character as 'intriguers' and 'liars' as well – certainly set the tone for an internal dialogue among British officials, perhaps legitimizing the amount of troops and money the British government spent in order to secure Britain's naval hegemony in the Mediterranean, or in defending Maitland's conduct when criticized in the British parliament. But as this thesis has argued, stereotypes heightened other, perhaps more significant, official anxieties. One major anxiety, for example, was a genuine concern about the lack of accurate information available to the British. Another was the threat of a large-scale rebellion in the islands, which became more evident during the last part of the period this thesis is concerned with, between 1819 and 1822. Moreover, as previous works on imperial historiography have also shown, cultural constructs 'frequently overlapped with concepts held previously': with pre-

existing and very real structures and divisions.[826] Difference in the islands was not only constructed by British authorities but also reflected centuries-old class antagonisms and local differences between the islands. Such differences were most pronounced between urban and rural areas in the islands. They were also pronounced in discussions over defence of the islands, when individuals like Foresti admitted the islanders could not protect themselves from the many threats that they faced.

Future research might profitably extend some of the insights put forward in this thesis to the later period, especially in terms of strategic considerations: how did, for example, Anglo-Russian relations evolve, particularly at the level of officials in situ, in the eastern Mediterranean throughout the nineteenth century? The thesis also offers additional new avenues and fresh contributions to explore some closely related topics. For instance, further research might also examine comparisons between the Venetian, French and British administrations of the Ionian Islands, particularly in terms of collecting and organizing information, and mainly, integrated into the state. The Ionian case, as well as the Mediterranean at large, can provide ample opportunities for further research starting for example with disease-control, medical knowledge and local institutions: how did medical officials gather information on plagues during Venetian or British administrations in the Ionian Islands? Were these individual endeavours or state-sponsored? Such research questions could illuminate crucial aspects of Venetian and British information systems. Examining comparatively how these administrations accumulated data would provide a valuable insight on the worth these governments put on quantitative information and the ends to which it was put.

The thesis has drawn our attention to a usually neglected period in Greek as well as in imperial history. With little doubt, the period between 1797 and 1822 was characteristically chaotic and experimental as historians of the Ionian Islands have also shown, but also incredibly formative in the history of *Anglokratia.* In this period of political and social experimentation, the thesis focused on personal and professional networks to study colonial governance, as well

[826] David Washbrook, 'Orients and Occidents: Colonial Discourse Theory and the Historiography of the British Empire', *OHBE,* V, p. 604.

as the ways that British officials collected and organized information. Finally, while the British protectorate was indeed a peculiar creation of wartime, the Ionian Islands became also part of a greater imperial project. From the outset, it was a central aim of this thesis to situate the islands within the global connections of the empire, but only by acknowledging their unique characteristics.

Appendix I

Foreign Secretaries (1798-1822)

Lord Grenville	1791 - 20 February 1801
The Lord Hawkesbury (later the 1st Earl of Liverpool)	20 Feb 1801 – 14 May 1804
The Lord Harrowby	14 May 1804 – 11 Jan 1805
The Lord Mulgrave	11 Jan 1805 – 7 Feb 1806
Charles James Fox	7 Feb 1806 – 13 Sept 1806 (died)
Viscount Howick (later the Earl Grey)	24 Sept – 25 March 1807
George Canning	25 March 1807 – 11 Oct 1809 (resigned)
The Earl Bathurst	11 Oct 1809 – 6 Dec 1809
The Marquess Wellesley	6 Dec 1809 – 4 March 1812
Viscount Castlereagh	4 March 1812 – 12 August 1822 (died)
George Canning	16 Sept 1822 – 30 April 1827

Secretaries of State for War and the Colonies (1801-1827)

Lord Hobart	17 March 1801 – 12 May 1804
The Earl Camden	14 May 1804 – 10 July 1805
Viscount Castlereagh	10 July 1805 – 5 Feb 1806
William Windham	5 Feb 1806 – 25 March 1807
Viscount Castlereagh	25 March 1807 – 1 Nov 1809
The Earl of Liverpool	1 Nov 1809 – 11 Jun 1812
The Earl Bathurst	11 Jun 1812 – 30 April 1827

Prime ministers (1798-1821)

William Pitt (the Younger)	19 Dec 1783 – 14 Mar 1801	Tory
Henry Addington	17 Mar 1801 – 23 Jan 1806+	Tory
William Grenville	11 Feb 1806 – 31 Mar 1807	Whig
Duke of Portland	31 Mar 1807 – 4 Oct 1809	Tory (nominally Whig)
Spencer Perceval	4 Oct 1809 – 11 May 1821+	Tory

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